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THE CORPORATE VEIL DOCTRINE 
REVISITED: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF 
THE ENGLISH AND THE U.S. CORPORATE 
VEIL DOCTRINES 
Thomas K. Cheng* 
Abstract: This Article undertakes a comparative study of corporate veil 
piercing doctrines under U.S. corporation and English company law. The 
Article highlights some fundamental differences between the doctrines in 
terms of jurisprudential approaches, treatment of specific case types, and 
other related issues. The Article demonstrates that despite these substan-
tial differences, many English corporate veil cases in fact share a similar 
analytical approach to the instrumentality doctrine under U.S. law. There-
fore, it is possible to construct an English instrumentality doctrine that will 
bring structure and clarity to the English corporate veil doctrine. The Ar-
ticle concludes with a revival of the much-maligned single economic unit 
theory, first propounded by Lord Denning. This reformulated theory will 
provide a more systematic approach to veil piercing cases involving corpo-
rate groups. 
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Introduction 
 The corporate veil doctrine—and the related rules of separate 
corporate personality and limited liability—has been a much-studied 
subject in corporation law since the early part of the twentieth century.1 
A perennial challenge facing the corporate veil doctrine has been the 
attempt to increase its predictability.2 The doctrine—being an excep-
tion to the general rule of limited liability—was created to prevent in-
                                                                                                                      
1 See, e.g., John Dewey, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 Yale L.J. 
655 passim (1926); William O. Douglas & Carrol M. Shanks, Insulation from Liability through 
Subsidiary Corporations, 39 Yale L.J. 193 passim (1929); Warner Fuller, The Incorporated Indi-
vidual: A Study of the One-Man Company, 51 Harv. L. Rev. 1373 passim (1938); Elvin R. Latty, 
The Corporate Entity as a Solvent of Legal Problems, 34 Mich. L. Rev. 597 passim (1936). 
2See Marc T. Moore, “A Temple Built on Faulty Foundations”: Piercing the Corporate Veil and 
the Legacy of Salomon v. Salomon, 2006 J. Bus. L. 180, 180–81 (noting the conceptual prob-
lems underlying the current application of the corporate veil doctrine and recommending 
a more workable interpretation). 
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justice.3 As such, the application of the doctrine has always been fact-
specific and open-ended.4 Justice requires a flexible legal standard that 
allows room for the weighing of equity and policy considerations. Some 
degree of open-endedness is thus probably inherent in the doctrine. It 
is perhaps because of this open-endedness that the corporate veil doc-
trine has remained fertile ground for academic research. 
 On the opposite side of the Atlantic, the corporate veil doctrine 
under English company law has similarly attracted considerable aca-
demic attention. 5  Although the academic discussion in the United 
States has focused on making sense of the voluminous, and often con-
tradictory, case law 6 —the importance of the doctrine having been 
firmly accepted in the United States7—the debate in the United King-
dom has taken on a different tone.8 Although some commentators have 
argued in favor of the doctrine,9 the general perception is that English 
courts are loathe to apply the doctrine.10 Only under exceptional cir-
cumstances is veil piercing permitted. Judicial attitude toward the doc-
trine, however, has not always been unaccommodating. Until the late 
1970s, English courts demonstrated considerable willingness to pierce 
the veil when justice so required. Most notably, Lord Denning pro-
pounded the single economic unit theory, which allows a court to treat a 
                                                                                                                      
3 See Len Sealy & Sarah Worthington, Cases and Materials in Company Law 51 
(8th ed. 2008); Lynn Gallagher & Peter Ziegler, Lifting the Corporate Veil in the Pursuit of 
Justice, 1990 J. Bus. L. 292, 293. 
4 See Gallagher & Ziegler, supra note 3, at 292–93. 
5 See, e.g., Moore, supra note 2, at 182–83; Murray A. Pickering, The Company as a Sepa-
rate Legal Entity, 31 Mod. L. Rev. 481, 481 (1968); Michael Whincup, Inequitable Incorpora-
tion—the Abuse of a Privilege, 2 Company Law 158, 159–60 (1981). The equivalent concept 
of a corporation under English law is called a company. See, e.g., Whincup, supra. This Arti-
cle will employ both terminologies, using corporation when referring to the corporate 
entity in the United States and company when referring to the corporate entity in the 
United Kingdom. In the United Kingdom, the corporate veil doctrine is generally called 
lifting of the corporate veil as opposed to piercing of the corporate veil. For simplicity, this 
Article will use piercing of the corporate veil to encompass both. 
6 See Douglas & Shanks, supra note 1, passim. 
7 See Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 Cornell L. 
Rev. 1036, 1039 (1991) (observing that limited liability and separate corporate personality 
have been features of U.S. corporate law in many jurisdictions since the mid-19th century). 
8 Compare Gallagher & Ziegler, supra note 3, at 293 (noting the importance of the doc-
trine in preventing injustice), with Moore, supra note 2, at 181 (arguing that current law is 
“doctrinally unsustainable” and in need of reform). 
9 See Andrew Beck, The Two Sides of the Corporate Veil, in Contemporary Issues in Com-
pany Law 69, 90–91 ( John Farrar ed., 1987) (positing that the doctrine, as employed, pro-
motes justice); Gallagher & Ziegler, supra note 3, at 293 (arguing that the doctrine prevents 
injustice). 
10 See Moore, supra note 2, at 180–81; Whincup, supra note 5, at 158–59. 
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corporate parent and its wholly owned subsidiaries as a single entity, a 
theory that would be considered expansive even under U.S. law.11 
                                                                                                                     
 What has plagued the English corporate veil doctrine and partly 
contributed to its lukewarm reception by the English courts is its lack of 
an overarching analytical framework.12 Judicial reluctance to pierce the 
veil can be partly attributed to a perceived haphazardness in the case 
law. One famous commentator of English company law has described 
the doctrine as “palm-tree justice.”13 Unlike their U.S. counterparts, 
English courts have not developed a systematic approach to the cases, 
and have instead largely relied on traditional common law concepts to 
resolve corporate veil issues.14 Academic analysis of the doctrine has 
not proceeded much beyond categorization of cases based on a hodge-
podge of criteria, such as the underlying claims and the legal concept 
invoked in the case.15 Even the single economic unit theory is poorly 
conceived, and its rationale unclear.16 Given the important role played 
by the corporate veil doctrine as an exception to separate corporate 
personality and limited liability—general principles which occasionally 
produce harsh and unjust results—it is important that the doctrine be 
reconsidered and rejuvenated. This requires a structured analytical 
framework for the doctrine that is nonetheless consistent with the Eng-
lish cases. 
 Although the English and the U.S. corporate veil doctrines have 
been well studied in their respective jurisdictions, little comparative re-
search has been done. In fact, this author is not aware of any compara-
 
11 See D.H.N. Food Distribs. Ltd. v. Tower Hamlets London Borough Council, [1976] 1 
W.L.R. 852 (A.C.) at 860 (Eng.); Thompson, supra note 7, at 1041 (noting that U.S. courts 
will disregard the corporate entity when it is used for “illegitimate purposes”). 
12 See Pickering, supra note 5, at 483 (noting lack of consensus on categorization of case 
law and scope of doctrine); K.W. Wedderburn, Company Law—Member’s Rights—Oppression of 
Minority, 1958 Cambridge L. J. 152, 155 (“What is urgently needed is a principle from which 
litigants can predict when the courts will, and will not, lift the veil of the corporate entity.”); 
K.W. Wedderburn, A Corporation’s Ombudsman?, 23 Mod. L. Rev. 663, 666 (1960) (“There is 
an urgent need for some principles to be injected into this area of law.”). 
13 See J. H. Farrar, Fraud, Fairness and Piercing the Corporate Veil, 16 Can. Bus. L.J. 474, 
475 (1990) (quoting L.C.B. Gower, Principles of Modern Company Law 138 (4th ed. 
1979)). 
14 See David H. Barber, Piercing the Corporate Veil, 17 Willamette L. Rev. 371, 376 (1980) 
(summarizing the two-prong test required to pierce the veil in U.S. courts); Whincup, supra 
note 5, at 159. But see Gallagher & Ziegler, supra note 3, at 292–93 (acknowledging the lack of 
a settled approach to English corporate veil cases and suggesting a similar confusion in U.S. 
cases). 
15 See Paul L. Davies et al., Gower and Davies Principles of Modern Company 
Law 202–08 (8th ed. 2008); Gallagher & Ziegler, supra note 3, at 293. 
16 See Sealy & Worthington, supra note 3, at 66. 
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tive work that systematically analyzes and contrasts the two doctrines.17 
This is surprising given that the United States and the United Kingdom 
are the two most important common law jurisdictions, and that U.S. 
corporation laws and English company law are arguably the two most 
important bodies of corporation law in the world. In economic terms, 
the United Kingdom is one of the most important economies in Europe 
and London continues to be a major financial center.18 In legal terms, 
to this day, English company law continues to influence the develop-
ment of corporation law in a number of jurisdictions, including Hong 
Kong, Singapore, Australia, New Zealand, India, and to a lesser extent, 
Canada.19 This Article aims to fill this void in the academic literature, 
and in the process, shed light on the English corporate veil doctrine and 
provide a more formal structure to it. Two recent cases decided by the 
English courts, Beckett Investment Management Group v. Hall20 and Stone & 
Rolls Ltd. v. Moore Stephens,21 indicated renewed flexibility toward sepa-
rate corporate personality on the part of the English courts. They pre-
sent a good opportunity to reconsider the doctrine. 
 Part I of this Article begins with a brief overview of the English cor-
porate veil doctrine—including its evolution over time and its current 
state—to provide background for the U.S. reader.22 Part II provides a 
detailed comparison between the English and U.S. corporate veil doc-
trines, focusing on differences in their jurisprudential approaches, 
treatment of specific case types, and related issues.23 Drawing on this 
comparison, Part II discusses the English and U.S. methods of judicial 
reasoning in the corporate veil piercing context.24 Part III argues that 
despite the myriad differences between the two doctrines, they in fact 
share some crucial similarities.25 Notably, evidence of the U.S. instru-
                                                                                                                      
17 There is only one exception. See Karen Vandekerckhove, Piercing the Corpo-
rate Veil 75–76 (English law), 93–94 (U.S. law) (2007). This book is a vast multi-
jurisdictional survey of the corporate veil doctrine. Id. at 1–2. There was little direct com-
parison between U.S. and English law, however. See id. at 156, 163, 265, 285, 358, 371, 476, 
499, 529–30 (discussing independently but rarely comparing the two bodies of law). 
18 See Peter Spufford, From Antwerp and Amsterdam to London: The Decline of Financial 
Centres in Europe, 154 De Economist 143, 170 (2006). 
19 See Douglas M. Branson, Teaching Comparative Corporate Governance: The Significance of 
“Soft Law” and International Institutions, 34 Ga. L. Rev. 669, 682 (2000) (recognizing the 
global ubiquity of English-style company law and specifically recognizing its influence in 
Pacific Rim nations and India). 
20 See [2007] EWCA (Civ) 613, [2007] I.C.R. 1539 (A.C.) 1545 (Maurice Kay L.J.) (Eng.). 
21 See [2009] UKHL 39, [2009] 1 A.C. 1391, [249] (appeal taken from Eng.). 
22 See infra notes 29–94 and accompanying text. 
23 See infra notes 95–342 and accompanying text. 
24 See id. 
25 See infra notes 343–406 and accompanying text. 
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mentality doctrine can be found in a number of important English cor-
porate veil cases.26 Hence, it is possible to construct an English version 
of the instrumentality doctrine that brings clarity and structure to the 
English doctrine. Part IV proposes a revival of the single economic unit 
theory first propounded by Lord Denning. 27  Drawing on economic 
analysis and recent cases in English company law and European Union 
(EU) competition law, Part IV advances a structured approach to the 
theory. This approach will allow English courts to analyze veil piercing 
cases involving corporate groups in a systematic manner.28 
I. A Brief History of the English Corporate Veil Doctrine 
 Unlike its U.S. counterpart, which has enjoyed steady judicial ac-
ceptance throughout the years,29 the English corporate veil doctrine 
has had a topsy-turvy career. The attitude of English courts toward the 
doctrine has oscillated from enthusiasm to outright hostility. The his-
tory of the English doctrine can be roughly divided into three periods. 
The first period lasted from 1897, when Salomon v. Salomon was de-
cided,30 to around the Second World War. This period can be called 
the early experimentation period, during which English courts experi-
mented with different approaches to the doctrine.31 The second period 
began after the War and continued until 1978, the year when Woolfson 
v. Strathclyde Regional Council was decided. 32  This period can be re-
garded as the heyday of the doctrine. Much of the vitality of the doc-
trine during this period can be attributed to Lord Denning, who was an 
enthusiastic advocate and practitioner of veil piercing and one of the 
most influential English jurists of the second half of the twentieth cen-
                                                                                                                      
26 See Wallersteiner v. Moir, [1975] 1 W.L.R. 991 (A.C.) at 1013 (Eng.); In re F.G. (Films) 
Ltd., [1953] 1 W.L.R. 483 (Ch.) at 486 (Eng.); Frederick Powell, Parent and Subsidiary 
Corporations 8–9 (1931) (defining the U.S. instrumentality rule). 
27 See infra notes 407–580 and accompanying text; see also D.H.N., [1976] 1 W.L.R. at 860. 
28 See infra notes 407–580 and accompanying text. 
29 See Thompson, supra note 7, at 1049 (charting the success rate for plaintiffs under 
the doctrine to demonstrate that it has largely remained in the pre-1960s level). 
30 [1897] A.C. 22 (H.L.) at 22 (Eng.). 
31 See, e.g., Gilford Motor Co. v. Horne, [1933] Ch. 935 (A.C.) at 956 (Eng.) (piercing 
the veil for attempting to evade a legal obligation); In re Darby, Brougham, [1911] 1 K.B. 
95 at 103 (Eng.) (piercing the veil because of misrepresentation). 
32 (1978) S.C.(H.L.) 90, 90 (appeal taken from Scot.). 
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tury.33 Woolfson marked the beginning of the third period, which has 
lasted to this day and has seen the doctrine fall into disfavor.34 
 Given Salomon’s revered status in English law—the 1897 House of 
Lords decision firmly established the primacy of separate corporate 
personality and limited liability—one may be excused for forgetting 
that limited liability was highly controversial at its inception.35 Limited 
liability was not established in Salomon itself. Rather, the British Parlia-
ment granted limited liability to English companies in the Limited Li-
ability Act of 1855.36 Salomon merely affirmed its availability to so-called 
one-man companies.37 Limited liability met vociferous opposition when 
it was first proposed in the mid-nineteenth century.38 In an 1824 edito-
rial, The Times of London pronounced that: 
Nothing can be so unjust as for a few persons abounding in 
wealth, to offer a portion of their excess for the formation of a 
company, to play with that excess—to lend the importance of 
their whole name and credit to the society, and then, should 
the funds of the incorporated body prove insufficient to an-
swer all demands, to retire into the security of their unhaz-
arded fortune, and leave the bait to be devoured by the poor 
deceived fish.39 
 Even after the passage of the Act, limited liability remained con-
troversial, at least as applied to “one-man companies.”40 This is evident 
from the appellate decision in Salomon v. Salomon, where the English 
Court of Appeal unanimously imposed personal liability on Mr. Salo-
mon for his company’s debts.41 Although the House of Lords affirmed 
the separate legal personality of one-man companies in Salomon, it did 
not settle the issue once and for all. English courts began to pierce the 
                                                                                                                      
33 Cf. Sealy & Worthington, supra note 3, at 53 (noting Lord Denning’s “positive en-
thusiasm” for veil piercing). 
34 See Woolfson, (1978) S.C.(H.L.) at 96; Moore, supra note 2, at 180–81; Whincup, supra 
note 5, at 158–59. 
35 See Salomon, [1897] A.C. at 42–43; Paul Halpern, Michael Trebilcock & Stuart Turn-
bull, An Economic Analysis of Limited Liability in Corporation Law, 30 U. Toronto L.J. 117, 
118–19 (1980) (discussing the debates surrounding the Limited Liability Act of 1855 and 
noting the importance of Salomon). 
36 Halpern et al., supra note 35, at 118–19. 
37 See Salomon, [1897] A.C. at 42–43. 
38 See Davies et al., supra note 15, at 194 (referring to “the battle for legislative accep-
tance of the principle of limited liability in the middle of the nineteenth century”). 
39 Editorial, Times (London), May 25, 1824. 
40 See Halpern et al., supra note 35, at 119. 
41 Broderip v. Salomon, [1895] 2 Ch. 323 (A.C.) at 340–41, 347 (Eng.). 
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veil soon after Salomon. These early cases included Apthorpe v. Peter 
Schoenhofen Brewing 42 and St. Louis Breweries v. Apthorpe, both of which 
were taxation cases involving very similar facts.43 Veil piercing was not 
confined to single-shareholder companies. The courts regularly pierced 
the veil of companies with multiple shareholders.44 
 What followed was a period of considerable enthusiasm for the 
corporate veil doctrine. Successful veil piercing cases in the first half of 
the twentieth century included Gilford Motor v. Horne, 45  In re Darby, 
Brougham,46 Trebanog Working Men’s Club and Institute, Ltd v. MacDonald,47 
and Rainham Chemical Works, Ltd. v. Belvedere Fish Guano Co.48 The lack of 
a well-defined approach to the doctrine meant that English courts had 
to experiment with existing common law concepts such as agency, trus-
teeship, and tort liability principles to resolve corporate personality is-
sues.49 These experiments failed to yield a generally applicable frame-
work. But this lack of a general framework did not prevent the courts 
from piercing the veil when the circumstances so warranted.50 This is 
not to say that the plaintiffs were always successful. There were instances 
in which the courts refused to pierce the veil.51 Nevertheless, the corpo-
rate veil doctrine was robust in this period. The sentiment of the time 
was perhaps best captured in Professor Kahn-Freund’s famous 1944 arti-
cle, in which he characterized Salomon as a “calamitous” decision and 
                                                                                                                      
42 [1899] 15 T.L.R. 245 (A.C.) at 245 (Eng.). 
43 [1898] 15 T.L.R. 112 (Q.B.) at 112 (Eng.). 
44 See Peter Schoenhofen Brewing, [1899] 15 T.L.R. at 245; St. Louis Breweries, [1898] 15 
T.L.R. at 113. 
45 [1933] Ch. at 943. 
46 [1911] 1 K.B. at 100. 
47 [1940] 1 K.B. 576 at 582 (Eng.). In Trebanog the court did not pierce the veil to find 
shareholder liability, but separate corporate personality was set aside nonetheless. Specifi-
cally, the court found that the incorporated company was acting as an unincorporated 
trustee for the alcohol of its members, and therefore did not represent an illegal sale by a 
distinct (incorporated) legal entity. See id.; Sealy & Worthington, supra note 3, at 59–60. 
48 [1921] 2 A.C. 465 (H.L.) at 466–67 (appeal taken from Eng.). 
49 Cf. Pickering, supra note 5, at 482–83 (recognizing that English courts created a tan-
gled history regarding corporate personality in the pre- and post-WWII eras). 
50 See, e.g., Rainham, [1921] 2 A.C. at 493–94. 
51 See, e.g., Macaura v. N. Assurance Co., [1925] A.C. 619 (H.L.) at 630 (Lord Sumner) 
(appeal taken from Ir.) (upholding the separate legal personality of Macaura’s company 
despite his complete control and ownership, resulting in his inability to collect on his in-
surance policy); Gramophone & Typewriter, Ltd. v. Stanley, [1908] 2 K.B. 89 (A.C.) at 96 
(Eng.) (upholding separate personality of a wholly owned subsidiary, and holding that 
complete share ownership does not automatically turn a subsidiary into a parent com-
pany’s agent). 
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advocated reforms that would dramatically narrow the scope of limited 
liability.52 He even contemplated abrogating Salomon by legislation.53 
 One exception to the lack of systematic approach in this period is 
Smith, Stone and Knight v. Birmingham, which represented the first at-
tempt by an English court to lay down comprehensive criteria for veil 
piercing.54 Judge Atkinson observed that whether a subsidiary can be 
said to be carrying on a business on behalf of its parent, which would 
justify veil piercing, depends on the facts of each case. Judge Atkinson 
proceeded to identify six guiding questions for each case: (1) Who was 
really carrying on the business?; (2) Were the profits treated as the 
profits of the parent company?; (3) Was the parent company the head 
and the brain of the trading venture?; (4) Did the parent company de-
cide what should be done and how much investment to make in the 
business?; (5) Did the parent company make a profit based on its skill 
and direction?; and (6) Was the parent company in effectual and con-
stant control? 55  These guiding questions are indistinguishable from 
those applied by U.S courts.56 In fact, there is substantial overlap be-
tween these criteria and the eleven circumstances identified by Freder-
ick Powell as indicating that a corporation is a mere instrumentality.57 
 Despite their comprehensive scope, these criteria have been largely 
overlooked in subsequent U.K cases.58 One explanation for this fact is 
that in applying the corporate veil doctrine, English courts have gener-
ally preferred to resort to traditional common law concepts.59 This at-
tempt at a comprehensive list of veil piercing criteria probably consti-
tuted judicial overreaching in the eyes of English judges. Another 
explanation is perhaps the unique factual circumstances of that case: it 
involved the parent company pleading for its own veil to be pierced in 
                                                                                                                      
52 See Otto Kahn-Freund, Some Reflections on Company Law Reform, 7 Mod. L. Rev. 54, 
54–55 (1944). 
53 See id. at 57. 
54 See [1939] 4 All E.R. 116 (K.B.). at 121 (Eng.) (concluding that the parent company 
did control the business and was entitled to compensation for the compulsory purchase of 
its business). 
55 Id. 
56 See Barber, supra note 14, at 374–75 (1980) (compiling criteria applied by U.S. courts). 
57 See Smith, Stone & Knight Ltd. v. Birmingham, [1939] 4 All E.R. 116 (K.B.) at 121 
(Eng.); Cathy S. Krendl & James R. Krendl, Piercing the Corporate Veil: Focusing the Inquiry, 55 
Denv. L.J. 1, 16–17 (1978) (listing Frederick J. Powell’s published indicators that a subsidi-
ary is a mere instrumentality). 
58 Compare Smith, Stone & Knight, [1939]4 All E.R. at 121 (specifying six factors a court 
should use in its analysis about whether to pierce a corporate veil), with Jones v. Lipman, 
[1962] 1 W.L.R. at 836–37(piercing the corporate veil without specifically using Smith, 
Stone & Knight’s factors), and In re F.G. (Films), [1953] 1 W.L.R. at 486 (same). 
59 See, e.g., In re FG (Films), [1953] 1 W.L.R. at 485. 
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order to obtain compensation from the government.60 These facts al-
lowed subsequent courts to distinguish their cases from Smith, Stone and 
Knight and decline to follow its approach.61 
 After the Second World War, the English corporate veil doctrine 
entered its golden era. Notable veil piercing cases in this period in-
cluded In re FG (Films),62 Jones v. Lipman,63 Firestone Tyre and Rubber v. 
Lewellin,64 and Merchandise Transport v. British Transport Commission.65 As 
mentioned earlier, the vigor of the doctrine was in no small part due to 
Lord Denning. He took part in a string of corporate veil cases between 
the 1950s and 1970s, including Scottish Cooperative Wholesale Society v. 
Meyer,66  Littlewoods Mail Order Stores v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, 67  
Wallersteiner v. Moir,68 and lastly—and most well known of them all— 
D.H.N. Food Distributors Ltd. v. Tower Hamlets London Borough Council.69 
His enthusiasm for the doctrine was best encapsulated in his judgment 
in Littlewoods, where he warned against blind adherence to Salomon: 
The doctrine laid down in Salomon v. Salomon & Co. [1897] 
A.C. 22, has to be watched very carefully. It has often been 
supposed to cast a veil over the personality of a limited com-
pany through which the courts cannot see. But that is not true. 
The courts can and often do draw aside the veil. They can, and 
often do, pull off the mask. They look to see what really lies 
behind. The legislature has shown the way with group ac-
counts and the rest. And the courts should follow suit.70 
Lord Denning’s call for judicial flexibility toward corporate personality 
is commendable. There is a significant difference, however, between 
requiring group companies to report their accounts on a consolidated 
basis, and collapsing group companies for liability purposes (thereby 
ignoring their separate legal personality). Financial reporting chiefly 
serves informational purposes and the legislature might have required 
                                                                                                                      
60 See Smith, Stone & Knight, [1939] 4 All E.R. at 118. 
61 Compare id. with Merch. Transp. v. British Transp. Comm’n, [1962] 2 Q.B. 173 (A.C.) 
at 180 (Eng.) (relying on Salomon while overlooking Smith, Stone & Knight), and In re FG 
(Films), at 485 (ignoring Smith, Stone & Knight). 
62 [1953] 1 W.L.R. at 483. 
63 [1962] 1 W.L.R. at 832. 
64 [1957] 1 W.L.R. 464 (H.L.) at 464 (appeal taken from Eng.). 
65 [1962] 2 Q.B. at 173. 
66 [1959] A.C. 324 (H.L.) at 364. 
67 [1969] 1 W.L.R. 1241 (A.C.) at 1254 (Eng.). 
68 [1974] 1 W.L.R. 991 (A.C.) at 993, 1013 (Eng.). 
69 [1976] 1 W.L.R. 852 (A.C.) at 857 (Eng.). 
70 [1969] 1 W.L.R. at 1254. 
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account consolidation for reasons that have nothing to do with limited 
liability. Nonetheless, Lord Denning’s call for judicial flexibility toward 
corporate entities would eventually culminate in his much-criticized 
decision in D.H.N. 
 As early as 1956, in Lee v. Sheard—not itself a corporate veil pierc-
ing decision—Lord Denning foreshadowed his logic in D.H.N. by ana-
logizing the relationship between a shareholder and his company to a 
partnership.71 In D.H.N., a unanimous English Court of Appeal allowed 
a parent company to claim compensation for disturbance of business 
under the Land Compensation Act, even though the business and the 
land on which it sat were owned by different corporate entities.72 Lord 
Denning’s judgment opened with these famous words: “This case might 
be called the ‘Three in One.’ Three companies in one. Alternatively, 
the ‘One in three.’ One group of three companies.”73 Lord Denning 
continued on to describe the single economic unit theory,74 declaring 
that “[t]his group is virtually the same as a partnership in which all the 
three companies are partners. They should not be treated separately so 
as to be defeated on a technical point.”75 In the same year, a prominent 
commentator declared that “modern English company law has aban-
doned the exaggerated view of Salomon’s case . . . . English law is now 
prepared to admit qualifications of, and exceptions to, this principle, by 
lifting the veil of corporateness.”76 That year marked the height of the 
corporate veil doctrine. Subsequent development proved that this op-
timism was misplaced and saw the English judiciary turning increas-
ingly frosty toward the doctrine. 
 Two years later, the House of Lords openly questioned the reason-
ing in D.H.N. In his judgment in Woolfson v. Strathclyde Regional Council, 
Lord Keith of Kinkel expressed doubt as to “whether in this respect the 
Court of Appeal properly applied the principle that it is appropriate to 
                                                                                                                      
71 See Lee, [1956] 1 Q.B. at 196; see also D.H.N., [1976] 1 W.L.R. at 860. (“[T]his group 
is virtually the same as a partnership in which all three companies are partners.”). 
72 See D.H.N., [1976] 1 W.L.R. at 857–58, 860–61, 867–68. 
73 Id. at 857. 
74 See id. at 860. In supporting his description of the single economic unit theory, Lord 
Denning quotes Professor Gower—a leading authority on English company law at the time—
who noted the emerging tendency in English law to treat group companies as a single eco-
nomic entity. See id. 
75 Id. It is important to note that Lord Denning never explicitly referred to the three 
companies in D.H.N. as a single economic entity in his judgment. See id. The term “single 
economic unit” was subsequently coined by commentators and the courts. See, e.g., Pierelli 
Cable Holding NV v. Inland Revenue Comm’rs, [2006] UKHL 4, [2006] 1 W.L.R. 400 
(H.L.) [73] (Eng.). 
76 Clive M. Schmitthoff, Salomon in the Shadow, J. Bus. L. 305, 306 (1976). 
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pierce the corporate veil only where special circumstances exist indicat-
ing that it is a mere façade concealing the true facts.”77 Woolfson sig-
naled the beginning of the decline of the doctrine. Although Lord 
Keith stopped short of overruling D.H.N., subsequent cases made it 
clear that the single economic unit theory and the corporate veil doc-
trine were falling out of favor. In Bank of Tokyo v. Karoon, the English 
Court of Appeal explicitly rejected the single economic unit argument, 
noting that “we are concerned not with economics but with law. The 
distinction between the two is, in law, fundamental and cannot here be 
abridged.”78 The corporate veil doctrine arguably reached its nadir in 
Adams v. Cape Industries plc, in which the English Court of Appeal de-
clared that the use of the corporate structure to limit future liabilities is 
an inherent feature of English company law and practically ruled out 
veil piercing in tort cases.79 
 It has not been all gloom and doom for veil piercing plaintiffs after 
Adams. Two years after that case, the court in Creasey v. Breachwood Mo-
tors Ltd. pierced the veil between two companies after their common 
owners had transferred the assets of the first company to the second in 
order to avoid an impending judgment.80 Five years later, in a case in-
volving very similar facts, the Admiralty Court, after explicitly endorsing 
the reasoning in Creasey, invalidated the sale of a vessel by one member 
of a corporate group to another.81  Unfortunately, Creasey was subse-
quently overruled in Ord & Anor v. Belhaven Pubs.82 
 The current state of the English corporate veil doctrine is best 
summed up by a leading commentator, who opined that: 
The doctrine of lifting the veil plays a small role in British 
company law, once one moves outside the area of particular 
contracts or statutes. Even where the case for applying the doc-
                                                                                                                      
77 See Woolfson, (1978) S.C.(H.L.) at 96. 
78 [1987] A.C. 45, 64 (Lord Goff L.J.); see also F. G. Rixon, Lifting the Veil Between Hold-
ing and Subsidiary Companies, 102 L. Q. Rev. 415, 415 (1986) (suggesting the demise of the 
single economic entity in English case law and the piercing of the corporate veil doctrine 
with respect to group companies). 
79 See [1990] Ch. 433 (A.C.) at 544 (Eng.). The English Court of Appeal reviewed vari-
ous grounds for veil piercing, including fraud, agency, and the single economic entity, and 
rejected them all. See id. at 494, 545–47, 532–39. 
80 See [1992] B.C.C. 638 (Q.B.) at 647–48 (Eng.). 
81 See The “Tjaskemolen” (Now Named “Visvliet”), [1997] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 465 (Q.B.) at 
470–71 (discussing the facts of Creasey), 471–73 (comparing the Creasey facts to the similar 
facts of Tjaskemolen), 474 (holding that the sale of a vessel by one corporation to another 
was invalid because the transaction was a sham) (Eng.). 
82 See [1998] B.C.C. 607 (A.C.) at 616 (Eng.). Although the Belhaven court did not 
overrule Tjaskemolen, the continued validity of that case is now in doubt. See id. 
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trine may seem strong, as in the undercapitalised one-person 
company, which may or may not be part of a larger corporate 
group, the courts are unlikely to do so.83 
After the high-profile cases in the 1990s that came out decidedly 
against the doctrine, the consensus is that veil piercing has become a 
rarity under English law.84 
 Nevertheless, two recent cases suggest a possible change of attitude 
toward veil piercing. In Beckett Investment Management Group v. Hall, the 
English Court of Appeal pierced the veil between the parent company 
and its subsidiaries to give effect to a covenant not to compete in an 
employment contract.85 The significance of this case for the corporate 
veil doctrine is underscored by a number of statements in Lord Justice 
Kay’s judgment, which will be discussed below.86 Likewise, in Stone & 
Rolls v. Moore Stephens, the sole shareholder and director of a company 
had set up a fraudulent scheme, which its external auditors failed to de-
tect, and swindled huge sums of money from some banks.87 The com-
pany subsequently went into liquidation and the liquidator brought 
claims against the auditors for professional negligence.88 At issue was 
whether the culpable shareholder’s intentions should be attributed to 
the company, which would prevent it from pursuing its claims against 
the auditors.89 The majority of the House of Lords set aside its separate 
legal personality and imputed the shareholder’s fraudulent intentions to 
the company.90 The company’s claims against the auditors were hence 
barred.91 
 The future of the English corporate veil doctrine remains to be 
seen. Beckett and Moore Stephens may augur a reversal of fortune for the 
doctrine. Although Adams left the applicability of the doctrine to tort 
claims in doubt,92 Beckett reaffirmed the availability of veil piercing in 
                                                                                                                      
83 Davies et al., supra note 15, at 208–09. 
84 See id. 
85 See [2007] EWCA (Civ) 613, [2007] I.C.R. 1539 (A.C.) at 1546–47. 
86 See infra text accompanying notes 444–447. 
87 See [2009] UKHL 39, [2009] 1 A.C. 1391 at 1447–48 (Eng.). Even though the case 
was primarily concerned with the attribution of a director’s knowledge to the company, it 
had clear implications for the separate corporate personality principle and the corporate 
veil doctrine. See id. at 1460. 
88 See id. 
89 See id. 
90 See id. at 1455. 
91 See id. 
92 See [1990] Ch. at 547 (refusing to pierce the veil of a British parent company for tort 
liability of its U.S. subsidiary). 
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contractual cases.93 Moreover, Moore Stephens may signal a willingness on 
the part of the English courts to pierce the veil against fraudulent sin-
gle-shareholder corporations.94 What is needed for a rejuvenation of 
the doctrine is a more formal analytical framework than currently exists 
in the case law. Before proposing such a framework, this Article will first 
turn its attention to a comparative analysis of the corporate veil doc-
trine on both sides of the Atlantic. 
II. Some General Comparisons Between the Two  
Corporate Veil Doctrines 
 At first glance, there seems to be an unbridgeable gulf between the 
corporate veil doctrines on the two sides of the Atlantic. Although 
courts in both countries have asserted the role of the judiciary in pre-
venting abuses of the corporate entity95—and the discussion about lim-
ited liability and the corporate veil doctrine in both jurisdictions often 
starts with Salomon v. Salomon 96—the attitude of the English judiciary is 
distinctly more conservative. 97  In contrast, U.S. courts have demon-
                                                                                                                      
93 See [2007] I.C.R. at 1545 (Maurice Kay L.J.). 
94 See [2009] W.L.R. at 515 (Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe) (indicating willingness to 
pierce the veil of a company primarily held and controlled by a single fraudulent actor). 
95 See, e.g., Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349, 366–67 (1944) (“If the judicial power is 
helpless to protect a legislative program from schemes for easy avoidance, then indeed it 
has become a handy implement of high finance. Judicial interference to cripple or defeat 
a legislative policy is one thing; judicial interference with plans of those whose corporate 
or other devices would circumvent that policy is quite another.”); In re a Company, [1985] 
1 B.C.C. 99421 (A.C.) at 99425 (Cumming-Bruce L.J.) (Eng.) (“In our view the cases be-
fore and after Wallersteiner v. Moir [1974] 1 W.L.R. 991 show that the court will use its 
powers to pierce the corporate veil if it is necessary to achieve justice irrespective of the 
legal efficacy of the corporate structure under consideration.”); In re Polly Peck Int’l plc, 
[1996] 2 All E.R. 433 (Ch.) at 447 (Walker J.) (Eng.) (explaining that lifting the corporate 
veil is justified when the corporate structure is used as a façade “in an unconscionable 
attempt to evade existing obligations or to practice some other deception”). 
96 See Davies et al., supra note 15, at 195; Bernard F. Cataldo, Limited Liability with One-
Man Companies and Subsidiary Corporations, 18 Law & Contemp. Probs. 473, 478 (1953); 
Douglas & Shanks, supra note 1, at 193–94, 194 n.3; Jonathan M. Landers, A Unified Ap-
proach to Parent, Subsidiary, and Affiliate Questions in Bankruptcy, 42 U. Chi. L. Rev. 589, 618 
(1975); Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil Within Corporate Groups: Corporate 
Shareholders as Mere Investors, 13 Conn. J Int’l L. 379, 381 (1999). Leading textbooks and 
casebooks in the United Kingdom all begin their treatment of limited liability with the 
Salomon case. E.g., Sealy & Worthington, supra note 3, at 31–33. 
97 Compare Moore, supra note 2, at 180–81 (stating that, with few exceptions, English 
courts have “steadfastly refused” to disregard the principle of limited liability), with Thomp-
son, supra note 7, at 1048 (showing that over several decades of the twentieth century, U.S. 
courts have pierced the corporate veil approximately forty percent of the time). 
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strated greater willingness to intervene when the situation so warrants.98 
The differences between these two jurisdictions, however, go deeper 
than mere disparities in plaintiff success rate. The divergent attitudes of 
the English and the U.S. courts reveals fundamental differences in their 
conceptions of judicial decision making, judicial prerogatives to fashion 
new legal doctrines, the weight given to policy considerations, and the 
role of justice and its potential conflict with doctrinal rules. 
A. Jurisprudential Approaches 
1. General Deference to the Separate Corporate Personality Principle 
 Corporate veil cases come in a great variety. The paradigmatic cor-
porate veil case is one in which the separate corporate personality is dis-
regarded and the shareholders are held liable for the corporation’s 
debts.99 In this type of case, both the rule of separate corporate person-
ality and limited liability—which provide that a shareholder’s responsi-
bility for a corporation’s liabilities is limited to the value of his equity 
investment—are overridden.100 Such cases may be called shareholder 
liability cases because veil piercing results in shareholder liability for 
corporate debts. 101  There are other types of corporate veil cases in 
which separate corporate personality is disregarded without the imposi-
tion of shareholder liability. For example, a subsidiary may be ignored as 
a separate legal entity to allow a court to exercise jurisdiction over the 
corporate parent or to compel the production of documents from a 
subsidiary.102 Separate corporate personality may be set aside so that 
proceeds from fraud that have been deposited into a company can be 
                                                                                                                      
98 Compare Moore, supra note 2, at 180–81, with Thompson, supra note 7, at 1048. Pro-
fessor Thompson’s survey of U.S. corporate veil cases suggests that U.S. courts have 
pierced the veil in approximately forty percent of the cases. Thompson, supra note 7, at 
1048. Meanwhile, the general perception within the English legal academia and profession 
is clearly that the corporate veil doctrine will not often be invoked by the courts. See 
Moore, supra note 2, at 180–81; Whincup, supra note 5, at 158–59. 
99 Vandekerckhove, supra note 17, at 11 (defining piercing the corporate veil as “the 
situation where a shareholder is held liable for its corporation’s debts despite the rules of 
limited liability and/or separate personality”). 
100 Sealy & Worthington, supra note 3, at 51. 
101 See Vandekerckhove, supra note 17, at 13 (explaining the distinction made by 
many commentators between corporate veil cases where shareholders are held liable and 
corporate veil cases where shareholders are not held liable). 
102 See Lonrho Ltd. v. Shell Petroleum Co., [1980] 1 W.L.R. 627 (H.L.) at 634–35 (ap-
peal taken from Eng.); Multinational Gas & Petrochemical Co. v. Multinational Gas & Pet-
rochemical Servs., [1983] Ch. 258 (A.C.) at 268 (Eng.); Tate Access Floors Inc. v. Boswell, 
[1991] Ch. 512 at 515 (Eng.). 
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recovered.103 The corporate entities of the parent and the subsidiary 
may also be collapsed for the purpose of determining the scope of a 
managing director’s responsibilities.104 Some commentators have called 
these “identification” cases,105 while others have used the more colorful 
metaphor of “peeping behind the veil.”106 
                                                                                                                     
 While the bulk of the corporate veil cases in the United States have 
been shareholder liability cases, shareholder liability is rarely imposed 
in the English cases. For example, of the seven cases excerpted under 
the corporate veil doctrine section107 of a leading text on English com-
pany law,108 only three attempted to impose shareholder liability by lift-
ing the corporate veil.109 In the remaining four, separate corporate per-
sonality was set aside for the following reasons: to prevent a U.S.-
produced film from being registered as a British film under a relevant 
statute,110 to allow a corporate parent to claim compensation for the 
loss of its business in a compulsory purchase (government takings) 
proceeding,111 to determine the enemy character of a company,112 and 
to avoid a prohibition on the sale of alcohol without a license.113 Even 
among the three cases that attempted imposition of shareholder liabil-
ity, the two in which the veil was pierced involved companies that had 
been incorporated with the express purpose of evading an existing le-
 
103 See Wallersteiner v. Moir, [1974] 1 W.L.R. 991 (A.C.) at 1016–17 (Eng.); Gencor ACP 
Ltd. v. Dalby, [2000] 2 B.C.L.C. 734 (Ch.) at 734 (Eng.). 
104 See Harold Holdsworth & Co. v. Caddies, [1955] 1 W.L.R. 352 (H.L.) at 357–58 
(Lord Viscount Kilmuir L.C.) (appeal taken from Scot.). 
105 See Vandekerckhove, supra note 17, at 13. The reason for calling these cases identi-
fication cases is that the shareholders are identified with the corporation. Id. 
106 See Smadar Ottolenghi, From Peeping Behind the Corporate Veil, to Ignoring It Completely, 
53 Mod. L. Rev. 338, 340 (1990). 
107 Daimler Co. v. Cont’l Tyre & Rubber Co. (Great Britain) Ltd., [1916] 2 A.C. 307 
(H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.); Adams v. Cape Indus. plc, [1990] Ch. 433 (A.C.) (Eng.); 
D.H.N. Food Distribs. Ltd. v. Tower Hamlets London Borough Council, [1976] 1 W.L.R. 852 
(A.C.). (Eng.); Gilford Motor Co. v. Horne [1933] Ch. 935 (A.C.) (Eng.); Trebanog Working 
Men’s Club & Inst. Ltd. v. MacDonald, [1940] 1 K.B. 576 (Eng.); In re Darby, Brougham, 
[1911] 1 K.B. 95 (Eng.); In re FG (Films) Ltd., [1953] 1 W.L.R. 483 (Ch.) (Eng.). 
108 Sealy & Worthington, supra note 3, at 51–71. 
109 Id. at 61–63, 66–68; see Adams, [1990] Ch. 433 (refusing to lift corporate veil to im-
pose shareholder liability); Gilford Motor, [1933] Ch. 935 (lifting corporate veil to prevent 
evasion of contractual obligation); In re Darby, [1911] 1 K.B. 95 (lifting corporate veil 
where company used to perpetrate fraud). 
110 See In re FG (Films), [1953] 1 W.L.R. at 486. 
111 See D.H.N., [1976] 1 W.L.R. at 860. 
112 See Daimler, [1916] 2 A.C. at 308. 
113 Trebanog, [1940] 1 K.B. at 582–83, 585. 
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gal obligation114 or perpetrating fraud.115 Neither involved a bona fide 
company: a company with an actual business operation, as opposed to a 
mere shell company. Indeed, Adams is the only case listed in this lead-
ing text that fits in the paradigmatic corporate veil case, and the veil 
was left intact in that case.116 In fact, among the thirty-five English cor-
porate veil cases surveyed in this Article, only six involved bona fide 
companies with legitimate business operations.117 
 There are two main implications from this discussion. First, unlike 
its U.S. counterpart, the principal focus of the English corporate veil 
doctrine was never the imposition of shareholder liability. Rather, its 
focus has been considerably broader, with identification cases forming 
                                                                                                                      
114 Gilford Motor, [1933] Ch. at 961–62. In Gilford Motor, an employee had signed a non-
compete agreement with its employer car dealer before leaving the company to start his 
own business. Id. at 953–55. To escape the reach of the non-compete clause, the employee 
set up a company to operate his car dealership. Id. at 954–56. The court pierced the veil to 
apply the non-compete agreement to his company. Id. at 961–62. 
115 In re Darby, [1911] 1 KB at 101–03. 
116 See Sealy & Worthington, supra note 3, at 61–63, 66–68. 
117 Compare Lonrho, [1980] 1 W.L.R. at 627 (no bona fide companies), and Woolfson v. 
Strathclyde Reg’l Council, (1978) S.C.(H.L) 90 (appeal taken from Scot.) (same), and Scottish 
Coop. Wholesale Soc’y Ltd. v. Meyer, [1959] A.C. 324 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (same), 
and Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co. v. Lewellin (Inspector of Taxes), [1957] 1 W.L.R. 464 (H.L.) 
(appeal taken from Eng.) (same), and Macaura v. N. Assurance Co., [1925] A.C. 619 (H.L.) 
(appeal taken from Ir.) (same), and Daimler, [1916] 2 A.C. at 307 (same), and Beckett Inv. 
Mgmt. Grp. Ltd. v. Hall, [2007] EWCA (Civ) 613, [2007] I.C.R. 1539 (A.C.) (Eng.) (same), and 
Ord & Anor v. Belhaven Pubs Ltd., [1998] B.C.C. 607 (A.C.) (Eng.) (same), and In re a Com-
pany, [1985] 1 B.C.C. at 99421 (same), and D.H.N., [1976] 1 W.L.R. at 852 (same), and Waller-
steiner, [1974] 1 W.L.R. at 991 (same), and Tunstall v. Steigman, [1962] 2 Q.B. 593(A.C.) (Eng.) 
(same), and Merch. Transp. Ltd. v. British Transp. Comm’n, [1962] 2 Q.B. 173 (A.C.) (Eng.) 
(same), and Ebbw Vale Urban Dist. Council v. S. Wales Traffic Area Licensing Auth., [1951] 2 
K.B. 366 (A.C.) (Wales) (same), and Gramophone & Typewriter, Ltd. v. Stanley, [1908] 2 K.B. 
89 (A.C.) (Eng.) (same), and Apthorpe v. Peter Schoenhofen Brewing Co., [1899] 15 T.L.R. 
245 (A.C.) (Eng.) (same), and Yukong Line Ltd. of Korea v. Rendsburg Invs. Corp. of Liberia, 
[1998] 1 W.L.R. 294 (Q.B.) (Eng.) (same), and The “Tjaskemolen” (Now Named “Visvliet”), 
[1997] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 465 (Q.B.) (Eng.) (same), and Trebanog, [1940] 1 K.B. at 576 (same), and 
Smith, Stone & Knight Ltd. v. Birmingham, [1939] 4 All E.R. 116 (K.B.) (Eng.) (same), and In 
re Darby, [1911] 1 K.B. at 95 (same), and St. Louis Breweries, Ltd. v. Apthorpe, [1898] 15 T.L.R. 
112 (Q.B.) (Eng.) (same), and Trustor AB v. Smallbone, [2001] 1 W.L.R. 1177 (Ch.) (Eng.) 
(same), and Gencor, [2000] 2 B.C.L.C. at 734 (same), and In re Polly Peck, [1996] 2 All E.R. at 433 
(same), and Boswell, [1991] Ch. at 512 (same), and Multinational Gas, [1983] Ch. 258 (Eng.) 
(same), and Jones v. Lipman, [1962] 1 W.L.R. 832 (Ch.) (Eng.) (same), and In re FG (Films), 
[1953] 1 W.L.R. at 483 (same), with Caddies, [1955] 1 W.L.R. at 352 (bona fide company), and 
Rainham Chem. Works, Ltd. v. Belvedere Fish Guano Co., [1921] 2 A.C. 465 (H.L.) (appeal 
taken from Eng.) (same), and Adams [1990] Ch. at 433 (same), and Littlewoods Mail Order 
Stores Ltd. v. Inland Revenue Comm’rs, [1969] 1 W.L.R. 1241 (A.C.) (Eng.) (same), and Gilford 
Motor, [1933] Ch. 935 (same), and Creasey v. Breachwood Motors Ltd., [1992] B.C.C. 638 
(Q.B.) (Eng.) (same). 
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the bulk of the English corporate veil cases.118 What brings an English 
case under the rubric of the corporate veil doctrine is not that share-
holder liability was imposed, but that there was an attempt to set aside 
separate corporate personality.119 Second, it is highly unlikely that at-
tempts to pierce the veil of a bona fide company will be successful under 
English law. One of the tacit premises of the Adams court’s decision to 
refuse to pierce the veil was that the U.S. subsidiary was a bona fide cor-
porate entity with a full-fledged asbestos operation.120  Although the 
House of Lords did pierce the veil against a bona fide company in Rain-
ham Chemical Works, the Law Lords’ reasoning relied heavily on com-
mon law concepts such as occupation rights.121 Additionally, Rainham 
has since received little attention from both courts and commentators. 
Meanwhile, U.S. courts have been willing to pierce the veil of a bona fide 
company if elements of the doctrine are met.122 At a jurisprudential 
level, the English approach to the corporate veil doctrine reflects a sub-
stantially more deferential attitude toward limited liability compared 
with the approach taken by U.S. courts. 
2. Reliance on Traditional Common Law Concepts 
 Beyond this general difference in attitude toward the corporate 
veil doctrine, the English and U.S. courts’ approaches to the doctrine 
diverge in a few specific ways. One striking difference between the judi-
cial approaches of these two jurisdictions is that while U.S. courts have 
been ready to fashion new doctrines—such as the instrumentality doc-
trine and the alter ego doctrine123—to analyze corporate veil cases, 
their English counterparts have often confined themselves to applying 
traditional common law concepts and principles, such as agency and 
trust.124 In In re (FG) Films, the court deemed the British company in-
                                                                                                                      
 
118 See supra text accompanying notes 100–117. 
119 See, e.g., Lonrho, [1980] 1 W.L.R. at 636–37 (discussing separate corporate personal-
ity in parent-subsidiary context and noting that there would be no liability for natural per-
son shareholders); Multinational Gas, [1983] Ch. at 269 (piercing the corporate veil with-
out imposing liability on shareholders). 
120 See Adams, [1990] Ch. at 544. 
121 See Rainham, [1921] 2 A.C. at 475. 
122 See Barber, supra note 14, at 373–75. 
123 See Thompson, supra note 7, at 1063 (analyzing plaintiff’s likelihood of success after 
courts invoked instrumentality and alter ego doctrines); see also Barber, supra note 14, at 
376–77 (outlining two-prong corporate veil test developed by courts); Krendl & Krendl, 
supra note 57, at 11–15 (discussing attempts to adopt systematic approach through instru-
mentality doctrine and alter ego test). 
124 See, e.g., Broderip v. Salomon, [1895] 2 Ch. 323 (A.C.) at 332, 338 (applying agency 
and trust concepts to hold Mr. Salomon liable for the company’s debts); Trebanog [1940] 1 
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corporated by its U.S. parent for film registration purposes as the lat-
ter’s agent.125 In Broderip v. Salomon, the English Court of Appeal char-
acterized Mr. Salomon himself as the beneficiary, and his company as 
“a trustee improperly brought into existence by him to enable him to 
do what the statute prohibits.”126 In both instances, the court set aside 
the separate legal personality of the companies because of the im-
proper purpose of incorporation.127 Although some U.S. courts have 
also applied agency concepts to corporate veil cases,128 the number re-
mains small.129 Other common law concepts are rarely employed to 
decide corporate veil cases.130 The English courts made a notable at-
tempt at fashioning a new doctrine in D.H.N.131 This attempt, however, 
only enjoyed a brief success.132 In fact, D.H.N. itself was the perfect il-
lustration of the important role played by traditional common law con-
cepts in the English corporate veil cases. In addition to the single eco-
                                                                                                                      
K.B. at 582 (analogizing the company to a trustee holding trust property for its beneficiary 
members). 
125 In re F.G. (Films), [1953] 1 W.L.R. at 484, 486. 
126 Broderip, [1895] 2 Ch. at 338. This case was overruled by the House of Lords in Sa-
lomon v. Salomon. [1897] A.C. 22 (H.L.) at 58 (appeal taken from Eng.). Nevertheless, the 
House of Lords did not overrule the English Court of Appeal on the grounds that a com-
pany could never be its shareholders’ trustee, but that in the instance before the court the 
trustee relationship was not established. See id. at 56–57. 
127 See Broderip, [1895] 2 Ch. at 338; In re F.G. (Films), [1953] 1 W.L.R. at 486. In Brode-
rip, the improper purpose was to shield Mr. Salomon from liability. [1895] 2 Ch. at 338. In 
In re F.G. (Films), the improper purpose was to circumvent the restriction on the showing of 
foreign films under the Cinematograph Films Acts of 1938 and 1948. [1953] 1 W.L.R. at 
486. 
128 See House of Koscot Dev. Corp. v. Am. Line Cosmetics, Inc., 468 F.2d 64, 67 n.2 (5th 
Cir. 1973) (noting that the concepts of agency, instrumentality, and identity are inter-
changeable); Kingston Dry Dock Co. v. Lake Champlain Transp. Co., 31 F.2d 265, 267 (2d 
Cir. 1929); Walkovszky v. Carlton, 223 N.E.2d 6, 7–8 (N.Y. 1966); Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. 
Co., 155 N.E. 61, 65 (N.Y. 1926); Anderson v. Smith, 398 S.W.2d 635, 637 (Tex. App. 1965). 
129 See Thompson, supra note 7, at 1063 (noting that of the more than 1600 cases sur-
veyed, only fifty-two mentioned agency as a consideration—representing roughly three 
percent of the cases—while 181 applied the alter ego doctrine and 550 mentioned domi-
nation and control by the shareholders). 
130 See id. (mentioning neither trust nor any other common law concepts as the bases 
for veil piercing by U.S. courts in any case in his comprehensive survey). 
131 See D.H.N., [1976] 1 W.L.R. at 860. 
132 See Woolfson, (1978) S.C.(H.L.) at 96. In his judgment, Lord Keith of Kinkel ex-
pressed doubts on “whether in this respect the Court of Appeal [in D.H.N.] properly ap-
plied the principle that it is appropriate to pierce the corporate veil only where special 
circumstances exist indicating that it is a mere façade concealing the true facts.” Id. One 
should not be too quick to announce the demise of the single economic unit theory, how-
ever. Litigants have continued to invoke the theory after Woolfson, and courts have contin-
ued to apply it, with mixed results for plaintiffs. See, e.g., Adams, [1990] Ch at 544; In re Polly 
Peck, [1996] 2 All E.R. at 447. 
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nomic unit theory, the D.H.N. court invoked trust law concepts such as 
constructive and resulting trusts.133 Even Lord Denning felt compelled 
to buttress the single economic unit theory with more mundane com-
mon law concepts such as irrevocable license.134 This reliance on exist-
ing legal concepts is in keeping with the general sentiment of the Eng-
lish courts, which tend to hold faith in the ability of the existing 
common law concepts to solve new problems.135 To the extent that ex-
isting concepts are applied to decide corporate veil cases, one may ar-
gue that there is no distinct content in or structure for the English cor-
porate veil doctrine. The doctrine is merely a label for the cases in 
which separate corporate personality is considered by the courts and 
for the myriad non-company law concepts that are applied to decide 
them. 
A3. bsence of Overarching Theory 
 Unlike U.S. corporate veil cases, the English doctrine lacks an 
overarching theory or analytical framework. In the United States, the 
instrumentality doctrine was first formulated in 1931 by Frederick J. 
Powell.136 Many state courts have since adopted some variation of this 
doctrine.137 In contrast, no general analytical framework can be identi-
fied in English cases, nor have the English courts enumerated relevant 
                                                                                                                      
133 See D.H.N., [1976] 1 W.L.R. at 859. Property law concepts were called upon because 
under the relevant statute for the determination of compensation, the corporate parent 
would have been entitled to more compensation had its interest in the land been more 
than that of a bare licensee. Two of the judges in the case, Lord Denning and Lord Justice 
Goff, believed that the parent company had an irrevocable license to the land. Id. at 859, 
860. ere utilized to determine that the parent company had an equitable 
inte
er 
man
 11; see Lowendahl v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 247 
A.D
re to comply with corporate formalities, undercapitalization, and overlap of 
corp
 Trust concepts w
rest in the land beyond that of a bare licensee. Id. at 859, 865. 
134 See id. at 859. 
135 See, e.g., id. at 859, 865. Another example is the equitable subordination doctrine, 
under which a shareholder’s capital contribution to the corporation will be subordinated 
to its creditors’ claims if the shareholder is found to have committed abuses in his or h
agement of the corporation. See Taylor v. Standard Gas & Elec. Co., 306 U.S. 307, 323–
24 (1938) (applying the equitable subordination doctrine in an early bankruptcy case). 
136 Krendl & Krendl, supra note 57, at
. 144, 145 (N.Y. App. Div. 1936), aff’d, 6 N.E.2d 56 (N.Y. 1936) (applying the instru-
mentality doctrine in an early example). 
137 Krendl & Krendl, supra note 57, at 13 n.40 (listing various state cases adopting the 
instrumentality doctrine). In addition, the courts have identified a host of relevant factors 
and considerations for adjudicating veil piercing claims, including lack of substantive sepa-
ration, failu
orate personnel. See Barber, supra note 14, at 374–75; Thompson, supra note 7, at 
1063. 
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factors or considerations.138 The prevailing analytical approach by Eng-
lish courts is to classify cases into a number of categories based on a 
mix of the legal concepts invoked and the factual circumstances in 
which the case arises. These categories include agency, trusts, fraud, 
group enterprises, enemy, revenue (taxation), and cases based on pro-
visions of the Companies Act.139 Agency and trusts are categories prem-
ised on the legal concepts applied.140 Fraud, taxation, and Companies 
Act cases, on the other hand, are based on the nature or the statutory 
basis of the underlying claims. The group enterprise category consists 
of cases sharing a common factual circumstance, namely that the 
shareholder at issue is a corporation and the plaintiff is attempting to 
impose enterprise liability on a corporate group.141 Enemy is a unique 
category illustrated by Daimler v. Continental Tyre and Rubber.142 At issue 
in that case was whether a company incorporated in the United King-
dom, all but one of whose shareholders and directors were German, 
ou
analytical framework.145 Lonrho v. Shell Petroleum was not concerned with 
sh ld be deemed an enemy company during the First World War.143 
 These categories would have been helpful if they were predictive of 
the outcome of cases. With the exception of fraud, however, this has not 
been the case.144 Nor is there any common mode of analysis across cases 
within the same category. Take the category of group enterprises as an 
example. A review of the leading cases reveals that there is no common 
                                                                                                                      
138 Beck, supra note 9, at 71, 73. Part III.B of this Article will argue that even though 
the ntify factors such as failure to comply with corpo-
rate  many of their decisions. 
See i
0. In fact, many of the cases in this category, such as D.H.N. and Woolfson, 
are n of shareholder liability at all. They belong to the 
grou
 was guilty of misfeasance.”); In re Darby, [1910] 1 
K.B.
 
English courts do not explicitly ide
 formalities or undercapitalization, these factors do underpin
nfra text accompanying notes 359–406. 
139 See Beck, supra note 9, at 72 n.7. 
140 See John H. Farrar et al., Company Law 57, 77 (1985). 
141 See id. at 6
not concerned with the impositio
p enterprise category merely because the cases involve corporate groups. 
142 Id. at 61. 
143 Daimler, [1916] 2 A.C. at 310. 
144 See, e.g., In re a Company, [1985] 1 B.C.C. at 99425; Wallersteiner, [1974] 1 W.L.R. at 
1014 (“[T]o my mind Dr. Wallersteiner
 at 99; Trustor, [2001] 1 W.L.R. at [23]; Gencor, [2000] 2 B.C.L.C. at [26] (applying 
equitable principles to lift the veil because the subsidiary was nothing more than a “crea-
ture company” used to receive profits). 
145 See, e.g., Lonrho, [1980] 1 W.L.R. at 636 (leaving the corporate veil intact in a dis-
covery action); Meyer, [1959] A.C. at 343 (reasoning that when a subsidiary is formed with 
an independent minority of shareholders, the parent must deal fairly with the subsidiary); 
Beckett, [2007] I.C.R. at 1439 (using rules of contract interpretation broadly to pierce the 
corporate veil); Ord, [1998] B.C.C. at 615 (declining to pierce the veil on limited liability 
grounds and holding that there were no improprieties alleged); Adams, [1990] Ch. at 543 
(stating that legal precedent provides “rather sparse guidance”); Multinational Gas, [1983] 
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imposition of liability.146 At issue was whether the corporate parent was 
required to produce documents possessed by its subsidiaries.147 The case 
largely hinged on the interpretation of the word “power” in the relevant 
rule for discovery in the English High Court.148 Gramophone and Type-
writer v. Stanley was a taxation case in which the pivotal issue was the con-
trol exercised by the parent over the subsidiary.149 In In re Polly Peck, a 
bankruptcy case,150 the court applied a range of concepts, ranging from 
agency and nomineeship to the single economic unit theory.151 The 
lack of a common analytical framework is unsurprising given the diver-
sity of facts and issues presented in these group enterprise cases. Even if 
there was a common approach to these cases, it would most likely re-
quire modifications in order to be applied to cases ranging from discov-
ery to bankruptcy and taxation. 
 The foregoing discussion may give the impression that the U.S. and 
English approaches to veil piercing are mutually exclusive. This is in fact 
not the case. Unexpected as it may be, a number of the categories under 
the prevailing English approach share common concerns and attributes 
with the U.S. instrumentality doctrine formulated by Powell.152 
4. The Role of Policy Considerations 
 A third difference between the U.S. and English judicial ap-
proaches to the corporate veil doctrine is the readiness of the former to 
acknowledge and discuss the policy considerations behind the statute 
                                                                                                                      
Ch. at 269 (declining to pierce the veil because the defendants were shareholders of the 
plaintiff and the plaintiff was not an agent); D.H.N., [1976] 1 W.L.R. at 860 (piercing the 
cing the veil is most appropriate where corporate per-
son
ho, [1980] 1 W.L.R. at 635. 
. at 95–96. 
R. at 433. 
veil because the parent company owned all the shares of the subsidiaries); Merch. Transp., 
[1962] 2 Q.B. at 202 (reasoning that “the fact that two persons are separate in the law does 
not mean that one may be under the control of the other to such an extent that together 
they constitute one commercial unit”); Ebbw Vale, [1951] 2 K.B. at 370 (declining to pierce 
the corporate veil because no inference of agency could be drawn without a contract); 
Tjaskemolen, [1997] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. at 474 (setting aside beneficial ownership of a vessel 
when the transfer was a sham); Smith, Stone & Knight, [1939] 4 All E.R. at 121 (reasoning 
that whether the court would pierce the veil depended on whether the subsidiary was car-
rying on the parent’s business or its own independent business); In re Polly Peck, [1996] 2 
All E.R. at 447 (reasoning that pier
ality is being used as a façade). 
146 Lonr
147 Id. 
148 Id. at 633, 635. 
149 Gramophone, [1908] 2 K.B
150 [1996] 2 All E.
151 Id. at 445–48. 
152 See infra text accompanying notes 359–406. 
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or the legal rule at issue.153 In cases premised on the interpretation of a 
statute, U.S. courts have often given explicit recognition to the policy 
rationale of the statute. In National Labor Relations Board v. Fullerton 
Transfer & Storage, in deciding whether to pierce the veil of the two 
corporations at issue, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals repeatedly re-
ferred to federal labor policies and focused on whether there was “a 
specific attempt to thwart labor law obligations.”154 In Walkovszky v. Carl-
ton, there was an in-depth discussion of the policy considerations be-
hind the minimum liability provisions of the New York Vehicle and 
Traffic Law and the need for the court to refrain from second-guessing 
or overriding it.155 The courts have also acknowledged the special pol-
icy concerns behind federal income taxation and bankruptcy laws.156 
Even in cases not premised on specific statutes, U.S. courts paid heed to 
general public policy. For example, in Swearngin v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 
the court affirmed the trial court where the trial court had pierced the 
veil of a two-tier corporate structure that had been set up to obstruct 
product liability suits against the manufacturer. 157  In doing so, the 
court specifically noted that the policy reasons for shielding distributors 
r re
                                                                                                                     
o tailers from product liability claims did not apply to the sales divi-
sion of an enterprise that also manufactured the product.158 
 In contrast, the English courts do not accord the same weight to 
policy considerations.159 In Commissioner of Inland Revenue v. Sanson, a 
taxation case, the issue was whether the business at issue belonged to 
the company or the dominant shareholder, which in turn would affect 
the tax liability of the respondent.160 Without relying on relevant taxa-
tion policies, the English Court of Appeal decided the case by invoking 
agency concepts and highlighting the fact that the shareholder had 
made a loan to the company.161 The court reasoned that if it were to 
disregard the separate personality of the company, it would have meant 
 
orage Ltd., 910 F.2d 331, 338 (6th Cir. 1990). 
y, 49 Tex. L. Rev. 979, 998–1002 (1971). 
 637, 642–43 (10th Cir. 1967). 
cient, adequate, eco-
nom land transport”). 
6–97 (Eng.). 
153 See Krendl & Krendl, supra note 57, at 29–31. 
154 NLRB v. Fullerton Transfer & St
155 See Walkovszky, 223 N.E.2d at 9. 
156 See Robert W. Hamilton, The Corporate Entit
157 See 376 F.2d
158 Id. at 643. 
159 See Whincup, supra note 5, at 159. But see Merch. Transp., [1962] 2 Q.B. at 185 (not-
ing that “Parliament [had] decided that it would be in the public interest that public haul-
iers should be protected against the inroads of private hauliers with spare capacity” unless 
the latter complies with some special licensing requirements); Ebbw Vale, [1951] 2 K.B. at 
373 (recognizing the duty of the relevant authority to secure “an effi
ical and properly integrated system of public in
160 [1921] 2 K.B. 492 (A.C.) at 49
161 See id. at 505, 509, 515. 
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that the shareholder had made a loan to himself, which would be logi-
cally absurd.162 In D.H.N., Lord Denning did not attempt to justify his 
decision by the policy rationale of the Land Compensation Act, even 
though he believed that the parent company was meant to be covered 
by the statute for the loss of its business.163 An even more striking illus-
tration of this de-emphasis of policy considerations in English cases is 
Rainham Chemical Works v. Belvedere Fish Guano.164 This case featured a 
direct conflict between the policies of limited liability and tort rules. In 
his judgment, Lord Buckmaster acknowledged that the objective of lim-
ited liability is that “enterprise and adventure . . . be encouraged,”165 
and tacitly recognized the conflict between this and the policy objective 
of tort law, which is to compensate tort victims.166 Nevertheless, he pro-
ed
sensitivity to the factual circumstances and legal considerations of each 
                                                                                                                     
ce ed to decide the case by applying the property law concepts of ten-
ancy and occupation rights.167 
 This is not to say that the English judges never consider policy ar-
guments. In an area of law in which the cases are as varied as corporate 
veil cases, generalizations are fraught with difficulty and subject to res-
ervations and qualifications. It remains true, however, that U.S. courts 
have demonstrated a greater propensity to take into account policy ar-
guments.168 This is to be expected given the English judiciary’s general 
aversion to policy arguments.169 One implication of U.S. courts’ recep-
tiveness to policy arguments is that it allows them to show heightened 
 
he property owner sought to im-
pos th the company and the directors. Id. 
t be done, the individuals as well as the 
com
bility could 
not
 have 
pier hat are blatantly avoiding a public policy). 
 at 159. 
162 See id. at 502, 504–05, 509. 
163 [1976] 1 W.L.R. at 857, 860. 
164 See [1921] 2 A.C. at 467. This case concerned two business people who were operat-
ing a plant manufacturing explosives for the British Ministry of Munitions during the First 
World War. Mindful of the potential for liability of their business, they incorporated a 
company and transferred the business to it. Id. at 474–75. An explosion ensued and caused 
damages to property adjacent to the plant. Id. at 466. T
e liability on bo
165 Id. at 475. 
166 Id. at 476 (“If the company was really trading independently on its own account, 
the fact that it was directed by Messrs. Feldman and Partridge would not render them re-
sponsible for its tortious acts unless, indeed, they were acts expressly directed by them. If a 
company is formed for the express purpose of doing a wrongful act or if, when formed, 
those in control expressly direct that a wrongful ac
pany are responsible for the consequences.”). 
167 Rainham, [1921] 2 A.C. at 478. In fairness, Lord Buckmaster seemed to have subtly 
resolved the conflict in favor of limited liability when he stated that “[h]aving contracted 
for the manufacture of munitions, which in itself does not appear to me that lia
 be displaced by the introduction of an independent contractor.” Id. at 477. 
168 See Krendl & Krendl, supra note 57, at 29–31 (illustrating where U.S. courts
ced the corporate veil for companies t
169 See Whincup, supra note 5,
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case.170 This is an appropriate approach in light of the paramount con-
cern behind the U.S. corporate veil doctrine of achieving justice.171  
Achieving justice generally requires case-by-case analysis and hence an 
open-ended standard.172 In contrast, the consensus within the English 
judiciary seems to be that justice is but one of many considerations in a 
corporate veil case and that separate corporate personality should be 
maintained absent exceptional circumstances.173 This consensus means 
that there is a less pressing need for a tailored approach to the cases. 
General common law concepts may suffice. In that sense, the English 
and U.S. courts have both chosen a suitable approach to the corporate 
veil doctrine given their respective conceptions of its purpose. 
. T
he role of justice has been confirmed time and 
again in recent cases.177 
                                                                                                                     
5 he Role of Justice 
 There is consensus that a main purpose of the corporate veil doc-
trine in the United States is to achieve justice. In Anderson v. Abbott, the 
Supreme Court declared that “the courts will not permit themselves to 
be blinded or deceived by mere forms of law but will deal with the sub-
stance of the transaction involved as if the corporate agency did not 
exist and as the justice of the case may require.”174 In Arnold v. Philips, 
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that application of the 
corporate veil doctrine is premised on the corporate entity being “a 
sham, a mere obstacle to justice, or instrument of fraud.”175 In perhaps 
one of the most famous corporate veil cases in the United States, Berkey 
v. Third Avenue Railway, Justice Cardozo, then sitting on the New York 
Court of Appeals, similarly noted the importance of justice as a guide in 
corporate veil cases.176 T
 
bstance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 Harv. L. 
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 St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Minneapo-
lis C
 by the general rules of 
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170 See id. at 160, 161. 
171 See id. at 161. 
172 See Duncan Kennedy, Form and Su
. 1685, 1688 (1976). 
173 See Beck, supra note 138, at 91–92. 
174 321 U.S. 349, 363 (1943) (quoting Chi., Milwaukee &
ivic & Commerce Ass’n, 247 U.S. 490, 501 (1918)) (internal quotations omitted). 
175 Arnold v. Phillips, 117 F.2d 497, 502 (5th Cir. 1941). 
176 See Berkey, 155 N.E. at 61. When discussing the circumstances under which a sub-
sidiary’s liability will be imputed to its corporate parent, Justice Cardozo observed that 
“[d]ominion may be so complete, interference so obtrusive, that
cy the parent will be a principal and the subsidiary an agent. Where control is less 
than this, we are remitted to the tests of honesty and justice.” Id. 
177 See Fullerton Transfer & Storage, 910 F.2d at 340 (noting that the promotion of justice 
and the prevention of fraud presented two bases for piercing the corporate veil in the 
instant case); Doughty v. CSX Transp., Inc., 905 P.2d 106, 110 (Kan. 1995) (“[A]ppellate 
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 In contrast, English judges have demonstrated an ambivalent atti-
tude toward considerations of justice. Some English judges share simi-
lar views with their U.S. brethren. In In re a Company, Lord Justice 
Cumming-Bruce asserted that “[i]n our view the cases before and after 
Wallersteiner v. Moir show that the court will use its powers to pierce 
the corporate veil if it is necessary to achieve justice irrespective of the 
legal efficacy of the corporate structure under consideration.”178 In At-
las-Maritime Co. v. Avalon Maritime Ltd., Lord Justice Neill asserted that 
“in the exercise of a discretion in relation to injunctive relief ‘the eye of 
equity’ can, I think, look behind the corporate veil in order to do jus-
tice.”179 A number of commentators have similarly endorsed the pri-
macy of justice in corporate veil cases.180  Despite these sympathetic 
statements, the current consensus within the English judiciary is that it 
is not “open to this court to disregard the principle of Salomon v. A Salo-
mon & Co Ltd merely because it considers it just to do so.”181 In Adams, 
the court’s refusal to pierce the veil meant that the plaintiff asbestos 
victims could not enforce their judgments against the English corpo-
rate parent of a U.S. subsidiary, which had been shut down by the par-
ent as part of an elaborate scheme to evade liability.182 Unfortunately 
for the asbestos victims in that case, Adams firmly established that the 
sanctity of separate corporate personality trumps the judicial preroga-
tive to prevent injustice.183 
 This English perception of the role of justice in corporate veil cas-
es reflects a more formalistic approach to judicial decision-making.184 It 
is also consistent with the English courts’ reliance on traditional com-
mon law concepts and their aversion to explicit references to public 
                                                                                                                      
courts in Kansas and elsewhere exhibit a willingness to look beyond the mere surface fea-
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and
ce of its business would have been “a denial of jus-
tice
pra note 9, at 71; Gallagher & Ziegler, supra note 3, at 307; Whincup, su-
pra 
at 537. 
 
k, supra note 9, at 91–92. 
tures of a business relationship where required in the interests of justice and equity.”); 
Seasword v. Hilti, Inc., 537 N.W.2d 221, 224 (Mich. 1995) (reasoning that the corporate 
veil may be pierced where the subsidiary is a mere instrumentality of the corporat
 the corporate entity is used to subvert justice or to circumvent public policy). 
178 [1985] 1 B.C.C. at 99425 (internal citation omitted). This statement was endorsed 
in Creasey, [1992] B.C.C. at 646. In D.H.N., Lord Justice Shaw similarly emphasized the 
importance of justice as a basis for veil piercing when he noted that a refusal to grant 
compensation to D.H.N. for disturban
.” See [1976] 1 W.L.R. at 854, 867. 
179 [1991] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 563 (A.C.) at 569 (Eng.). 
180 See Beck, su
note 5, at 161. 
181 Adams, [1990] Ch. 
182 See id. at 534, 541.
183 See id. at 541–44. 
184 See Bec
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policies.185 After all, policy considerations are often invoked to modify 
existing legal concepts or to substantiate a reinterpretation of prece-
dent so that a more just or fair result can be reached. The English 
judges’ reservations about the overt pursuit of justice may be due to the 
open-ended nature of the concept. Although there are cases, such as 
Adams, in which there is little doubt about the just outcome,186 in some 
close cases, justice can be said to be in the eye of the beholder. For in-
stance, while Lord Justice Shaw believed that it would be an affront to 
justice to deny D.H.N. compensation for the value of its business,187 a 
commentator has argued that allowing a company to “play hot and 
cold” with incorporation would be grossly unfair. 188  Moreover, ac-
knowledging justice as the ultimate goal of the doctrine is one thing, 
but applying it as an operational principle is quite another. U.S. courts 
have fashioned new doctrines—such as the instrumentality doctrine 
and the alter ego doctrine—to encapsulate the occasional conflict be-
tween separate corporate personality and considerations of justice, and 
to render justice an operational principle for deciding cases.189 The 
English judiciary’s reluctance to create new doctrines means that they 
must rely on existing legal concepts, which are often not well-suited for 
that purpose.190 Deprived of the better-tailored tools available to their 
U.S. counterparts, it is not surprising that English judges have shied 
away from the pursuit of justice in veil piercing cases. 
. Su6 mming Up 
 The various jurisprudential characteristics of the English corporate 
veil doctrine are interrelated. The formalistic approach to judicial deci-
sion making and the strict adherence to separate corporate personality 
enshrined in Salomon191 means that there is little need to take into ac-
count notions of justice and policy considerations. This de-emphasis of 
justice and policy in turn obviates the need to fashion a new analytical 
framework, thus allowing English courts to rely on traditional common 
law concepts which were not created with the corporate veil piercing 
situation in mind, and are ill-suited for deciding corporate veil cases.192 
                                                                                                                      
185 See id. 
186 See Adams, [1990] Ch. at 434–35. 
187 See D.H.N., [1976] 1 W.L.R. at 867–68. 
188 See Rixon, supra note 78, at 420. 
189 See Barber, supra note 14, at 377. 
190 See Whincup, supra note 5, at 159. 
191 See id. 
192 See id. 
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The jurisprudential development of the U.S. corporate veil doctrine 
contrasts with its English counterpart and reflects the different judicial 
philosophy prevailing in the United States. U.S. courts first analyzed 
corporate veil issues with traditional common law concepts, but quickly 
found them deficient.193 They proceeded to develop special doctrines 
such as instrumentality and alter ego, which were necessary because 
ey
fi-
cers l v. 
Balti  
breaking down corporate immu-
.199 Unlike its English counterpart, tradi-
on
                                                                                                                     
th  allowed the courts to focus on the factors that are truly important 
in corporate veil cases.194 
 The use of agency concepts by U.S. courts vividly illustrates this 
difference. Like their English counterparts, U.S. courts have applied 
these concepts in corporate veil cases.195 Nevertheless, U.S. courts ap-
preciated the limitations of agency concepts early on. In Kingston Dry 
Dock v. Lake Champlain Transportation, Judge Learned Hand noted that 
while agency concepts may be useful in consensual agency relationships 
expressly contracted for by the parties, they do not focus on considera-
tions such as “the parent’s direct intervention in the transaction, ignor-
ing the subsidiary’s paraphernalia of incorporation, directors and of
” that ultimately drive corporate veil decisions.196 In Lowendah
more & Ohio Railroad, the court similarly observed the following:
[E]xcept in cases of express agency, the use of the term “agent” 
seems unfortunate and may tend to confuse . . . [and] the “in-
strumentality” rule seems to furnish the most practical and ef-
fectively applicable theory for 
nity where equity requires that this be done to circumvent 
fraud or other legal wrong.197 
Early U.S. commentators similarly noted the inadequacy of agency con-
cepts for resolving corporate veil claims.198 Some U.S. courts use the 
term “agent” interchangeably with instrumentality rather than in the 
traditional common law sense
ti al agency concepts have largely faded into the background in U.S. 
corporate veil jurisprudence. 
 
193 See id. at 160–61. 
194 See Barber, supra note 14, at 377. 
195 See, e.g., House of Koscot Dev., 468 F.2d at 67 n.2 (noting that the concepts of agency, 
instrumentality, and identity are interchangeable); Kingston Dry Dock, 31 F.2d at 267; Walk-
ovszky, 223 N.E.2d at 10; Berkey, 155 N.E. at 61; Anderson, 398 S.W.2d at 637. 
196 31 F.2d at 267. 
197 247 A.D. at 156. 
198 See Douglas & Shanks, supra note 1, at 195. 
199 See Barber, supra note 14, at 400. 
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 Although the English judges’ aversion to the creation of new legal 
doctrines is consistent with their general judicial philosophy, it is worth 
remembering that common law concepts were judicial creations in the 
first place. They originate from precedents that are, in some cases, hun-
dreds of years old. For instance, negligence, which is the dominant basis 
for tort liability, was a judicially crafted doctrine and only became a fully 
recognized basis for tort liability in the nineteenth century.200 When the 
need arose, English judges did not hesitate to create this new doctrine 
to tackle the pressing problems of the time.201 Therefore, their conser-
vatism should no ith an analytical 
framework that presents a more systematic approach to corporate veil 
that U.S. 
ur
cases in which the absence of misrepresentation was noted.207 
                                                                                                                     
t prevent them from coming up w
cases. 
B. Treatment of Specific Types of Cases 
1. Fraud and Misrepresentation 
 Promotion of justice and prevention of fraud are the main objec-
tives of the U.S. corporate veil doctrine.202 It is important to note that 
fraud is given a considerably broader meaning in the corporate veil 
cases than its general usage. When the courts refer to fraud in these 
cases, the conduct at issue usually falls short of common law fraud, and 
is more appropriately deemed a misrepresentation.203 The courts seem 
to use fraud and misrepresentation to refer to the same class of con-
duct.204 Plaintiff success rates in the United States are very high when 
misrepresentation is present.205 Professor Thompson found 
co ts had pierced the veil in ninety-four percent of the cases in which 
misrepresentation was established.206  Perhaps even more revealingly, 
they had refused to pierce the veil in over ninety-two percent of the 
 
200 See Dan B. Dobbs et al., Prosser and Keeton on Law of Torts § 28 (5th ed. 1984). 
201 See Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law: 1780 to 1860 
89 (1977). 
202 See Thompson, supra note 7, at 1041. 
203 Krendl & Krendl, supra note 57, at 31; Thompson, supra note 7, at 1044–45 n.53. 
204 Krendl & Krendl, supra note 57, at 31. 
205 See Thompson, supra note 7, at 1063. Thompson includes in this category cases in 
which the defendant made misrepresentations as to the assets and financial condition of 
the corporation and the party responsible for payment. Id. at 1044–45 n.53. 
206 Id. at 1063. This is hardly surprisingly because once a court has branded certain 
conduct as misrepresentation, refusal to pierce the veil would be tantamount to tacit en-
dorsement of the conduct. 
207 Id. at 1064–65 n.141. 
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 As stated earlier, fraud is the only predictive category within the 
English corporate veil case classification. English judges have often 
pierced the veil when the defendant is found to have perpetrated a 
fraud.208 Unlike their U.S. counterparts, most of the English cases that 
fall within the fraud category have generally involved misappropriation 
of corporate assets or other outright fraudulent conduct.209 Neverthe-
less, the English courts have also occasionally expanded the scope of 
fraud to encompass misrepresentation. This is aptly illustrated by In re 
Darby, Brougham, one of the leading veil piercing cases involving 
fraud. 210  That case featured two notorious fraudsters in the United 
Kingdom at the time, Darby and Gyde, who had set up an elaborate 
scheme to defraud public investors.211 To attract public investment in 
the debentures issued by their sham company, they concealed their 
connection to the scheme from the public.212 They accomplished this 
through the incorporation of a Guernsey corporation as the parent of 
the sham company.213 Although the ostensible ground for veil piercing 
in that case was fraud, Judge Phillimore characterized the fraud involved 
as “what they did through the corporation they did themselves and rep-
resented it to have been done by a corporation of some standing and 
position, at any rate a corporation which was more than and different 
from themselves.”214 Judge Phillimore also stated that “they represented 
that some business was being done by or through the corporation and 
concealed the fact that it was done by and through Darby and Gyde.”215 
                                                                                                                      
208 See, e.g., In re a Company, [1985] 1 B.C.C. at 99425; Wallersteiner, [1974] 1 W.L.R. at 
1014; In re Darby, [1910] 1 K.B. at 99; Trustor, [2001] 1 W.L.R. at 23; Gencor, [2000] 2 
B.C.
nd business opportunities by 
offi
Slate 
sou ce the veil of the Guernsey corporation to recover the secret profit. Id. 
d. 
L.C. at 734. 
209 See, e.g., Wallersteiner, [1974] 1 W.L.R. at 999, 1001 (involving a financier’s acquisi-
tion of a company through circular check transactions, defrauding the company’s other 
shareholders and creditors in the process); Trustor, [2001] 1 W.L.R. at 1179 (involving the 
misappropriation of corporate funds by one of the officers); Gencor, [2000] 2 B.C.L.C. at 
734 (involving the misappropriation of corporate funds a
cers to themselves or to companies controlled by them). 
210 See [1911] 1 K.B. at 101. In that case, two notorious fraudsters, Darby and Gyde, 
had incorporated a company in Guernsey, an island jurisdiction in the English Channel off 
the coast of France. They then used this company to incorporate yet another company, 
Welsh Slate Quarries Ltd., to offer debentures to the general public. Welsh Slate never had 
a viable business and the investors lost all their investment. Meanwhile, Darby and Gyde 
had made a secret profit from their promotion activities. The liquidator for Welsh 
ght to pier
211 See id. 
212 See id. 
213 See i
214 Id. 
215 Id. at 101. 
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Therefore, Judge Phillimore’s real objection was to how they concealed 
their involvement in the scheme and misrepresented that the Guernsey 
corporation was the entity behind the sham company.216 It is noteworthy 
that the misrepresentation in that case did not concern the amount of 
er, is questionable. A creditor would 
nly
                                                                                                                     
assets in support of the company—the usual subject of misrepresenta-
tion in U.S. cases217—but the general credibility and creditworthiness of 
its shareholders.218 
 Some commentators argue that from a transaction cost perspec-
tive, misrepresentation justifies veil piercing because it induces corpo-
rate creditors to expend monitoring costs to a socially wasteful level.219 
If misrepresentation results in shareholder liability, shareholders will be 
deterred from engaging in it, and creditors will incur lower costs to de-
tect it.220 This justification, howev
o  investigate if it had grounds for suspicion. If the representation 
made by the corporation seemed valid and genuine, the creditor would 
have little reason to investigate it. 
 Take the example of In re Darby. If the investors had no reason to 
doubt the legitimacy of the Guernsey corporation, they would have lit-
tle motivation to undertake any investigation, regardless of the avail-
ability of shareholder assets for recovery.221  The investigation would 
have been straightforward: the identity of the shareholders of the cor-
poration should have been available at the Companies Registry in 
Guernsey.222 Moreover, the extent to which the investors would have 
been reassured by shareholder liability is unclear. If they had been 
aware of Darby and Gyde’s role in the sham company, the investors 
probably would not have been assuaged by the availability of veil pierc-
ing to remain in the company. They would have either not invested at 
all or tried to sell their investments. The incentive to investigate does 
not arise from the fact that limited liability confines investor recovery to 
corporate assets. Rather, the incentive derives from the potential inves-
 
216 See In re Darby, [1911] 1 K.B. at 101, 103. 
217 See Harry G. Henn & John R. Alexander, Laws of Corporations 432 (3d ed. 
1983) (citing Courtney v. Georger, 228 F. 859 (2d Cir. 1915); Rhode v. Dock-Hop Co., 194 P. 
11 (Cal. 1920); Hospes v. Northwestern Mfg. & Car Co, 50 N.W. 1117 (Minn. 1892); G. 
Loewus & Co. v. Highland Queen Packing Co., 6 A.2d 545 (N.J. Ch. 1939)). 
218 See In re Darby, [1911] 1 K.B.at 101. 
219 See Richard A. Posner, The Rights of Creditors of Affiliated Corporations, 43 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 499, 520–21 (1976). 
220 See id. The kind of misrepresentation Posner has in mind is when a parent has rep-
resented to a subsidiary that the parent’s assets will be available to the subsidiary’s credi-
tors. See id. at 521. 
221 See In re Darby, [1911] 1 K.B. at 101. 
222 See id. 
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tors’ desire to avoid exposure to fraud in the first place. Contrary to the 
transaction cost perspective, altering the size of the pool of assets avail-
ble
 raise the costs of fraud, but it will not eliminate it. 
orp
ires the corporate debtor to be truthful and honest in its 
eal
White may illustrate the court’s tacit utilization of the principles of Truth 
                      
a  for recovery will not have significant impact on investor incentives 
to investigate. Justifying veil piercing in misrepresentation cases on 
transaction cost grounds is shaky at best. 
 The obvious response from the transaction cost line of reasoning is 
that if misrepresentation results in veil piercing, shareholders will re-
frain from attempting it in the future. There will be no need for poten-
tial creditors to investigate. Unfortunately, shareholder liability will not 
deter potential fraudsters from attempting to defraud creditors. These 
fraudsters will react to the threat of veil piercing by shifting the proceeds 
of their fraudulent schemes beyond the reach of the creditors by way of 
offshore accounts, trusts, or other liability-evading devices. 223  Share-
holder liability will
C orate creditors will continue to investigate and monitor the corpo-
ration regardless of the existence of a misrepresentation exception to 
limited liability. 
 It seems that one can best justify a misrepresentation exception 
with a combination of estoppel and what one commentator refers to as 
the ideals of Truth and Respect that govern a debtor’s dealing with his 
creditor.224  Estoppel refers to the idea that once a shareholder has 
made the representation that he is responsible for the corporation’s 
debts, and the creditor has reasonably relied on it, the shareholder 
should be estopped from repudiating the representation.225 The ideal 
of Truth requ
d ing with its creditors, and the ideal of Respect requires it to accord 
primacy to the creditors’ claims when engaging in transfers of corpo-
rate assets.226 
 The 1961 Texas Court of Appeals case Moore & Moore Drilling Co. v. 
                                                                                                
 Clark, The Duties of the Corporate Debtor to Its Creditors, 90 Harv. L. 
Rev
inciples of Modern Company Law 381–83 (K.W. Wedder-
bur
y, friends, shareholders, 
and . at 510–11. 
223 See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 Yale L.J. 1, 14 (1996). 
224 See Robert Charles
. 505, 509–11 (1977). 
225 L.C.B. Gower, The Pr
n et al. eds., 3d ed. 1969). 
226 See Clark, supra note 224, at 509–11. Professor Clark defines the ideal of Truth as a 
requirement that in connection with transfer of property to others, a debtor cannot tell 
lies that will lead to non-satisfaction of the creditor’s claim. Id. at 509. The ideal of Respect 
imposes on the debtor “a moral duty in transferring his property to give primacy to so-
called legal obligations, which are usually the legitimate, conventional claims of standard 
contract and tort creditors, as opposed to the interests of self, famil
 shrewder or more powerful bargaining parties.” Id
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and Respect.227 In that case, a Texas state court refused to pierce the veil 
based only upon the defendant corporation’s silence about its financial 
situation.228 The court would not impose shareholder liability absent 
fraud or other active misrepresentation.229 This result, while sound, is 
inconsistent with the transaction cost analysis presented above. From the 
transaction cost perspective, the Moore court should have pierced the 
veil because doing so would have compelled the corporation to come 
forward with its own financial information, saving the plaintiff creditor 
substantial investigation costs. Taking this reasoning to its logical conclu-
sion, from a transaction cost perspective there should be no material dif-
ference between active misrepresentation and omission to provide in-
formation. In either case, transaction costs will be saved if the threat of 
veil piercing compels the corporation to come forward with relevant in-
formation. It thus goes beyond mere sanctioning of active misrepresenta-
tion and would impose an affirmative duty on a corporate debtor to pro-
epresentation to the creditor 
means that the estoppel rationale did not apply.233 The Moore court was 
 refusing to pierce the veil. 
                                                                                                                     
vide full disclosure of relevant financial information to its creditors. 
Nevertheless, courts would likely find this approach too intrusive.230 
 A better explanation for the outcome in Moore is that the defen-
dant corporation was truthful and respectful in its dealing with the 
plaintiff creditor and had made no representations of any kind. The 
defendant did not pursue deceptive conduct that resulted in non-
satisfaction of the creditor’s claims.231 Nor did it undermine the pri-
macy of the creditor’s claims in any asset transfer by favoring its own 
associates.232 Moreover, the lack of active r
thus correct in
2. Tort Cases 
 Economic analysis of limited liability and the corporate veil doc-
trine has drawn distinctions between different types of claimants. Ac-
cording to this mode of analysis, judicial readiness to override limited 
 
227 See 345 S.W.2d 550, 555–56 (Tex. App. 1961). 
228 See id. 
229 See id. 
230 See id. (noting that in the absence of a fiduciary relationship between the parties, 
there is no affirmative duty to disclose financial information of the corporation). 
231 See Clark, supra note 224, at 508–09. 
232 See id. at 511–12. 
233 Moore, 345 S.W.2d at 555–56; see Clark, supra note 224, at 541 n.97 (claiming that in 
the absence of express agency, estoppel, or tort, three elements must be proved to make a 
parent corporation responsible for the subsidiary: control, fraud, and proximate causation 
of injury). 
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liability should vary according to the claimant at issue. In particular, 
many commentators have argued that veil piercing should be more 
readily available to tort claimants than to contractual claimants because 
of the former’s inability to negotiate ex ante for compensation or to seek 
additional credit protection from the corporation.234 Despite this al-
most unanimous view within the academic community, U.S. courts have 
been more sympathetic toward contractual claims than tort claims. Pro-
fessor Thompson found that the plaintiff success rate in contractual 
corporate veil cases was forty-two percent, compared to only thirty-one 
percent for tort cases.235 Although an eleven percent difference is clear-
d in-
tent ed 
subs
                                                                                                                     
ly substantial, a thirty-one percent success rate suggests that tort claim-
ants prevail with sufficient regularity in the United States as well. 
 The same cannot be said about English tort claimants. The general 
view in the English judiciary after the Adams decision is that the door to 
tort claimants bringing veil piercing claims is largely closed.236 In re-
sponse to the argument that the corporate parent in that case ha
ionally located hazardous asbestos operations in an underfund
idiary to avoid potential liabilities, the court proclaimed that: 
 
234 See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for 
Corporate Torts, 100 Yale L.J. 1879, 1919 (1991); David W. Leebron, Limited Liability, Tort 
Victims, and Creditors, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 1565, 1566–68 (1991); Comment, Should Sharehold-
ers Be Personally Liable for the Torts of Their Corporations?, 76 Yale L.J. 1190, 1195 (1967); see 
also Barber, supra note 14, at 381–82 (suggesting that because a tort claimant has usually 
not engaged in prior dealings with the corporation, it seems illogical to require a disregard 
of corporate formalities before piercing the veil); Phillip I. Blumberg, Limited Liability and 
Corporate Groups, 11 J. Corp. L. 573, 616–17 (1986) (claiming that the efficiency advantages 
of limited liability where there are tort claimants disappears as compared to when there 
are contract claimants); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the 
Corporation, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 89, 112 (1985) (claiming that courts are more willing to 
disregard the corporate veil in tort than in contract cases); William P. Hackney & Tracey G. 
Benson, Shareholder Liability for Inadequate Capital, 43 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 837, 867 (1982) (stat-
ing that a tort claimant differs from a contract claimant because the tort claimant cannot 
“select the person he does business with”); Halpern et al., supra note 35, at 145–47 (argu-
ing that some unlimited liability be available for tort claimants because of the risk that 
corporations will shift the risk of business failures to these claimants). But see Posner, supra 
note 219, at 519–20 (arguing that piercing the corporate veil for tort claimants would cre-
ate a negative externality in that investment would be discouraged); Robert B. Thompson, 
Unpacking Limited Liability: Direct and Vicarious Liability of Corporate Participants for Torts of the 
Enterprise, 47 Vand. L. Rev. 1, 31–32 (1994) (arguing that liability should not be extended 
to shareholders because it will have a significant negative effect on the ability of share-
holders to diversify and therefore will remove the advantage of standardized share-pricing 
necessary for liquid financial markets for shares). 
235 See Thompson, supra note 7, at 1058. 
236 See Trustor, [2001] 1 W.L.R. at 1184–85. 
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[W]e do not accept as a matter of law that the court is entitled 
to lift the corporate veil as against a defendant company 
which is the member of a corporate group merely because the 
corporate structure has been used so as to ensure that the le-
gal liability (if any) in respect of particular future activities of 
the group (and correspondingly the risk of enforcement of 
that liability) will fall on another member of the group rather 
not received 
in Adams.243 The underlying premise of these U.S. courts seems to be 
                                                                              
than the defendant company. Whether or not this is desirable, 
the right to use a corporate structure in this manner is inher-
ent in our corporate law.237 
 The English courts have not always held such a staunchly pro-
corporation view on this issue. In Rainham Chemical Works, Lord Sumner 
described the two shareholders’ attempt to shield themselves from po-
tential tort liabilities through the interposition of a company as “expe-
dient” and “ignoble,”238 and the House of Lords proceeded to impose 
shareholder liability for the damages caused by an explosion at their 
explosives plant.239 Remarkably, this was done in the absence of any 
improper conduct or wrongdoing on the part of the shareholders.240 In 
this sense, the Law Lords were actually more progressive as compared 
with their U.S. contemporary, Justice Cardozo, in Berkey v. Third Avenue 
Railway, where Justice Cardozo refused to pierce the veil between the 
parent and the subsidiary in light of the absence of fraudulent con-
duct.241 For whatever reason, Rainham Chemical Works has 
much attention in the academic literature or subsequent cases. Adams 
has largely shaped the current view on the applicability of the corpo-
rate veil doctrine to tort claims in the United Kingdom.242 
 Some U.S. courts have expressed a similar view to that articulated 
                                        
he same time occupiers and not occupiers of the premises, which 
was 484. 
mained liable to the tort victim under 
Eng
ilar to that 
wiel  Rainham Chemical Works. 
 145, 149–52 (3d Cir. 1988); 
Har
237 Adams, [1990] Ch. at 544. 
238 [1921] 2 A.C. at 483. Lord Sumner added that the use of the corporate entity “was 
excellent if it could be made good, but unfortunately it required that Messrs. Feldman and 
Partridge should be at t
absurd.” Id. at 
239 Id. at 466. 
240 Id. at 486. The decision held that the two shareholders had retained their occupa-
tion rights with respect to the plant and therefore re
lish precedent Rylands v. Fletcher. Id. at 478, 479. 
241 See Berkey, 155 N.E. at 58, 61; Rainham, [1921] 2 A.C. at 486. The degree of control 
exerted by the corporate parent over the subsidiary in Berkey was quite sim
ded by the two shareholders over the company in
242 See, e.g., Trustor, [2001] 1 W.L.R. at 1184–85. 
243 See Craig v. Lake Asbestos of Quebec, Ltd., 843 F.2d
ris v. Curtis, 8 Cal. App. 3d 837, 841–42 (Ct. App. 1970). 
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that the use of the corporate entity to limit future liabilities is legiti-
mate.244 For these courts, however, the crucial condition is the absence 
of improper conduct or wrongdoing on the part of the corporation 
and its shareholders.245 The stance taken by English and U.S. courts on 
the proper use of the corporate entity to limit future tort liabilities is 
most aptly illustrated by Adams246 and the 1988 Third Circuit Court of 
Appeals case Craig v. Lake Asbestos of Quebec.247 These two cases in fact 
arose from the same events and involved the same plaintiffs, employees 
of NAAC, which was the U.S. asbestos-producing subsidiary of Cape 
Industries in Adams.248 There was ample evidence before the English 
Court of Appeal that the decision to shut down NAAC was calculated to 
escape a default judgment that had been entered against it by a U.S. 
court.249 Yet by refusing to pierce the veil, the court tacitly condoned it. 
In contrast, the Third Circuit acknowledged the fraudulent nature of 
this liability evasion scheme. 250  These two cases show that English 
courts hold a considerably more permissive view of the exploitation of 
mi
is dearth of tort cases in 
                                                                                                                     
li ted liability protection against tort claims. In comparison, most U.S. 
courts would have treated Cape Industries’ activities as asset strip-
ping.251 
 Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that even before Adams, tort claims 
appeared less frequently among English corporate veil cases. Of the 
thirty-five prominent English corporate veil cases surveyed in this Arti-
cle, only one involved tort claims. 252  This starkly contrasts with the 
composition of the corporate veil cases in the United States. Of the 
1,600 cases Professor Thompson included in his survey, 226 were tort 
cases.253 It is not entirely clear what explains th
 
244 See Craig, 843 F.2d at 150; Harris, 8 Cal. App. 3d at 843. 
245 See Craig, 843 F.2d at 150. After accepting that Cape’s liability evasion scheme was 
fraudulent, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals proceeded to declare that “evasion of tort 
liability has never, in itself, been sufficient basis to disregard corporate separateness.” Id. 
246 See Adams, [1990] Ch. at 544. 
247 See Craig, 843 F.2d at 150. 
248 See id. at 146–48; Adams, [1990] Ch. at 434–35. 
249 See Moore, supra note 2, at 182. 
250 See Craig, 843 F.2d at 149–50 (“We accept for purposes of this appeal the district 
court’s findings and conclusion that Cape’s scheme to avoid asbestos-injury liability in the 
United States constituted the type of ‘fraud or injustice’ that would satisfy that element of 
the standard for piercing the corporate veil.”). The Third Circuit refused to impose liabil-
ity on Cape Industries’ shareholder, who had no direct involvement in the liability-evasion 
scheme or NAAC’s asbestos operations in the United States. See id. at 150–52. 
251 See Whincup, supra note 5, at 162. 
252 See Rainham, [1921] 2 A.C. at 470 (seeking to pierce the corporate veil in compen-
sation for damage to property following an explosion at a munitions factory). 
253 Thompson, supra note 7, at 1058. 
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the United Kingdom. It is possible that even before Adams, potential 
rt 
ing of bankruptcy, was executed with the 
ec
some of the best-known English corporate veil cases.260  These cases 
bring to the forefront one of the most vexing questions in the corporate 
veil doctrine: how to distinguish between legitimate uses and abuses of 
                                                                                                                     
to claimants appreciated that avoidance of future liabilities is an in-
herent feature of the English corporate entity. 
3. Asset Stripping vs. Evasion of Existing Legal Obligations 
 One class of U.S. corporate veil cases involves asset stripping. Asset 
stripping is shareholder dissipation of corporate assets by way of exces-
sive dividend disbursements, inflated director salaries, or other im-
proper means.254 The corporation is usually rendered insolvent as a 
result, and hence becomes unable to meet its creditors’ claim or to sat-
isfy a judgment.255  Asset stripping may take place before or after a 
judgment is entered against the corporation, but is usually performed 
after a legal obligation has been incurred.256 It should not come as a 
surprise that the U.S. courts have long adopted a hostile attitude to-
ward such conduct. As early as 1939, in Pepper v. Litton, the Supreme 
Court subordinated the debts of the controlling shareholder of a cor-
poration after the shareholder was found to have orchestrated a com-
plex scheme to empty the corporate coffers.257 The company’s scheme, 
which involved voluntary fil
sp ific intent to evade a judgment debt against the corporation.258 Re-
gardless of whether it happens before or after a judgment has been is-
sued, asset stripping has been roundly condemned by the U.S. courts 
ever since Pepper v. Litton.259 
 The closest concept to asset stripping in the English corporate veil 
doctrine is evasion of existing legal obligations, which encompasses 
 
khove, supra note 17, at 178. 
, 692 F.2d 973, 977 (4th Cir. 1962); Henderson v. Rounds & Porter 
Lum
.C at 614–16; Adams, [1990] Ch. at 544; Gilford Motor, 
[19
254 See Vandekerc
255 See id. 
256 See id. at 180. 
257 308 U.S. 295, 310–12 (1939). 
258 See id. at 299. 
259 See id. at 305–07; Laborers’ Pension Fund v. Lay-Com, Inc., 580 F.3d 602, 611 (7th 
Cir. 2009); Brandon v. Anesthesia & Pain Mgmt. Assocs. Ltd., 419 F.3d 594, 596–97 (7th 
Cir. 2005); Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Pepper Source, 993 F.2d 1309, 1312 (7th Cir. 1993); 
FDIC v. Sea Pines Co.
ber Co., 99 F. Supp 376, 380 (W.D. Ark 1951); World Broad. Sys. v. Bass, 328 S.W.2d 
863, 866 (Tex. 1959). 
260 See, e.g., Ord, [1998] B.C
33] Ch. at 969; Tjaskemolen, [1997] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. at 469; Creasey, [1992] B.C.C. at 647; 
Jones, [1962] 1 W.L.R. at 836–37. 
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the corporate entity.261 This is related to the earlier discussion about the 
reluctance of English courts to pierce the veil of a bona fide company.262 
The English courts have affirmed the legitimacy of using the corporate 
structure to avoid future liabilities. 263  Therefore, the crucial inquiry 
seems to be the relative timing of the incurrence of legal obligations 
and the use of corporate structure to avoid them. The best formulation 
of this inquiry appeared in a Hong Kong case prior to 1997, when Eng-
lish precedents were still binding on the Hong Kong courts. In China 
Ocean Shipping v. Mitrans Shipping, the Hong Kong Court of Appeal de-
clare
reversing such avoidance so as to cre-
d that: 
Using a corporate structure to evade legal obligations is objec-
tionable. The courts’ power to lift the corporate veil may be 
exercised to overcome such evasion so as to preserve legal ob-
ligations. But using a corporate structure to avoid the incur-
ring of any legal obligation in the first place is not objection-
able. And the courts’ power to lift the corporate veil does not 
exist for the purpose of 
ate legal obligations. 264 
                                                                                                                      
261 See, e.g., Laborers’ Pension Fund, 580 F.3d at 611 (stating that the rule for analyzing 
whether the corporate form would sanction fraud is not clear cut). 
262 See supra notes 117–121 and accompanying text. An English commentator has la-
beled these evasion cases as fraud cases. See Jennifer Payne, Lifting the Corporate Veil: A Reas-
sessment of the Fraud Exception, 56 Cambridge L.J. 284, 284 (1997). Nevertheless, there are 
considerable differences between the underlying conduct at issue in these evasion cases 
compared with the genuine fraud cases discussed above. All the genuine fraud cases fea-
tured outright fraudulent conduct. Gencor ACP and Smallbone both involved misappropria-
tion of company funds and Wallersteiner involved so-called “circular cheque transactions” 
that were used to inflate the corporation’s book assets. See Wallersteiner, [1976] 1 W.L.R. at 
991–92; Trustor, [2001] 1 W.L.R. at 1177; Gencor, [2000] 2 B.C.L.C. at 734. Meanwhile, the 
evasion cases involved the defendant’s attempt to avoid legal obligations that had been 
created under fully legitimate and lawful circumstances. Gilford Motor and Creasey involved 
an unemployment contract, Jones involved a conveyance of land, and Yukong and Tjaske-
molen involved charter-parties. See Yukong, [1998] 1 W.L.R. at 294; Gilford Motor, [1933] Ch. 
at 935; Tjaskemolen, [1997] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. at 465; Creasey, [1992] B.C.C. at 638; Jones, [1962] 
1 W.L.R. at 832. It was only when one of the parties to these legal transactions attempted to 
evade their legal obligations that the issue of veil piercing arose. See Payne supra, at 287–88. 
Therefore, this Article draws a distinction between these two categories of cases and refers 
to cases involving evasion of existing legal obligations as “evasion cases.” 
263 Adams, [1990] Ch. at 544 (remarking that it is unobjectionable that “the corporate 
structure has been used so as to ensure that the legal liability (if any) in respect of particu-
lar future activities of the group . . . will fall on another member of the group rather than 
the defendant company”). 
264 China Ocean Shipping Co. v. Mitrans Shipping Co., [1995] 3 H.K.C. 123, 127 (C.A). 
2011] Comparing the English & U.S. Corporate Veil Doctrines 367 
If the legal obligation existed prior to incorporation, the use of the 
corporate structure would be considered evasion and the veil would be 
pierced. If the legal obligation was only created after incorporation, the 
se w
t would most likely have been con-
em
subsidiary’s incorporation—that ought to serve as the reference point 
     
u ould be considered as avoidance and separate corporate personal-
ity would be upheld. This formulation of the evasion of existing legal 
obligations rule in fact explains a majority of the English cases in this 
category.265 
 Again, it should come as no surprise that English courts have been 
more tolerant of asset stripping than their U.S. counterparts. Two cases 
in particular—Adams266 and Yukong v. Rendsburg Investments Corp.267— 
featured the kind of conduct tha
d ned by U.S. courts.268 Yet English courts refused to pierce the veil. 
In Adams, the English Court of Appeal treated the case as concerning 
the legitimate incorporation of a subsidiary to limit the asbestos liability 
exposure of a corporate group.269 
 In reality, the corporate parent evaded the default judgment that 
had been entered against the subsidiary by shutting it down and trans-
ferring its operations to a newly incorporated subsidiary. To ensure that 
it would be safely insulated from liability, the parent interposed a Liech-
tenstein dummy corporation between itself and the new subsidiary.270 
The asbestos liabilities had materialized when the second subsidiary was 
incorporated, which means that its veil should have been pierced under 
the evasion rule. The court chose to focus on the first subsidiary, how-
ever, which means that incorporation preceded the incurrence of li-
abilities and separate corporate personality was upheld.271 The court 
likely reasoned that because the liabilities were incurred by the first 
subsidiary, it should be the time of its incorporation—not the second 
                                                                                                                 
265 See, e.g., Gilford Motor, [1933] Ch. at 938 (upholding a covenant not to compete be-
cause the legal obligation had been created prior to the incorporation of defendant’s com-
pany); Tjaskemolen, [1997] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. at 469 (extending liability to the acquiring company 
because the alleged breach of contract had occurred before the vessel was transferred); Crea-
sey, [1992] B.C.C. at 638 (allowing the plaintiff to seek the assets of the acquiring company 
because the alleged wrongful termination occurred before the takeover); Jones, [1962] 1 
W.L.R. at 835 (requiring a sham company to convey property pursuant to the purchaser’s 
pre- iginal company). 
accepting the district court’s finding that Cape’s liability 
evas t.) 
 at 544. 
merger contract with or
266 [1990] Ch. at 433. 
267 [1998] 1 W.L.R. at 294. 
268 See Craig, 843 F.2d at 149 (
ion scheme was fraudulen
269 See [1990] Ch.
270 See id. at 450. 
271 See id. at 539–44. 
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when applying the evasion rule. Although this reasoning may be logi-
cally sound, it has essentially left the door wide open for evasion by 
judgment debtors.272  This dilemma can be sidestepped if the court 
shows greater flexibility in the choice of reference point. In a case such 
as Adams, given the substantial connection between the first and the 
co
gal obligation had been created.274 Again, the court re-
tion of a new company, but also the use of an existing company to 
evade legal obligations. The reference point should be modified from 
                                                                                                                     
se nd corporations—the latter had received all of the former’s assets 
and hired all of its employees—it would be appropriate to choose the 
creation of the second corporation as the reference point. 
 Yukong exposed a further, and perhaps more serious, limitation of 
the evasion rule as a tool against asset stripping.273 Just as in Adams, the 
defendant shareholder shifted assets from the first to the second com-
pany after a le
fused to pierce the veil.275 Unlike the company in Adams, the second 
company in Yukong was incorporated before the legal obligation in-
curred.276 
 The second company existed when the breach of contract at issue 
took place. Therefore, no flexibility in the choice of reference point 
would have resulted in veil piercing. Yukong demonstrates how a share-
holder can evade liabilities without being subject to veil piercing. The 
key is to ensure that incorporation precedes the incurrence of the legal 
obligation. But such ease of evasion is highly unsatisfactory. Therefore, 
the evasion rule should be modified to reach not only the incorpora-
 
shareholder personally liable by piercing the veil between him and Rendsburg. Id. at 
299
endsburg’s assets beyond the reach of Yukong 
in t
ial was disreputable, and that he contradicted himself on several key issues of 
the 
276 Compare id. at 298, with Adams, [1990] Ch. at 444. 
272 See Ord, [1998] B.C.C. at 615 (demonstrating the impact on evasion post-Adams). 
273 See Yukong, [1998] 1 W.L.R. at 309–10.Yukong concerned a charter-party between 
Rendsburg, a Liberian company controlled by the defendant shareholder, and Yukong 
Line, a Korean shipping company. Id. at 297–98. Rendsburg repudiated the contract after 
market conditions had deteriorated, after which Yukong sued for breach of contract. Id. at 
298. Upon filing of the suit, the shareholder promptly transferred Rendsburg’s assets to 
another company also controlled by him. Id. at 298–99. Yukong sought to hold the defen-
dant 
. 
274 Id. at 298–99; see Adams, [1990] Ch. at 443–44. In fact, the removal of assets took 
place on the same day that the contract was repudiated. Yukong, [1998] 1 W.L.R. at 302. 
The court refused to accept that this sequence of events was a coincidence, and concluded 
that “the purpose of the transfer was to put R
he probable event of litigation.” Id. 
275 Id. at 310. This decision was all the more remarkable given the judge’s characteriza-
tion of Rendsburg as the shareholder’s “alter ego.” Id. at 302. The judge further found that 
the shareholder had completely controlled both companies, that his conduct before and 
during the tr
case. Id. 
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the time of incorporation to the time a corporate entity is utilized. Such 
use may be by way of incorporation, as in Adams,277 or by way of transfer 
 fu
.S. approach 
speculative when the second subsidiary was incorporated.284 One prob-
                                                                        
of nds to the company, as in Yukong.278 
 The different approaches to asset stripping on both sides of the 
Atlantic vividly illustrate the limitations of the English formalistic ap-
proach to veil piercing. The emphasis of the evasion rule under English 
law is on contractual obligations and tort liabilities. What matters is 
when a contract is breached or when a tort is committed vis-à-vis when a 
company is incorporated.279 In contrast, the U.S. corporate veil doc-
trine focuses on the underlying economic reality that justifies veil pierc-
ing, notably, the fact that a shareholder has taken deliberate action to 
impair creditor interests.280 This focus is more in keeping with the pol-
icy-driven and justice-conscious approach to veil piercing adopted by 
U.S. courts.281 In light of all the complexities of the evasion rule, it 
would seem that if the goal was to deter evasion of legal obligations, the 
U.S. approach to asset stripping should be preferred. By focusing on 
whether the shareholder has acted deliberately to undermine creditor 
interests instead of comparing the relative timing of the incurrence of 
legal obligation and the use of the corporate entity, the U
focuses the inquiry on the crux of an asset stripping case. 
 Given the entrenched status of the evasion rule under English law, 
however, the best one can do is to improve its administrability. In fact, 
Adams raised one further issue concerning its application. Although the 
asbestos injuries had occurred prior to the incorporation of the second 
subsidiary, liability was only established after incorporation.282 There-
fore, whether the evasion rule should have resulted in veil piercing de-
pends on one’s view of when a legal obligation arises. There are a num-
ber of possibilities. One of them is that a legal obligation exists once 
liability is established.283 Applying this formulation, one commentator 
endorsed the outcome in Adams by arguing that liabilities were merely 
                                              
1990] Ch. at 443–44; Yukong, [1998] 1 W.L.R. at 298–99. 
8. 
0] Ch. at 443–44, 447. 
as used as a liability limiting device. Adams, [1990] Ch. at 449–50. Second, Cape had 
 
277 See [1990] Ch. at 443–44. 
278 See [1998] 1 W.L.R. at 298–99. 
279 See Adams, [
280 See Krendl & Krendl, supra note 57, at 2
281 See id. at 2. 
282 See Adams, [199
283 Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 234, at 1896. Hansmann and Kraakman call this 
the judgment rule. Id. 
284 Payne, supra note 262, at 289. It is not clear that the liabilities were speculative. 
First, the event that gave rise to liability had already taken place when the corporate struc-
ture w
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lem with this approach is that it would create a gaping loophole for 
shareholders to exploit.285 Considerable time usually elapses between 
when a company becomes aware of its potential tort liability and when 
the liability is formally established in court.286 If legal obligations only 
exist when liability is judicially established, the time elapsed can be used 
to transfer assets out of the company. The second possibility is that a le-
gal obligation exists when a claim is filed in court.287 Nevertheless, this 
possibility still leaves much room for strategic behavior on the part of 
the shareholders. The timeframe for liability evasion strategies would be 
shorter, but the possibility still exists. The best rule seems to be that a 
legal obligation is incurred when the event that gives rise to potential 
liability takes place, and the company knows, or has reason to know, that 
the event may expose it to liability. 288  This formulation would have 
changed the results in Adams. In Adams, the corporate parent was clearly 
aware of the potential for further liability when it set up the second cor-
poration. After all, it had settled similar asbestos claims.289 
 On the other hand, whether a contractual obligation arises re-
quires a different analysis. A contractual obligation is created when the 
parties enter into the contract.290 The time of breach is more precisely 
described as the time when a potential liability arises, and judgment 
date as the time when liability is established.291 When the evasion rule is 
applied to contractual cases, the more suitable reference point is the 
time of breach. For contractual claims, the main concern of the evasion 
rule is that the shareholders will attempt to avoid judgment after they 
know or have reason to know that liability will be incurred: i.e., the 
breach. This concern can be adequately addressed by choosing the 
time of breach as the reference point. Adopting the time of contract 
formation as the reference point would be the most complete solution 
as it would cover practically all attempts at evasion. 
                                                                                                                      
settled some similar asbestos claims prior to incorporating the second subsidiary. Id. at 
449. 
285 See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 234, at 1896. 
286 See id. at 1896–97. 
287 Id. at 1896. 
288 See id. at 1897. This is similar to Hansmann and Kraakman’s “information-based 
rule.” Id. Their rule is more complicated, however, because it is an ex ante unlimited liabil-
ity rule for corporate torts. It thus takes into account issues that are not particularly perti-
nent to ex post veil piercing. See id. 
289 [1990] Ch. at 449. 
290 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 9 (1981). 
291 See id. §§ 243, 346, 357. 
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 Nevertheless, adopting the time of contract formation as the refer-
ence point would prove over-inclusive by catching many legitimate uses 
of the corporate entity. It is important to note that the choice of the 
reference point should reflect the likelihood that at that point in time, 
the shareholders had a specific intent to evade liability. Most contrac-
tual parties do not contemplate contractual breach or evasion of liabil-
ity at the time of contract formation. Moreover, choosing contract for-
mation as the reference point would mean that shareholder liability 
could result from any asset transfer after the contract was entered into 
regardless of whether the shareholders had a specific intent to evade 
liability. In fact, using contract formation as the reference point would 
b antamount to imposing an obligation on the corporation not to 
transfer its assets to any affiliated company after the contract was en-
tered into. This would clearly be an excessively burdensome obligation. 
 A further modification of the evasion rule is needed for contrac-
tual obligations. The necessity of this modification is due to the fact 
that the breaching party can control the timing of the breach. A corpo-
ration bent on evading its contractual obligation may incorporate a 
second company or transfer funds to it just before it repudiates a con-
tract, thereby avoiding veil piercing. To forestall this possibility, if the 
use of the corporate entity takes place close in time to the breac
e t
h, there 
ou
e 
when the shareholder knew, or should have learned, about the im-
e transfer of assets to the second company, 
e v
                                                                                                                     
sh ld be a rebuttable presumption of evasion. To avoid veil piercing, 
the company must rebut this presumption by adducing evidence that 
the use of the corporate structure was for a legitimate purpose. 
 Applying this modified evasion rule would have changed the result 
in Yukong. In Yukong, the shareholder knew that the contractual repu-
diation would expose him to liability and he promptly transferred assets 
from the first to the second company after he had decided to repudiate 
the contract.292 As the court found, that was why he siphoned funds out 
of the first company on the day of repudiation.293 Given that the tim
pending breach preceded th
th eil would have been pierced under the modified evasion rule.294 
 
292 See Yukong, [1998] 1 W.L.R.at 302. 
293 See id. 
294 See id. 
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4. Voluntary Piercing Cases 
 One notable feature of the English corporate veil cases is the pre-
ponderance of voluntary piercing cases.295 Voluntary piercing is also 
referred to as reverse piercing.296 This is a misnomer, however, because 
strictly speaking, reverse piercing refers to the imposition of liability on 
the corporation for the shareholder’s debts.297 This contrasts with the 
usual piercing situation—forward piercing—in which the shareholders 
are held liable for the corporation’s debts.298 Voluntary piercing, how-
ever, refers to the invocation of the doctrine by the shareholders them-
selves to set aside the corporate entity.299 It is voluntary because it is in-
stigated by the shareholder itself. The typical veil piercing claim is 
involuntary in that it is filed by a creditor or corporate outsider, and the 
shareholders are subject to liability against their will.300 Therefore, even 
hout gh reverse piercing is often voluntary, it need not be so. An exam-
ple of an involuntary reverse piercing claim is when a corporate par-
ent’s creditors seek recovery from its subsidiaries because, perhaps, the 
latter have more assets in their possession than the parent.301 
 Interestingly, in a majority of English voluntary piercing cases, the 
veil piercing claims are advanced so that the shareholder can claim 
                                                                                                                      
. at 860; Tunstall, [1962] 2 Q.B. at 600–02; 
Smi Knight, [1939] 4 All E.R. at 120–22. 
ry L. Rev. 667, 667 
(19
l taxpayer’s 
liab
 843 (Nev. 2000)(finding that the alter ego doctrine may be applied to recover an 
ind
295 See, e.g., Woolfson, (1978) S.C.(H.L) at 90; Macaura, [1925] A.C. at 625–28; Beckett, 
[2007] I.C.R. at 1545–46; D.H.N., [1976] 1 W.L.R
th, Stone & 
296 See Ottolenghi, supra note 106, at 351; Michael J. Gaertner, Note, Reverse Piercing the 
Corporate Veil: Should Corporation Owners Have It Both Ways?, 30 Wm. & Ma
89). 
297 Elham Youabian, Reverse Piercing of the Corporate Veil: The Implications of Bypassing “Own-
ership” Interest, 33 Sw. U. L. Rev. 573, 574 (2004). 
298 Id. 
299 See Ottolenghi, supra note 106, at 351. This is done when the shareholder can 
somehow benefit from the disregard of separate corporate personality. 
300 See Youabian, supra note 297, at 577. 
301 See Kingston Dry Dock, 31 F.2d at 267. In this case, the plaintiff attempted to reach 
for the subsidiary’s assets because the parent had failed to satisfy the debts. Id.; see also 
Floyd v. Internal Revenue Serv., 151 F.3d 1295, 1299–1300 (10th Cir. 1998) (remanding 
case in which IRS sought to reverse-pierce corporation to satisfy individual’s debts); Towe 
Antique Ford Found. v. Internal Revenue Serv., 999 F.2d 1387, 1390–91 (9th Cir. 1993) 
(allowing United States’ levy of corporation’s automobiles to satisfy individua
ilities because corporation was individual’s alter ego); LFC Mktg. Group v. Loomis, 8 
P.3d 841,
ividual debt from the assets of a corporation determined to be the alter ego of the indi-
vidual debtor); Zisblatt v. Zisblatt, 693 S.W.2d 944, 955 (Tex. App. 1985) (finding that most 
of the assets the corporation acquired during the time of individual’s marriage were in fact 
part of the individual community estate and subject to division upon divorce). 
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compensation or benefit of some kind.302 These cases may be referred 
to as compensation cases, three of which, in particular, arose in a com-
pulsory purchase (government takings) context.303 These cases raise 
interesting theoretical issues for two reasons. First, the corporations 
themselves are pleading for veil piercing.304 Second, unlike the typical 
veil piercing cases, where shareholder liability is at stake, the doctrine is 
invoked in these cases to obtain financial benefits for the corpora-
tion.305 The English courts have expressed almost uniform hostility to-
ward voluntary piercing. In Tunstall v. Steigman, Lord Justice Danck-
werts stated that “[the owner] cannot say that in a case of this kind she 
is entitled to take the benefit of any advantages that the formation of a 
com ties 
arisi sed 
this s
, for all purposes beneficial to 
pany gave to her, without at the same time accepting the liabili
ng therefrom.” 306  Vice-Chancellor Browne-Wilkinson expres
entiment pointedly in Tate Access Floors Inc. v. Boswell: 
If people choose to conduct their affairs through the medium 
of corporations, they are taking advantage of the fact that in 
law those corporations are separate entities, whose property 
and actions are in law not the property or actions of their in-
corporators or controlling shareholders. In my judgment con-
trolling shareholders cannot
them, insist on the separate identity of such corporations but 
then be heard to say the contrary when discovery is sought 
against such corporations.307 
 There is greater diversity of views among U.S. courts toward volun-
tary piercing. Some courts believe that voluntary piercing should be re-
jected on principle, while some apply the same analysis to both volun-
tary and involuntary piercing claims.308 Yet other courts apply a more 
                                                                                                                      
302 See, e.g., Macaura, [1925] A.C. at 625–28; Smith, Stone & Knight, [1939] 4 All E.R. at 
120–22. 
303 See, e.g., Woolfson, (1978) S.C.(H.L) at 90; D.H.N., [1976] 1 W.L.R. at 854; Smith, 
Stone & Knight,, [1939] 4 All E.R. at 117. Compulsory purchase is the equivalent of gov-
Legality of Shrinking Cities, 58 Clev. St. L. Rev. 387, 392 (2010) (“‘[C]ompulsory 
pur ish, while ‘eminent domain’ [is] exclusively Ameri-
can
 at 947. 
, 8 P.3d at 844. 
1] Ch. 512 at 531. 
ernment takings under eminent domain in the United States. See Ben Beckman, Note, The 
Wholesale Decommissioning of Vacant Urban Neighborhoods: Smart Decline, Public-Purpose Takings, 
and the 
chase’ [is] primarily used in Brit
.”). 
304 See Zisblatt, 693 S.W.2d
305 See LFC Marketing Group
306 [1962] 2 Q.B. at 601. 
307 [199
308 Gaertner, supra note 296, at 681. 
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open-ended policy analysis to voluntary piercing claims.309 Despite this 
variety of analytical approaches, voluntary piercing has a considerably 
lower likelihood of success. In his comprehensive survey, Professor 
Thompson discovered that only 13.4% of voluntary piercing claims pre-
vailed, while the success rate was 42.3% when the plaintiff was a credi-
tor.310 These figures suggest that English and U.S. courts are similarly 
averse to voluntary piercing. 
 Although the argument that the shareholders should not be al-
lowed to have it both ways carries considerable intuitive appeal, it is 
worth pondering whether it admits of exceptions or qualifications. This 
is illustrated by D.H.N.311 The benefit allegedly obtained by D.H.N. from 
its corporate structure was savings on a stamp duty.312 The cost was the 
loss of compensation for the disturbance of business.313 Although the 
opinion contained no information on the amount of compensation in 
dispute, it is likely to have exceeded the savings on stamp duty.314 Given 
this discrepancy between the realized costs and benefits of incorpora-
tion, one may defend voluntary piercing in D.H.N. on the grounds that 
there was a significant mismatch between the realized costs and benefits 
from incorporation, and that compulsory purchase is not something 
that D.H.N. could have reasonably foreseen. The argument is that when 
a potential incorporator considers whether to set up a corporation, it 
forms expectations of the benefits and costs of incorporation. It weighs 
these expected benefits and costs, and decides to incorporate if the 
former exceed the latter. Given that the incorporator cannot anticipate 
                                                                                                                      
309 Id. 
310 Thompson, supra note 7, at 1057. 
311 See D.H.N., [1976] 1 W.L.R. at 854–55, 857–60. The facts of this case are as follows: 
D.H.N., the corporate parent, operated a grocery business on a premise in Tower Hamlets, 
a borough in London. Id. at 857. D.H.N. had acquired the premise through a series of 
rather complex transactions that resulted in the land being owned by one of its wholly 
owned subsidiaries, Bronze. Id. at 854–55. The Tower Hamlets Borough Council issued a 
compulsory purchase order for the redevelopment of the land and offered compensation 
for the value of the land to the subsidiary. Id. at 854. The Council, however, refused to 
compensate the parent for the value of the business itself. Id. at 858. Under the Land 
Compensation Act, D.H.N. would only have been entitled to compensation if it had been 
more than a bare licensee of the land. Id. at 857–58. The English Court of Appeal unani-
mously pierced the veil between D.H.N. and Bronze and allowed compensation for the 
disturbance of business on a variety of grounds, including that the companies constituted a 
single economic entity, that D.H.N. had an irrevocable license to the land, and that D.H.N. 
had an equitable interest in the land. Id. at 859–60. 
312 See id. at 858. 
313 See id. at 857–58. 
314 See id. at 858, 860. 
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every contingency, it follows that it should not be held accountable for 
consequences that it should not be expected to have foreseen. 
 Although this may initially seem like a convincing argument, it is 
flawed in a number of ways. First, it is difficult to determine what the 
incorporator should have and should not have foreseen. Likewise, it is 
very difficult for a court to make this determination ex post. Second, 
and more important costs, there are also 
ex
ces 
In the end, the best rule is to 
purposes, namely, the protection of creditors from shareholder dissipa-
tion of corporate assets. This commentator characterizes the latter 
three as “functional substitutes or technically necessary complements to 
ly, while there are unexpected 
un pected benefits. Voluntary piercing may permit a court to save an 
incorporator from a substantial unexpected cost. Nevertheless, no legal 
doctrines exist to allow a court to remove the unexpected benefits. 
Therefore, permitting voluntary piercing under these circumstan
creates a windfall for the incorporator. 
require an incorporator to bear all the costs, expected and unexpected, 
of incorporation, which means that a court should not sanction volun-
tary piercing in a compensation case.315 
C. Issues External to the Doctrine 
 There are two further differences between the English and the 
U.S. corporate veil doctrines that do not directly bear on the judicial 
approaches to the doctrine, but are nonetheless interesting to note. 
1. Dearth of Complementary Doctrines 
 The first difference is the lack of related substitutes for the corpo-
rate veil doctrine under English law. One commentator has argued that 
fraudulent conveyance laws, dividend restraint statutes, the equitable 
subordination doctrine, and the corporate veil doctrine serve similar 
                                                                                                                      
315 See id. at 857–58 (explaining the argument advanced by the party opposing volun-
tary piercing). Even if one holds the view that a corporation should not bear the unex-
pected costs of incorporation, it is doubtful whether D.H.N. deserved compensation in this 
case. Lord Justice Shaw referred to the fact that D.H.N. could have maintained all the 
benefits of incorporation and conveyed the land to itself the day before the compulsory 
purchase order was issued, and would have received full compensation. Id. at 867. D.H.N. 
had become aware of the possibility of a compulsory purchase as early as February 1970, 
and had eight months until October 1970—when the order was finally issued—to convey 
the land back to itself. See id. at 858. No explanation was given for why D.H.N. had failed to 
do s at 856. Having been given ample opportunity to 
pro ’s voluntary piercing claim should have been re-
ject
o over this long period of time. See id. 
tect itself and failing to do so, D.H.N.
ed. See id. at 857–58. 
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the law of fraudulent conveyances.”316 Given the narrow scope of the 
English corporate veil doctrine, one would expect creditor protection 
 b
 claims.320 In light of the functional 
equivalence of these two doctrines321 and the English courts’ reserva-
of an equitable subordination doc-
ine
                                                                                                                     
to e taken on by these other doctrines. Veil piercing and equitable 
subordination, in particular, have substantial overlaps with each other 
in the United States.317 Both doctrines are triggered by a host of similar 
considerations, such as fraudulent conduct by the controlling share-
holder and inadequate capitalization of the corporation.318 Courts ap-
plying both doctrines have invoked the same language of “instrumen-
tality” or “alter ego.”319 
 Yet there is no equitable subordination under English insolvency 
law that allows the courts to subordinate a shareholder’s advances to 
the corporation below the creditors’
tions about veil piercing,322 the lack 
tr  in English law is not altogether surprising. There are, however, a 
host of statutory provisions under English law that perform similar 
functions as the fraudulent conveyance laws in the United States.323 
Therefore, the significance of a lack of equitable subordination in Eng-
lish law should not be overstated.324 
 
316 Clark, supra note 224, at 505. 
317 See Landers, supra note 96, at 590. 
nders, supra note 96, at 597–98. 
ity 504 (2005). 
e fraudulent conveyance laws in the 
Uni
. . there is scarcely any need for a doctrine of equitable 
sub
318 See Clark, supra note 224, at 518; La
319 See Landers, supra note 96, at 598. 
320 James O’Donovan, Lender Liabil
321 See Landers, supra note 96, at 590. 
322 O’Donovan, supra note 320, at 504. 
323 Id. at 458. A number of examples include Sections 238 through 241, and 423 through 
425 of the Insolvency Act. Sections 238 through 241 allow the courts to invalidate transac-
tions that constitute an unfair preference for a particular creditor or that are undervalued. 
Id. at 458–59. Sections 423 through 425 set aside transactions that are at an undervalue and 
entered into for the purpose of putting corporate assets beyond the reach of its creditors. 
Roy Goode, Principles of Corporate Insolvency Law 503–05 (2005). These sections 
replace the fraudulent conveyance provisions in the Law of Property Act, the application of 
which to the mere payment of money was not clearly established. See Sir Kenneth Cork, 
Insolvency Law and Practice—Report of the Review Committee 276 (1982). These 
provisions seem largely to serve the same purpose as th
ted States. See O’Donovan, supra note 320, at 458. 
324 O’Donovan, supra note 320 at 504 (“Indeed, with the arsenal of remedies and de-
fences available against lenders for misrepresentation, economic duress, breach of fiduci-
ary duty, wrongful and fraudulent trading, fraudulent and voidable dispositions, [and] 
transactions at an undervalue, . 
ordination in English law.”). 
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2. Absence of Federalism Concerns 
 The second further difference between English and U.S. corporate 
veil cases is the absence of federalism concerns in the former. One issue 
that has been raised in some U.S. corporate veil cases, especially those 
involving the enforcement of a federal statute, is the extent to which the 
policy considerations behind the federal statute trump state corporation 
law.325 It has been argued that in some statutory veil piercing cases, the 
rule of separate corporate personality frustrates federal regulatory pol-
icy.326 United States v. Bestfoods showcases the conflict between state cor-
poration law and federal regulatory policy.327  Bestfoods addressed the 
extent to which a parent corporation could be held liable for a subsidi-
ry’sa  operation of a polluting facility under the Comprehensive Envi-
ronmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA).328  
The Sixth Circuit applied Michigan corporate veil law and absolved the 
corporate parent in that case from liability in light of the court’s finding 
that the parent had not used the subsidiary to perpetrate fraud or to 
“subvert justice.”329 The Sixth Circuit further held that direct liability 
under CERCLA would only apply if the parent had sole or joint venture 
operation of a polluting facility.330 This holding is consistent with the 
traditional state law notion of separate corporate personality. 
 The Supreme Court, however, overturned the Sixth Circuit’s deci-
sion, and held that a parent corporation could be liable under CER-
LAC  even when its participation in the polluting facility is short of sole 
and joint venture operation.331 This decision can be understood as re-
flecting a recognition that the demarcation of a corporation’s bounda-
ries under state law would have obfuscated the federal policy behind 
CERCLA, which had been characterized as a “remedial statute de-
                                                                                                                      
325 See United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 63 (1998). 
326 Ronald G. Aronovsky & Lynn D. Fuller, Liability of Parent Corporations for Hazardous 
Substance Releases Under CERCLA, 24 U.S.F.L. Rev. 421, 463–67 (1990); Note, Piercing the 
Corporate Law Veil: The Alter Ego Doctrine Under Federal Common Law, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 853, 
871 (1982). But cf. Thompson, supra note 96, at 392. Thompson describes federalism as 
“an example of Latty’s triumph of a minor premise,” and argues that the alleged conflict 
between state corporation law and federal regulatory policy is “a conflict which does not 
exis ritten before Bestfoods was handed down, however, and 
he e y stated that it does not incorporate the Bestfoods decision. Id. at 379. It is possi-
ble 
s, 524 U.S. at 60. 
e Court, however, did not rule on the par-
ent 3. 
t.” Id. Thompson’s article was w
xpressl
that Bestfoods would have changed his view on the conflict. 
327 See Bestfood
328 Id. 
329 United States v. Cordova Chem. Co. of Mich., 113 F.3d 572, 582 (6th Cir. 1997). 
330 Id. at 81. 
331 Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 66–67. The Suprem
corporation’s liability and instead remanded the issue to the trial court. Id. at 72–7
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signed to protect and preserve public health and the environment.”332 
The Supreme Court circumvented this problem by adopting a more 
expansive interpretation of the term “operator” in the statute to over-
ride separate corporate personality under state law.333 
 The absence of federalism concerns is hardly surprising given that 
the United Kingdom is not a federalist polity and does not comprise a 
federal legal system alongside subordinate state legal systems. 334  Al-
ate personality arises, it is seldom 
resolved with a direct recognition of the conflict.339 Instead, it is medi-
ate re 
G)
                                                                                                                     
though the United Kingdom actually consists of two legal systems— 
England, Wales, and Northern Ireland, on the one hand, and Scotland, 
on the other—the two systems function in parallel.335 Moreover, there 
is only one body of company law for the entire United Kingdom. The 
Companies Act (2006) applies to the entire United Kingdom and there 
is no separate Scottish company law with which statutory policies pur-
sued by Parliament may clash.336 
 This is not to say that the notion of separate corporate personality 
under English company law does not clash with statutory policies. It 
only means that the interface between company law and statutory poli-
cies will often be different from the kind of interaction underpinned by 
federalism concerns that is seen in U.S. cases. In the United States, the 
interaction is often that of deference by state law to federal regulatory 
law.337 In the United Kingdom, company law need not yield to statutory 
policies as both are promulgated at the same level in the polity.338 Even 
then, given the hesitation of the English courts explicitly to discuss pol-
icy considerations in corporate veil cases, whenever a clash between 
statutory policies and separate corpor
d through traditional common law concepts.340 For instance, In 
(F  Films could have been treated as a case featuring a conflict be-
tween separate corporate personality and the statutory policy of the 
 
332 Cordova, 113 F.3d at 577. 
ds, 524 U.S. at 65–67. 
atter and Companies 
Acts
151 F.3d at 1300 (explaining the problems associated with reverse 
pier cision whether to adopt the doctrine rests with 
stat
k, supra note 323, at 12–13. 
e FG (Films) Ltd., [1953] 1 W.L.R. at 486. 
333 See Bestfoo
334 See S.H. Smith et al., The Modern English Legal System 4 (5th ed. 2007). 
335 Id. at 4. 
336 Companies Act 2006 c. 46, pt. 47, § 1299 (U.K.); see also Explanatory Notes to Com-
panies Act 2006, at para. 14 (Gr. Brit.) (“Company law is a reserved m
 extend to the whole of Great Britain.”), available at www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/ 
2006/46/contents (click “Explanatory Notes”; then click “Scotland”). 
337 See, e.g., Floyd, 
cing, but noting that ultimately the de
e corporate law). 
338 See Cor
339 See In r
340 See id. 
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Cinematograph Films Act to protect the British film market.341 There 
was little recognition of this conflict, however, and the court decided 
the case applying agency concepts.342 
III. A Reconciliation of the Two Corporate Veil Doctrines 
 Part II highlighted a number of important differences between the 
English and U.S. corporate veil doctrines. In particular, Part II ex-
plained that the prevailing approach to the corporate veil doctrine un-
der English law involves classification into common law categories such 
as agency, trust, and fraud.343 This approach is distinctly unfamiliar to 
the U.S. co wo doc-
trines are i any Eng-
lish corporate veil case  analysis used by U.S. 
ur
trine are the 
two  in 
corp tal-
ity d ego 
doct or-
mula hl v. 
Balti -
men
                                                                                                                     
rporation lawyer.344 Despite these differences, the t
n fact more similar than they seem at first glance. M
s share the same mode of
co ts under the instrumentality doctrine and the alter ego doctrine. 
In these cases, English courts have focused on the lack of economic 
substance of the company at issue and the presence of improper con-
duct, which are the two main prongs of the instrumentality doctrine. 
A. The Instrumentality and Alter Ego Doctrines in U.S.  
Corporate Veil Jurisprudence 
 The instrumentality doctrine and the alter ego doc
most systematic analytical frameworks applied by U.S. courts
orate veil cases. In Professor Thompson’s survey, the instrumen
octrine was applied in seventy-five cases. Alternatively, the alter 
rine was applied in 181 cases.345 One of the most authoritative f
tions of the instrumentality doctrine was laid down in Lowenda
more & Ohio Railroad.346 The Lowendahl court stated that three ele
ts must be satisfied to establish a corporate veil claim: 
(1) Control, not mere majority or complete stock control, but 
complete domination, not only of finances, but of policy and 
business practice in respect to the transaction attacked so that 
 
341 See id. 
), 208–223 (discussing English courts’ application of fraud to 
the 
3–130 (discussing U.S. courts’ readiness to 
ado s). 
at 156 (N.Y. App. Div. 1936), aff’d, 6 N.E.2d 56 (N.Y. 1936). 
342 See id. 
343 See supra text accompanying notes 124–135 (discussing English courts’ reliance on 
principles of agency and trust
corporate veil doctrine). 
344 See supra text accompanying notes 12
pt new doctrines in corporate veil case
345 Thompson, supra note 7, at 1063. 
346 See 247 A.D. 
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the corporate entity as to this transaction had at the time no 
separate mind, will or existence of its own; and (2) Such con-
trol must have been used by the defendant to commit fraud 
or wrong, to perpetrate the violation of a statutory or other 
positive legal duty, or a dishonest and unjust act in contraven-
tion of plaintiff’s legal rights; and (3) The aforesaid control 
and breach of duty must proximately cause the injury or un-
just loss complained of.347 
Accordingly, the instrumentality doctrine involves three elements. First, 
a corporation must be devoid of independence and economic sub-
stance.348 Second, there must be an improper purpose or conduct.349 
And third, there must be a showing that the “instrumentalization” of 
he c 350t orporation proximately caused injury to the plaintiff.  Frederick 
Powell, who first articulated this doctrine, identified eleven circum-
stances that tend to show that a corporation is an instrumentality,351 
and seven situations that qualify as improper purposes.352 The doctrine 
was originally conceived to apply only to parent-subsidiary relation-
ships, but has since been extended to individual shareholder cases.353 
One commentator has proposed a two-prong test for veil piercing that 
                                                                                                                      
 as its own; (10) the directors or 
exe
re not observed. Id. 
al fraud, (2) violation of a statute, (3) strip-
pin misrepresentation, (5) estoppels, (6) torts, and (7) 
oth justice. Id. 
347 Id. 
348 See id. 
349 See id. 
350 See id. 
351 Frederick J. Powell, Parent and Subsidiary Corporations 9 (1931). These cir-
cumstances are: (1) the parent corporation owns all or most of the capital stock of the 
subsidiary; (2) the parent and subsidiary corporations have common directors or officers; 
(3) the parent corporation finances the subsidiary; (4) the parent corporation subscribes 
to all of the capital stock of the subsidiary or otherwise causes its incorporation; (5) the 
subsidiary has grossly inadequate capital; (6) the parent corporation pays the salaries and 
other expenses or losses of the subsidiary; (7) the subsidiary has substantially no business 
except with the parent corporation or no assets except the ones conveyed to it by the par-
ent corporation; (8) in the papers of the parent corporation or in the statements of the 
officers, the subsidiary is described as a department or division of the parent corporation, 
or its business or financial responsibility is referred to as the parent corporation’s own; (9) 
the parent corporation uses the property of the subsidiary
cutives of the subsidiary do not act independently in the interest of the subsidiary but 
take their orders from the parent corporation in the latter’s interest; and (11) the formal 
legal requirements of the subsidiary a
352 Id. at 54. These situations are: (1) actu
g the subsidiary of its assets, (4) 
er cases of wrong or in
353 Krendl & Krendl, supra note 57, at 11. 
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focuses on “disregard of formalities and fairness.”354 The proposed test 
is almost identical to the eleven factors identified by Powell.355 
 The alter ego doctrine focuses on the lack of independence of a 
corporation from its shareholders. To show that a corporation is an al-
ter ego  
are fundamentally indistin milton v. Water Whole Inter-
                                      
, a plaintiff must show that the corporation and its shareholders
guishable.356 In Ha
national Corp., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit identi-
fied nine relevant factors for determining when a corporation becomes 
an alter ego.357 These factors largely overlap with the eleven identified 
by Powell.358 In many ways, the alter ego doctrine replicates the first 
prong in the instrumentality doctrine. 
B. Construction of an Instrumentality Doctrine from the English  
Corporate Veil Cases 
 There are traces of the instrumentality and alter ego doctrines in 
some English corporate veil cases, which similarly focused on the eco-
nomic substance of the corporation and the presence of impropriety. 
These cases, however, paid little attention to proximate causation. In 
cases in which the English courts pierced the veil, there was little doubt 
that the improper conduct caused the plaintiff’s injury, which largely 
obviated the need for a separate showing of proximate causation.359 
                                                                                
354
355
356 273, 
280 (6
357
poration’s assets were con-
veyed from the dominant corporation, (7) whether the dominant corpora-
the 
Id. 
ying notes 400–403. 
 Barber, supra note 14, at 397. 
 See id. at 397–98. 
 Transition Healthcare Assocs., Inc. v. Tri-State Health Investors, 306 F. App’x 
th Cir. 2009). 
 302 F. App’x 789, 793 (10th Cir. 2008). These factors are: 
(1) whether the dominant corporation owns or subscribes to all the subservi-
ent corporation’s stock, (2) whether the dominant and subservient corpora-
tions have common directors and officers, (3) whether the dominant corpo-
ration provides financing to the subservient corporation, (4) whether the 
subservient corporation is grossly undercapitalized, (5) whether the domi-
nant corporation pays the salaries, expenses or losses of the subservient cor-
poration, (6) whether most of the subservient corporation’s business is with 
the dominant corporation or the subservient cor
tion refers to the subservient corporation as a division or department, (8) 
ers or directors follow the domi-whether the subservient corporation’s offic
nant corporation’s directions, and (9) whether the corporations observe 
legal formalities for keeping the entities separate. 
358 Compare id. with Powell, supra note 351, § 6 (sharing most factors in common). 
359 See infra text accompan
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 In each of the three main categories of English corporate veil cas-
es—agency, fraud, and evasion of existing legal obligations—there are 
cases in which the analysis parallels the first two prongs of the instru-
orporate formalities, consummating “contracts of enormous 
ag
                                                                                                                     
mentality doctrine. Examples among the fraud cases include Gencor v. 
Dalby,360 Wallersteiner v. Moir,361 and Trustor v. Smallbone.362 In these cases, 
the defendant shareholder committed fraud and therefore impropriety 
was clearly present.363 The courts, however, did not base their corporate 
veil analysis solely on the existence of fraud, even though the conduct at 
issue in those cases was outright fraudulent.364 In addition to the im-
proper conduct, the courts emphasized the lack of economic substance 
of the companies. 
 In Gencor, one of the main issues was whether the sham company 
controlled by one of the officers, Mr. Dalby, was accountable to Gencor 
ACP for the commission paid to Dalby but deposited into the com-
pany.365 The commission could only have been recovered if the veil of 
the sham company was pierced.366 The court did so with little hesita-
tion, focusing on Dalby’s complete control over the company and its 
lack of genuine business substance such as “sales force, technical team 
or other employees capable of carrying on any business.”367 
 In Wallersteiner, holding the fraudster in the case, Mr. Wallersteiner, 
liable entailed piercing the veil of a number of sham companies he had 
formed in Liechtenstein.368 Lord Denning characterized the compa-
nies as Mr. Wallersteiner’s agents on the grounds that Wallersteiner had 
eschewed c
m nitude on their behalf on a sheet of notepaper,” and that he had 
commingled his funds with theirs, using “their moneys as if they were 
his own.”369 Although Lord Denning characterized the company as an 
agent, he was not using the term in the traditional common law sense, 
but in the U.S. alter ego sense.370 In Smallbone, the court pierced the 
veil of the company after describing it as “simply a vehicle used for re-
 
360 Gencor ACP Ltd. v. Dalby, [2000] 2 B.C.L.C. 734 (Ch.) at 742–44 (Eng.). 
e, [2001] 1 W.L.R. 1177 (Ch.) at 1177 (Eng.). 
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[20 42–44. 
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or, [2000] 2 B.C.L.C. at 740. 
40–42. 
361 Wallersteiner v. Moir, [1974] 1 W.L.R. 991 (A.C.) at 995–96, 1013 (Eng.). 
362 Trustor AB v. Smallbon
363 See Wallersteiner, [1974] 1 W.L.R. a
00] 2 B.C.L.C. at 7
364 See Wallerste
00] 2 B.C.L.C. at 742–44. 
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366 Id. at 7
367 Id. at 744. 
368 See [1974] 1 W.L.R. at 1013. 
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370 See id. 
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ceiving money from Trustor,”371 again emphasizing its lack of economic 
substance. 
 Within the agency category, the English case that best fits into the 
instrumentality doctrine is In re (FG) Films.372  In that case, a British 
company was created in an attempt to bypass a prohibition against the 
showing of non-British films in the United Kingdom.373 This consti-
tuted circumvention of a statute and would meet the impropriety prong 
of the instrumentality doctrine.374  Although the court characterized 
the English company as the U.S. company’s agent, it was clear that no 
genuine agency relationship existed between them.375 Meanwhile, the 
ur
ly had two directors and shareholders, 
                                                                                                                     
co t emphasized the fact that the company had “no place of business 
apart from their registered office, and . . . did not employ any staff,”376 
that it only had a capital of ₤100 when the film it had purportedly pro-
duced had cost ₤80,000 to make, and that it did not play any role in the 
production of the film.377 In the eyes of the court, the company was 
inadequately capitalized and lacked a genuine business operation and 
physical presence.378 These would likely be sufficient to satisfy the eco-
nomic substance prong of the instrumentality doctrine.379 
 Among the evasion of existing legal obligations cases, a number of 
them also applied analysis that largely parallels the first two prongs of 
the instrumentality doctrine. In these cases, the improper purpose 
prong is satisfied because upholding separate corporate personality 
would allow the defendant to evade its legal obligation, which would 
result in a wrong or injustice. In Gilford Motor Co. v. Horne, Judge Farwell 
set aside the company incorporated by Mr. Horne to escape his non-
compete obligations with his former employer by focusing on the fol-
lowing facts: (1) the company on
Horne’s wife and his former colleague; (2) the company had no physi-
cal premise of its own, and was only located in a garage in his home; 
and (3) the letterheads and notepapers of the company were practically 
 
e id. at 484. 
ering, supra note 5, at 495 (explaining that the term agency “was used descrip-
tivel ttempt was made to define the relationship in question in any precise legal 
sens
371 [2001] 1 W.L.R. at 1186. 
372 [1953] 1 W.L.R. 483 (Ch.) (Eng.). 
373 Se
374 See id. 
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y and no a
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376 In re F.G. (Films), [1953] 1 W.L.R. at 486. 
377 Id. 
378 See id. 
379 See id. 
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the same as those previously used by Horne himself.380 There was fur-
ther evidence that his wife took no active role in the company’s man-
agement and that he ran the company as if it were his own.381 These 
facts would support a finding of a lack of economic substance under 
the U.S. corporate veil doctrine. 
 In Jones v. Lipman, the defendant had contracted to sell property to 
the plaintiff, but subsequently changed his mind.382 To put the prop-
erty beyond the plaintiff’s reach, the defendant transferred it to a com-
any
corporate veil cases.390  By referring to 
companies whose veil is pierced as a façade, Lord Keith emphasized 
                                                                                                                     
p  he had bought for this very purpose.383 Calling the company “the 
creature of the first defendant, a device and a sham, a mask which he 
holds before his face in an attempt to avoid recognition by the eye of 
equity,”384 the court did not hesitate to pierce the veil and ordered spe-
cific performance of the contract.385 The non-compliance with corpo-
rate formalities was serious. The company did not issue share capital or 
possess any real physical premise.386 Nor was any director appointed.387 
It was obvious that this company had no genuine economic substance 
and was used solely to evade the defendant’s contractual obligation.388 
 Aside from a wealth of cases in which the English courts employed 
analysis resembling the instrumentality doctrine, the doctrine also re-
ceives tacit support from a leading judgment by the House of Lords. 
There is a close parallel between the first two prongs of the instrumen-
tality doctrine and Lord Keith’s statement in Woolfson that veil piercing is 
only justified if the corporate entity is used as “a mere façade concealing 
the true facts.”389 This is one of the most authoritative formulations of a 
test under the English corporate veil doctrine, and has been repeatedly 
invoked by English courts in 
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Trustor, [2001] 1 W.L.R. at 1184–85; In re Polly Peck Int’l plc, [1996] 2 All E.R. 433 (Ch.)at 
447 (Eng.) 
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th  lack of economic substance. A company with a genuine business 
operation and a high degree of economic independence would not like-
ly be called a façade. The reference to concealment of the true facts at 
least covers fraud and misrepresentation, two of the seven situations qu-
alifying as an improper purpose under Powell’s formulation.391 The ref-
erence can also be understood more broadly to encompass generally 
dishonest and deceptive conduct, such as asset stripping and circumven-
tion of a statutory provision.392 
eir
tality doctrine, and perhaps under the English corporate veil doctrine 
generally. The instru as no
     
 It should be clear by now that there are greater similarities in the 
approaches to veil piercing on both sides of the Atlantic than was pre-
viously assumed. In a way, this parallel is to be expected. If the question 
is whether the separate legal personality of a corporation should be set 
aside, it is difficult to avoid assessments of its economic substance and 
the propriety of the purpose for which the corporation is used. Label-
ing the corporation an agent, an instrumentality, or an alter ego does 
not alter the fundamental nature of the analysis. 
 There is ample support from case law for English courts to fashion 
their own version of the instrumentality doctrine. Doing so would help 
English courts provide clearer guidance to future litigants and would 
sharpen the focus of their analysis. Some modifications will be needed, 
however. First, given the English courts’ demonstrated reluctance to 
pierce the veil of a bona fide company,393 the economic substance prong 
of an English instrumentality doctrine should be crafted in such a way 
that the existence of a bona fide business operation precludes finding a 
lack of economic substance. Second, the preponderance of English cas-
es involving evasion of an existing legal obligation394 means that evasion 
should be expressly incorporated as one of the improper purposes un-
der the impropriety prong. A determination of whether an evasion has 
taken place can be made with reference to the modified evasion rule 
proposed above.395 Third, a decision needs to be made as to whether 
voluntary piercing should be permissible under this English instrumen-
mentality doctrine w t formulated with volun-
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393 See, e.g., Wallersteiner, [1974] 1 W.L.R. at 1013; Yukong, [1998] 1 W.L.R. at 305–10. 
394 See, e.g., Yukong, [1998] 1 W.L.R. at 294; Gilford Motor, [1933] Ch. at 935; Tjaskemolen, 
[1997] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. at 465; Creasey, [1992] B.C.C. at 638; Jones, [1962] 1 W.L.R. at 832, 
835–37. 
395 See supra text accompanying notes 28
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tary piercing in mind, and its focus on improper purposes arguably 
renders it unsuitable for these cases.396 Voluntary piercing usually entails 
the company pleading to pierce its own veil to obtain some benefits.397 
he
                                                                                                                     
T re is usually no improper purpose or conduct of the kind that Pow-
ell enumerated. If English courts decide to continue to allow voluntary 
piercing claims, a separate analytical framework is probably needed. 
Nonetheless, in light of the discussion of the demerits of voluntary 
piercing above,398 there is a strong argument in favor of precluding vol-
untary piercing claims.399 
 A remaining difference between the English cases and the U.S. 
instrumentality doctrine is the absence of discussions of proximate cau-
sation in the English cases.400 This omission is in some ways unremark-
able given that many U.S. courts and commentators do not insist on a 
proximate causation requirement.401 Such a requirement was arguably 
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 invoked. First, there must be such a unity of interest 
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398 See supra text accompanying notes 310–315. 
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1)); Sonora Diamond, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 836 (“In California, two conditions must be met 
before the alter ego doctrine will be
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unnecessary in the English cases discussed above. In most of them, 
there was little doubt that the defendant’s control of the company di-
rectly contributed to the plaintiff’s loss. In Gencor, Wallersteiner, and 
Smallbone, the company was an integral part of the fraudulent scheme 
to embezzle funds.402 In Gilford Motor and Lipman, the company played 
a pivotal role in the defendant’s attempt to evade its existing legal obli-
gation.403 The question remains, however, whether such a requirement 
ou
iffi
sh ld be incorporated into an English instrumentality doctrine. Un-
der most circumstances, requiring proof of proximate causation will 
create additional obstacles to plaintiff recovery and limit the availability 
of veil piercing. Given the English courts’ generally conservative atti-
tude toward veil piercing, the inclusion of a proximate causation re-
quirement of some kind seems appropriate. 
 If such a requirement is included, what should the causation link 
consist of? On one side is obviously the plaintiff’s loss. On the other side 
are two possibilities: the company’s lack of economic substance or im-
propriety.404 Some commentators argue that the plaintiff should be re-
quired to show that the lack of economic substance proximately caused 
its loss.405 This view, however, should be rejected. It would be extremely 
d cult for a plaintiff to prove that the overlap of corporate personnel 
or the sharing of physical premises proximately caused its loss. In most 
cases, the link between the lack of economic substance and the plain-
tiff’s loss is too tenuous to be demonstrated in court. Instead, the plain-
tiff should only be required to show that the improper conduct caused 
its loss. This represents a much more reasonable causation requirement. 
 What remains to be determined is the appropriate stringency of 
this requirement. Some commentators have criticized Powell’s formula-
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tion of t parent’s 
om
oped distinct approaches for veil piercing within corporate groups.408 
Professor Berle first proposed enterprise liability—the reassignment and 
r developed Berle’s proposal and 
cal 410
he third prong— “wrongful acts resulting from the 
d ination being the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s loss” —as too 
restrictive. Instead, such commentators have proposed a more liberal 
standard of “some reasonable connection between plaintiff’s injury and 
the action of the defendant.”406 The stringency of the third prong can 
be calibrated to reflect the courts’ view of the desirable scope of the 
corporate veil doctrine. It will need to be determined in future deci-
sions. 
IV. Revival of the Single Economic Unit Theory 
 Thus far, the discussion has emphasized the relative conservatism 
of the English corporate veil doctrine. There is in fact one area within 
the corporate veil doctrine in which the English courts have demon-
strated greater progressiveness than even U.S. courts: the single eco-
nomic unit theory. Under this theory, the court may impose general 
enterprise liability on a corporate group, something which even U.S. 
courts have been hesitant to do.407 Despite repeated suggestions of en-
terprise liability within the academic circle, U.S. courts have not devel-
imposition of liabilities within a corporate group based on a reconstruc-
tion of the economic boundary of the enterprise—in the 1940s.409 Sub-
sequent commentators have furthe
led for some version of enterprise liability.  Other commentators 
                                                                                                                      
406 Krendl & Krendl, supra note 57, at 27. 
407 See D.H.N. Food Distribs. Ltd. v. Tower Hamlets London Borough Council, [1976] 1 
W.L.R. 852 (A.C.) at 860 (Eng.); Thompson, supra note 96, at 388–92. 
408 See Adolf A. Berle, Jr., The Theory of Enterprise Entity, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 343, 352–54 
(1947); Thompson, supra note 96, at 388–92. 
409 Berle, supra note 408, at 354. 
410 See Blumberg, supra note 234, at 630 (“If a subsidiary corporation constitutes only 
one of a number of components of a corporate group collectively conducting a frag-
mented unitary business, the very basis for the establishment of limited liability as a matter 
of general legal policy disappears.”); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 234, at 111 (“Al-
lowing creditors to reach the assets of parent corporations does not create unlimited liabil-
ity for any people. Thus the benefits of diversification, liquidity, and monitoring by the 
capital market are unaffected.”); Landers, supra note 96, at 623 (“Moving beyond the 
threshhold problem of limited liability for the protection of ultimate investors in the en-
terprise, separate consideration must be given to the application of limited liability to cor-
porate groups. When limited liability is applied to multi-tiered corporate groups, layer 
upo
rl Hofstetter, Parent Responsibility for Subsidiary Corporations: 
 
n layer of insulation from liability can result.”). But cf Posner, supra note 219 (arguing 
against Landers’ proposal); Thompson, supra note 234, at 38–39 (defending limited liabil-
ity for corporate groups). Some scholars of English law have also advocated some version 
of enterprise liability. See Ka
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have advocated the imposition of shareholder liability on the corporate 
parent for its subsidiary’s torts.411 Notwithstanding these proposals, U.S. 
courts have largely applied the same analytical framework to corporate 
nd a individual shareholders.412 In fact, Professor Thompson found that 
U.S. courts appear more hesitant to pierce the veil against a corporate 
shareholder compared to an individual shareholder.413 
 In contrast, the single economic unit theory was specifically devel-
oped to address corporate groups.414 It was first propounded by Lord 
Denning in D.H.N.415 Unfortunately, he did not provide further elabo-
ration of the theory in the opinion.416 His reasoning for treating the 
three group companies as one entity was thin.417 Nor did he suggest 
how to distinguish circumstances where the theory applies from circum-
stances where it does not.418 Furthermore, D.H.N. was a compensation 
case, and it was never entirely clear how the single economic unit theory 
would apply to attempts to impose shareholder liability on the corporate 
                                                                                                                      
Evaluating European Trends, 39 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 576, 577–78 (1990); see also Clive M. 
Schmitthoff, The Wholly Owned and the Controlled Subsidiary, J. Bus. L. 218, 226 (1978) (argu-
ing in favor of presumption that parent company be liable for debts of wholly owned sub-
sidia
34. They called for the repeal of limited liability for cor-
pora
any may spawn a number of subsidiary 
com ctly by the shareholders of the parent company. 
If o ubsidiary companies, to change the metaphor, turns out to be the runt of 
the eclines into insolvency to the dismay of its creditors, the parent company 
and ompanies may prosper to the joy of the shareholders without any 
liab
.N., [1976] 1 W.L.R. at 860. 
e id. 
ry). 
411 See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 234, at 1932–34; Leebron, supra note 234, at 
1649–50. Hansmann and Kraakman’s proposal was in fact much broader. See Hansmann & 
Kraakman, supra note 234, at 1932–
te torts in general. See id. 
412 See Henn & Alexander, supra note 217, at 355. 
413 See Thompson, supra note 7, at 1055–56. The plaintiff’s success rate against corpo-
rate parents was found to be thirty-seven percent and that against individual shareholders 
forty-three percent. See id. at 1055. 
414 See D.H.N., [1976] 1 W.L.R. at 860. The single economic unit theory was indirectly 
inspired by Professor Adolf Berle. To support his treatment of the three companies in a 
corporate group as one entity, Lord Denning cited Laurence Gower. See Laurence Gower, 
Modern Company Law 216 (3d. ed. 1979). Gower in turn cited Professor Berle’s The The-
ory of Enterprise Entity, supra note 408. 
415 See D.H.N., [1976] 1 W.L.R. at 850. D.H.N. notwithstanding, English judges have as-
serted on various occasions that there is no presumption that group companies be treated 
as a single economic unit or an enterprise under English company law. See Harold Holds-
worth & Co. v. Caddies, [1955] 1 W.L.R. 352 (H.L.) at 363 (appeal taken from Scot.) 
(“[E]ach company in the group is in law a separate entity.”); In re Southard & Co., [1979] 1 
W.L.R. 1198 (A.C.) at 1208 (Eng.) (“English company law possesses some curious features, 
which may generate curious results. A parent comp
panies, all controlled directly or indire
ne of the s
litter and d
 the other subsidiary c
ility for the debts of the insolvent subsidiary.”). 
416 See D.H
417 See id. 
418 Se
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parent. 419  Two years after D.H.N. was decided, the House of Lords 
openly questioned the validity of the theory, although it stopped short 
of overruling it.420 And the theory has been repeatedly criticized in sub-
t to justify the revival of the single eco-
nomic unit theory in light of recent case law under both English com-
pany law and EU com general insights from 
con
sequent cases.421 Despite its theoretical infirmities and questionable va-
lidity, the single economic unit theory has continued to feature in Eng-
lish corporate veil cases.422 If the theory can be reformulated with a 
more clearly defined scope and provided a theoretical foundation, it 
can be rendered a useful tool for English courts in corporate veil cases. 
 What follows is an attemp
petition law, along with 
e omic theory. Based on lessons drawn from these sources, Part IV.D 
proposes a more formal structure for the theory so that it is capable of 
more predictable application. 
A. A Critique of the Theory 
 One needs to look no further than Lord Denning’s judgment itself 
to discern a central flaw in the single economic unit theory. He offered 
scant guidance on when group companies may constitute a single eco-
nomic unit. To substantiate his conclusion, he relied on two main ar-
guments. First, D.H.N., the corporate parent, “can control every move-
ment of the subsidiaries. These subsidiaries are bound hand and foot to 
the parent company and must do what the parent company says.”423 
Second, the group “is virtually the same as a partnership in which all the 
three companies are partners.”424 Control alone cannot be the deciding 
factor, for that would mean that the veil will be pierced between every 
wholly owned subsidiary and its parent.425 Moreover, no justification was 
                                                                                                                      
419 See id. at 857, 860. 
420 Woolfson v. Strathclyde Reg’l Council, (1978) S.C.(H.L) 90, 95–96 (appeal taken 
from Scot.). 
1990] Ch. 433 (A.C.) at 532–39 (Eng.); In re Polly 
Peck Int’l plc, [1996] 2 All E.R. 433 (Ch.) at 447–48 (Eng.) (Walker J.). 
., 
Tow nue Serv., 999 F.2d. 1387, 1393 (2d. Cir. 1993); 
Kin Co., 31 F.2d. 265, 267 (2d. Cir. 1929). 
421 See Vandekerckhove, supra note 17, at 72; see also Davies et al., supra note 15, at 
202–03. 
422 See Adams v. Cape Indus. plc, [
423 D.H.N., [1976] 1 W.L.R. at 860. 
424 Id. 
425 Lord Denning’s basis for concluding that D.H.N. controlled the subsidiary was that 
it had complete ownership of it. See id. at 856, 860. This argument was firmly rejected in 
Gramophone & Typewriter, Ltd. v. Stanley. See [1908] 2 K.B. 89 (A.C.) at 95–96 (Eng.). Many 
U.S. courts have similarly held that control alone does not justify veil piercing. See, e.g
e Antique Ford Found. v. Internal Reve
gston Dry Dock Co. v. Lake Champlain Transp. 
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provided for  cases.426  
her
licable in these two situa-
tions will be different. So are the relevant theoretical considerations. In 
ysis of limited liability is only relevant for in-
                                                                                                                     
applying partnership concepts to veil piercing
T e is in fact an inherent contradiction between Lord Denning’s two 
arguments. Generally, partners are co-equals in a partnership and wield 
the same management powers. There is no presumption that one part-
ner controls the others.427 By analogizing the three companies as part-
ners, Lord Denning implicitly suggested that they are autonomous enti-
ties, which contradicts his first argument that the parent controls the 
subsidiaries. 
B. Jurisprudential Support for a Revival of the Theory 
 For the purpose of reformulating the single economic unit theory, 
it is important to distinguish between voluntary piercing and involun-
tary piercing. The doctrinal framework app
particular, economic anal
voluntary piercing cases. Although voluntary piercing implicates sepa-
rate corporate personality, it almost never bears on limited liability.428 
As argued above, there is little theoretical justification for voluntary 
piercing.429 It was urged that English courts reconsider whether volun-
tary piercing should be permitted at all.430 Nevertheless, English courts 
continue to allow it, as was evident in the most recent corporate veil 
case Beckett Investment Management v. Hall.431 
1. Voluntary Piercing 
 There has always been firm jurisprudential support for applying 
the single economic unit theory to voluntary piercing cases. After all, 
the theory originated in such a case. 432  As mentioned above, even 
though the validity of the theory was openly questioned in Woolfson, the 
House of Lords stopped short of overruling it.433 Beckett, a case decided 
 
n-compete covenant); 
D.H le economic entity” theory and condi-
tion  as separate entities). 
0–315. 
5. 
H.L.) at 95–97. 
426 See D.H.N., [1976] 1 W.L.R. at 860. 
427 Henn & Alexander, supra note 217, at 70. 
428 Cf. Woolfson, (1978) S.C.(H.L.) at 95–97 (declining to treat subsidiary and parent 
company as separate entities in compulsory land acquisition proceedings); Beckett Inv. 
Mgmt. Grp. Ltd. v. Hall, [2007] EWCA (Civ) 613, [2007] I.C.R. 1539 (A.C.) (Eng.) (treat-
ing members of a corporate group as a single entity to effectuate no
.N., [1976] 1 W.L.R. at 852 (describing the “sing
s under which companies could be treated
429 See supra text accompanying notes 31
430 See supra text accompanying note 31
431 See Beckett, [2007] I.C.R. at 1545–46. 
432 See D.H.N., [1976] 1 W.L.R. at 860. 
433 See (1978) S.C.(
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by the English Court of Appeal in 2007, gave the theory a boost. In that 
case, the English Court of Appeal treated members of a corporate 
group as one entity in a voluntary piercing context. Specifically, the veil 
between group members was pierced at their behest to give effect to a 
covenant not to compete.434 Mr. Hall, the employee at issue in the case, 
signed an employment contract with the parent holding company, 
p ising not to solicit its customers within a certain time period after 
departure from his employment.
rom
rt to treat members of a cor-
ra
                                                                                                                     
435 Unfortunately for the group, the 
parent did not have any customers. All of the group’s services were pro-
vided by the subsidiaries.436 Nevertheless, the covenant expressly only 
referred to the holding company’s customers.437 A literal construction 
of the covenant would have rendered it meaningless. This predicament 
seemed to have been the result of a drafting oversight by the group’s 
lawyers.438 The court came to the employer’s rescue, and treated mem-
bers of the group as one entity for purposes of enforcing the covenant.439 
 Even though the Beckett court did not invoke the single economic 
unit theory by name, the outcome of the case fits squarely within the 
theory. The court treated the parent and the two wholly owned subsidi-
aries as a single entity.440 The facts in Beckett were similar to those in 
D.H.N. in that both cases required the cou
po te group as a single entity in order to allow the group to reap cer-
tain benefits.441 In D.H.N., the benefit was compensation for the distur-
bance of the parents’ business.442 In Beckett, it was the right to enforce a 
contractual covenant against a former employee.443 The justification 
for veil piercing is arguably even weaker in Beckett because the group’s 
predicament was entirely of its own making. In D.H.N. at least the com-
pulsory purchase was beyond the group’s control. The fact that the 
English Court of Appeal pierced the veil in Beckett provides consider-
able support for the single economic unit theory. 
 
ett, [2007] I.C.R. at 1545–46. 
enant because it 
only any, whereas other parts of the employment contract referred to 
the loyer had intended the covenant to extend to 
the have so stated. Id. at 1545. 
6. 
6] 1 W.L.R. at 860. 
434 See Beck
435 Id. at 1541–43. 
436 Id. at 1544. 
437 See id. 
438 See id. at 1545–46. The trial judge had refused to enforce the cov
 referred to the comp
company and its subsidiaries. If the emp
entire group, the judge reasoned, it would 
439 See id. at 1545–46. 
440 See Beckett, [2007] I.C.R. at 1545–4
441 See id.; D.H.N., [197
442 [1976] 1 W.L.R. at 860. 
443 Beckett, [2007] I.C.R. at 1541–42. 
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 This conclusion is further bolstered by a number of statements 
made by Lord Justice Kay, who decided Beckett. These statements indi-
cate that his decision was based on more than mere contractual inter-
pretation. Rather, he treated the companies as a single economic 
unit.444 To substantiate his decision, he cited Lord Denning’s judgment 
in Littlewoods Organisation Ltd. v. Harris,445 in which Lord Denning rea-
soned that “the law to-day has regard to the realities of big business. It 
takes the group as being one concern under one supreme control.”446 
Lord Justice Kay proceeded to declare that “unlike the [High Court] 
judge, I do not feel inhibited by a purist approach to corporate person-
 that Beckett was not a genuine corporate veil 
se
 The support from recent English cases for applying the single 
ct. One case that 
were transferred to the recently constituted Supreme Court of the 
Un ingdom, the House of Lords handed down a controversial and 
                                                                  
ality.”447 One may argue
ca  because there was no imposition of shareholder liability. Neverthe-
less, the English corporate veil doctrine has always encompassed more 
than mere shareholder liability cases.448 It has been regularly applied to 
situations similar to that in Beckett.449 The fact that the English Court of 
Appeal permitted a voluntary piercing claim—generally disfavored after 
Woolfson—further underscores the significance of this case and the sup-
port it lends to the single economic unit theory. 
2. Involuntary Piercing 
economic theory to involuntary piercing is less dire
supports such application is Stone & Rolls Ltd. v. Moore Stephens, in which 
the House of Lords tacitly applied the single economic unit theory to 
allow the attribution of the controlling shareholder’s fraudulent inten-
tions to the company at issue. Outside of the United Kingdom, applica-
tion of the theory to involuntary piercing finds support in a string of 
EU competition law cases. In fact, under EU law, there is a presumption 
of single economic unit if the parent owns all the shares of a subsidiary. 
a. The Stone & Rolls Ltd. v. Moore Stephens Decision 
 In the summer of 2009, in its last case before its judicial functions 
ited K
                                                    
s listed in note 119. 
444 See id. at 1545–46. 
445 [1977] 1 W.L.R. 1472 (A.C.) at 1482. 
446 See Beckett, [2007] I.C.R. at 1546. 
447 Id. 
448 See supra text accompanying notes 100–119. 
449 See supra source
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sharply divided decision in Stone & Rolls Ltd. v. Moore Stephens, in which 
it pierced the veil between a company and its sole beneficial share-
holder to impute his fraudulent intentions to the company.450 This im-
putation meant that the company’s professional negligence claims 
against its external auditors were barred under the tort law principle of 
ex turpi causa.451 The company at issue was Stone & Rolls (S&R), which 
was set up by Mr. Stojevic as part of a fraudulent scheme. 452  The 
scheme resulted in a loss in excess of £94 million for many bank lend-
ers.453 Stojevic had hired Moore Stephens to audit the company specifi-
lly
implicitly treated S&R and its parent, Isle of Man company, as one en-
                                                                                                                     
ca  to lend legitimacy to his fraudulent scheme.454 After the fraud was 
uncovered, the company promptly became insolvent and entered liq-
uidation proceedings. 455  The liquidators brought professional negli-
gence claims against Moore Stephens, arguing that the auditors had 
performed their external audits negligently.456 For the ex turpi causa 
principle to apply to bar these claims, Stojevic’s fraudulent intentions 
must be treated as the company’s. 
 The ownership structure of S&R was complicated. The company 
had a corporate parent, an Isle of Man company, which in turn was 
owned by Stojevic’s family trust.457 The relationship between him and 
his family trust was shrouded in mystery. What was known was that Sto-
jevic did not directly own any shares in S&R.458 Applying the ex turpi cau-
sa principle would require the House of Lords to treat Stojevic as S&R’s 
shareholder, which the majority did.459 In fact, the majority deemed him 
the company’s sole controlling shareholder.460 In doing so, the House 
 
olls Ltd. v. Moore Stephens, [2009] UKHL 39, [54]–[56] [2009] 1 A.C. 
139 om Eng.). It was a 3–2 decision in which Lord Scott 
of F
 its own illegal conduct. Id. at [20]. 
. 
 reduced). 
450 Stone & R
1 (H.L.) [54]–[56] (appeal taken fr
oscote and Lord Mance dissented. Id. at [88], [206]. 
451 See id. at [86]. This principle states that a claimant cannot recover under a tort claim if 
pleading that claim requires the claimant to invoke
452 See id. at [1]
453 See id. at [3]. 
454 Id. at [4]. 
455 Id. at [3]. 
456 See Stone & Rolls, 1 A.C. 1391 (H.L.) at [1], [3] (noting liquidators’ argument that 
had Moore Stephens exercised due care, they would have uncovered the fraud earlier and 
the company’s losses would have been
457 Id. at [90]. 
458 See id. at [90], [113]. 
459 See id. at [20], [51], [86]. 
460 See id. at [2]. The minority disagreed with the majority on this point. Lord Mance, 
for one, thought that the ownership interest of S&R was not entirely clear. See id. at [34]. 
Nevertheless, there was no dispute that Stojevic was the sole director of the company and 
controlled its affairs. See id. at [209]. 
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tity.461 As Stojevic had no direct ownership interest in S&R, the only way 
to deem him a shareholder was to collapse the entities at issue into one 
economic unit. The House of Lords proceeded to impute Stojevic’s 
fraudulent state of mind to S&R and barred its claims against external 
auditors.462 The single economic unit theory was thus tacitly invoked to 
permit the majority to achieve its desired result.463 What was most sur-
prising, given the English courts’ generally strict adherence to separate 
corporate personality, was how facilely the three Law Lords in the major-
ity treated S&R and its parent company as one entity. After a brief men-
tion of the Isle of Man parent in the beginning of the case, its existence 
was almost completely ignored for the remainder.464 
 Even though Stone & Rolls was primarily concerned with attribution 
of shareholder intentions to the company,465 there was no mistake that 
separate corporate personality was implicated. The majority set aside the 
separate legal personalities of the various companies to treat them as 
one entity. It then pierced the veil of this entity to impute Stojevic’s in-
tentions to it.466 Interestingly, this is not a case of forward veil piercing— 
the imposition of shareholder responsibility for corporate liabilities— 
                                                                                                                      
461 See id. at [2], [113]. 
ord Scott characterized the majority’s decision as “lifting the 
corpo epel 
the ex cou-
pled w ded 
to arg as in 
fact an rity’s 
veil pi
Id. a oed this sentiment, asserting that “S & R is a legal persona in its 
own  disagreement over S & R’s status as a separate legal entity was 
high nt characterizations of its role in the fraudulent scheme by the ma-
jority and the minority. Lord Phillips and Lord Walker were unequivocal in calling S & R a 
perp
]. 
462 See Stone & Rolls, 1 A.C. 1391 (H.L.) at [54], [86]. 
463 Id. at [86]. The House of Lords clearly appreciated that veil piercing was at stake in 
the case. What divided the majority and the minority was whether S & R’s separate person-
ality was to be respected. L
rate veil and treating S & R as if it were Mr Stojevic himself who was seeking to r
 turpi causa defence” on the basis of his “absolute beneficial owner[ship] . . . 
ith his undoubted absolute managerial control.” Id. at [118]. Lord Scott procee
ue that the veil should not be pierced because it was unclear whether Stojevic w
 absolute beneficial shareholder. Id. Lord Mance similarly objected to the majo
ercing, arguing that: 
I am also aware of no “policies or principles”, generally understood or not, 
which might limit a company’s recovery for a wrong done to it by reference to 
whatever loss its innocent shareholders might, if the corporate veil were 
lifted, be said themselves to have suffered. The suggestion that this could be 
the measure of a company’s recovery again ignores the company’s separate 
legal identity and interests. 
t [255]. Lord Scott ech
 right.” Id. at [118]. The
lighted by differe
etrator of the fraud, whereas Lord Scott labeled it a co-victim of Mr. Stojevic’s con-
duct. Id. at [1], [115], [126]. 
464 See id. at [1]–[87
465 See id. at [39]–[56]. 
466 See id. at [54]. 
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which is the usual type of veil piercing.467 It instead involved reverse veil 
piercing. The company was deemed responsible for its shareholder’s 
conduct.468 Reverse piercing is generally considered more controversial 
than forward piercing because the company’s stakeholders must share 
the company’s assets with the shareholder’s creditors.469 Given that in 
ore stakeholders—including shareholders 
d 
                                                                                                                     
most cases a company has m
an creditors—than an individual has creditors, and that a company 
does not control its shareholders’ conduct, reverse veil piercing affects 
more innocent parties and raises more fairness issues than forward 
piercing.470  The fact that the House of Lords countenanced reverse 
piercing in this case suggests a renewed readiness to set aside separate 
corporate personality when the circumstances so warrant. 
b. EU Competition Law Cases 
 EU courts have regularly applied the EU’s equivalent of the single 
economic unit theory in competition law (antitrust) cases to pierce the 
veil against corporate groups. In a recent decision, Akzo Nobel NV v. 
Commission, the European Court of Justice affirmed a line of previous 
cases, including Stora Kopparbergs Bergslags AB v. Commission,471  which 
held that complete share ownership establishes a rebuttable presump-
tion that the parent exercise control over the subsidiary.472 Absent a 
rebuttal of this presumption, the parent and the subsidiary will be 
treated as a single economic entity.473 In Akzo Nobel, subsidiaries in the 
Akzo Nobel group, a Dutch chemical group, were fined for their par-
ticipation in an international cartel concerning the chemical choline 
chloride.474 Liability of the subsidiaries was not in doubt as they had 
directly participated in the cartel. The European Commission sought to 
impose liability on the parent as well.475 In Michelin v. Commission, the 
 
467 See id. 
54]. Recovery was highly probable had the 
Hou
ee id. at [6]. 
, 
110 000); see also Youabian, supra note 297, at 592–95. 
97, at 593–95. 
 C-286/98, Stora Kopparbergs Bergslags AB v. Comm’n, 2000 E.C.R. I-9925, at 
par
473 Id. at paras. 60–61. 
468 See Stone & Rolls, 1 A.C. 1391 (H.L.) at [
se of Lords not barred the claims, given Moore Stephens’ admission of negligence in 
its audit. S
469 See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law
Yale L.J. 387, 398–405 (2
470 See Youabian, supra note 2
471 Case
a. 20. 
472 Case C-97/08, Akzo Nobel NV v. Comm’n, 2009 E.C.R. I-8237, at paras. 55, 58–62. 
474 Id. at paras. 12–17. 
475 Id. 
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then-European Court of First Instance476 emphasized that “Community 
competition law recognises that different companies belonging to the 
same group form an economic unit and therefore an undertaking with-
in the meaning of Article 81 EC and 82 EC if the companies do not de-
termine independently their own conduct on the market.”477 In Akzo 
Nobel, the European Court of Justice echoed this statement and asserted 
that “the concept of an undertaking, in the same context, must be un-
derstood as designating an economic unit even if in law that economic 
unit consists of several persons, natural or legal.”478 
 The support from these EU cases for the single economic unit 
theory is unmistakable. Similar to Lord Denning’s reasoning in D.H.N., 
the European Court of Justice reaffirmed that a parent and its subsidi-
aries are deemed one economic unit by virtue of the parent’s complete 
control of the subsidiaries.479 In fact, the single economic entity ap-
proach under EU competition law goes one step further than its coun-
terpart under English company law in two important ways. First, under 
the EU approach, complete share ownership establishes a rebuttable 
presumption that the parent exercises control over the subsidiary. The 
burden then bsidiary pos-
sse
                                                                                                                     
falls on the parent to demonstrate that the su
se s commercial autonomy.480 No such presumption exists under the 
English single economic unit theory.481 Second, under the EU law, not 
only does the parent become liable for the subsidiary’s fine, its own 
revenue will also be taken into account for the calculation of the 
fine.482 In other words, the EU single economic entity approach not 
 
476 The Court of First Instance was renamed the General Court. See Consolidated Version 
of th oning of the European Union art. 256, Sep. 5, 2008, [2008] O.J. 
47. 
ent’s turnover 
was 
revenue is now deemed to be two hundred million Euros. 
e Treaty on the Functi
477 Case T-203/01, Michelin v. Comm’n, 2003 E.C.R. II-4071, at para. 290. 
478 Akzo Nobel, 2009 E.C.R. I-8237 at para. 55. 
479 Id. at paras. 58–62. 
480 Id. at paras. 60–61. 
481 In fact, in Gramophone and Typewriter v. Stanley, the notion that complete share own-
ership of a subsidiary confers control over the parent was specifically rejected. [1908] 2 
K.B. at 93–94, 95–96, 98–100. 
482 Council Regulation 17, First Regulation Implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the 
Treaty, art. 15, 1962 J.O. (13) 204 (EC), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/RECH_ref- 
erence_pub.do (type in year as “1962,” OJ number as “13,” and page number as “204”; 
search for “all OJ series”; click hyperlink to only result). Assume that the subsidiary’s turn-
over was one hundred million Euros in the relevant time period, and the par
the same. Further assume that the Commission determines the fine to be ten percent 
of the undertaking’s turnover. After the application of the single economic entity ap-
proach, the fine for the group increases from ten million Euros to twenty million Euros as 
the undertaking’s 
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only shifts liability, it actually expands it. As a result, not only is limited 
liability abrogated, the liability of the group also increases. 
C. Economic Support for a Revival of the Theory 
 Economic analysis of limited liability only pertains to involuntary 
piercing, and specifically to the imposition of shareholder liability. This 
should be obvious because limited liability, with which economic analysis 
s.483 Eco-
cing. The 
iscu
and employees.487 The relevant 
attributes are their monitoring costs and risk-bearing abilities.488 Moni-
is concerned, is only implicated in involuntary piercing case
nomic analysis therefore has little relevance for voluntary pier
d ssion below focuses on the transaction cost implications of the sin-
gle economic unit theory. It analyzes how application of the theory will 
affect monitoring costs and risk allocation between the corporate parent 
of a wholly owned subsidiary and the subsidiary’s creditors. The discus-
sion begins by focusing on the imposition of a subsidiary’s liabilities on 
the corporate parent, or forward piercing. It then extends to a possible 
full-blown enterprise liability theory that covers forward piercing, re-
verse piercing, and lateral piercing between affiliated corporations. 
1. Corporate Parent Liability for Wholly Owned Subsidiaries 
 From an economic perspective, the optimal corporate liability rule 
is determined by reference to a number of attributes of the various 
stakeholder or claimant groups within a firm.484  These claimants in-
clude the shareholders and the creditors.485 The creditors can be cate-
gorized into involuntary creditors, who are mainly tort victims, and vol-
untary creditors.486 The voluntary creditors can in turn be subdivided 
into financial creditors, trade creditors, 
                                                                                                                      
483 See Peter B. Oh, Veil-Piercing 84 (U. Pitt. Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Se-
ries, Working Paper No. 2010-06, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 
cfm?abstract_id=1557972 (noting the assimilation of veil piercing tests into unincorporated 
business entities). 
484 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 234, at 99–101, 103–07 (describing the vary-
ing s associated with different liability 
regi pra note 35, at 133–36 (noting the liability regime’s impact on 
the information costs, which in turn affects creditors’ expected rate of re-
turn te 234, at 1588–1605 (discussing risk allocation among corporate 
mem
ischel, supra note 234, at 99. 
costs to creditors, shareholders, and other member
mes); Halpern et al., su
magnitude of 
); Leebron, supra no
bers under different liability regimes); Posner, supra note 219, at 507–09 (analyzing 
risk allocation under different liability regimes). 
485 See Easterbrook & F
486 See id. at 104, 107. 
487 Id. at 104. 
488 See id. at 104–06. 
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to g costs refer to the costs incurred by a corporate claimant to moni-
tor the management.
rin
onitoring costs can be determined by taking into 
s, a 
489 Monitoring is necessary to guard against fraud, 
self-interested transactions, and general mismanagement. 490  Risk-
bearing abilities refer to a corporate claimant’s ability to diversify away 
potential exposure to corporate insolvency through investments in oth-
er financial instruments.491 An efficient corporate liability rule is one 
that achieves an optimal level of firm-wide monitoring at the lowest ag-
gregate monitoring costs, and that allocates risks to the corporate claim-
ant group with the highest risk-bearing abilities.492 
 To determine the optimal corporate liability rule for monitoring 
costs, the analysis must compare the information costs of the various 
groups of creditors on the one hand and the shareholders on the other 
hand, and also compare the aggregate monitoring costs of the firm un-
der alternative rules of liability.493 Information costs refer to the costs 
incurred by a party to obtain and analyze information about the firm.494 
A claimant group’s m
account its information costs and monitoring level.495 With respect to 
information costs, if the shareholders have higher information costs 
than the creditors as a whole, then it would be more economically effi-
cient to place the burden of monitoring on the creditors. If, on the oth-
er hand, the creditors have higher information costs than the share-
holders, the shareholders should monitor instead. The optimal liability 
rule shifts losses in the event of bankruptcy to the claimant group that 
has lower information costs so that it has the incentive to undertake 
more monitoring.496 
 With respect to the monitoring level, the choice of liability rule may 
affect firm-wide monitoring costs in a number of ways. First—and re-
lated to information costs—shifting potential losses between sharehold-
ers and creditors alters their incentives to monitor.497 Second, it affects 
their scope of monitoring. If, following a change of liability rule
                                                                                                                      
489 See Leebron, supra note 234, at 1605–08; see also Posner, supra note 219, at 507–09 
(describing the costs associated with obtaining information and supervising a corpora-
tion’s internal affairs). 
490 See Leebron, supra note 234, at 1606. 
494 See Posner, supra note 219, at 508, 514–15. 
 at 99–101; Posner, supra note 219, at 516–
17. 
a note 234, at 1605–07. 
 Fischel, supra note 234, at 115. 
491 See id. at 1588–1605. 
492 See Posner, supra note 219, at 507–09. 
493 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 234, at 99–101. 
495 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 234,
496 See Leebron, supr
497 See Easterbrook &
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claimant group has to monitor a wider range of issues, its overall moni-
toring level will be higher.498 Third, shifting losses changes the informa-
tion costs of the various corporate claimants. A change of liability rule 
may alter information costs by shifting the relative bargaining powers 
between the outside creditors and the firm.499 Under a rule of unlim-
ited liability, for example, the outside creditors have the liability rule in 
their favor. If the shareholders want to contract out of unlimited liability, 
the creditors will be in a position to demand concessions, such as 
greater access to information. This reduces the creditors’ information 
costs. 
 Applying the above concepts and analytical framework, the corpo-
te 
ctive is one that imposes liability on the 
rp
the need to monitor shareholder wealth will be obviated under a pro 
                                 
ra parent clearly has lower information costs than any creditor. The 
case of involuntary creditors is easy to dispose of as these creditors rare-
ly have the opportunity to monitor the corporation.500 In most tort cas-
es, the victim has no prior knowledge of the identity of the tortfeasor.501 
Even for voluntary creditors—including the most sophisticated ones 
such as institutional investors and lenders—their access to information 
is likely to be more limited and costly than that of a corporate parent, 
which will have practically unfettered access to information from the 
subsidiary.502 In fact, it makes little sense even to speak of monitoring 
because the parent controls the subsidiary. The same entity is both 
monitoring and being monitored. Therefore, the optimal liability rule 
from a monitoring cost perspe
co orate parent for the subsidiary’s liabilities. 
 Many commentators have observed that unlimited liability will in-
crease monitoring costs because it will cause shareholders to monitor 
the wealth of fellow shareholders.503 This is important information to 
shareholders because their share of liability will be contingent on fellow 
shareholders’ wealth, should unlimited liability be joint and several.504 
This observation has little relevance for the single economic unit the-
ory for two reasons. First, many commentators have pointed out that 
                                                                                     
e Halpern et al., supra note 35, at 145–47. 
1. 
, at 93–97; Halpern et al., supra note 35, at 
136
498 See id. at 90–91. 
499 See id. at 99–101. 
500 Se
501 See Leebron, supra note 234, at 1601 n.114. 
502 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 234, at 99–101, 105–06. 
503 See id. at 99–100; Halpern et al., supra note 35, at 130–3
504 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 234
–38. 
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rata rule.505 Second, and more importantly, given that the single eco-
nomic unit theory only applies to wholly owned subsidiaries, there is 
o one shareholder and no one else’s wealth that the corporate par-
ent needs to monitor.
nly 
 investment can be diversi-
ed 
506 
 Some commentators argue that unlimited liability will cause the 
subsidiary’s creditors to monitor the shareholders’ wealth—or in the 
case of the single economic unit theory, the corporate parent’s credit 
worthiness.507 Although that may be true, a wholly owned subsidiary’s 
creditors only need to monitor the wealth of one shareholder: the cor-
porate parent. The increase in monitoring costs would not be substan-
tial. Therefore, from a monitoring cost perspective, the single economic 
unit theory would be an efficient rule because it shifts incentives to 
monitor to the corporate parent, which has the lowest information 
costs.508 It thus reduces the aggregate monitoring costs of the subsidiary. 
 To determine the optimal corporate liability rule from the per-
spective of efficient allocation of risks, the analysis entails identifying 
the corporate claimant group with the greatest ability to diversify away 
the non-systematic risks of its investment in the firm. 509  Under the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model, each investment entails systematic risks, 
which arise from fluctuations in the general economy. They also entail 
non-systematic risks, which are peculiar to a particular firm or business 
sector.510 Non-systematic risks of a particular
fi away through the purchase of another investment that tends to 
move in the opposite direction from the investment at issue.511 System-
atic risks, meanwhile, cannot be eliminated through diversification.512 
A corporate claimant’s ability to diversify away the non-systematic risks 
of his or her investment in the firm depends on a number of factors, 
most notably the proportion of investment in his or her overall asset 
portfolio.513 If an individual has personal assets of one million dollars 
and invests fifty percent of them in a firm, it is unlikely that diversifica-
                                                                                                                      
505 See Halpern et al., supra note 35, at 137–38; Leebron, supra note 234, at 1581; Ste-
phen B. Presser, Commentary, Thwarting the Killing of the Corporation: Limited Liability, De-
mocracy, and Economics, 87 Nw. U. L. Rev. 148, 160–61 (1992). 
lpern et al., supra note 35, at 133–35. 
 note 234, at 
1595
phen A. Ross et al., Corporate Finance 267–70 (4th ed. 1996). 
69–70, 293–94. 
506 See Leebron, supra note 234, at 1605–08. 
507 See Halpern et al., supra note 35, at 134; Posner, supra note 219, at 516–17. 
508 See Ha
509 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 234, at 96–97; Leebron, supra
–1600. 
510 Ste
511 Id. at 269–70. 
512 Id. 
513 See id. at 2
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tion will eliminate the non-systematic risks of that investment. If that 
individual invests one percent of his or her assets to buy the shares of a 
listed corporation, he should be able to diversify away the non-
systematic risks through purchases of other financial assets. 
 It may seem that the sole shareholder of a corporation is least able 
to diversify away risks. This is because its investment in the firm is likely 
to account for a greater proportion of its overall asset portfolio in com-
parison to the exposure of financial lenders or other creditors to this 
firm.514 The logical conclusion would be that the optimal rule from a 
risk allocation perspective would be to provide limited liability, which 
may undermine the premise of the single economic unit theory.515 This 
argument, however, is invalid for two reasons. First, while the above rea-
 the economic literature is the role 
 li
fear of exposing themselves to massive liability payments.520 This would 
cause corporate investments to dry up, which would be highly detri-
mental to businesses. These scholars have in mind passive individual 
                                                                                                                     
soning may be true for an individual shareholder, it is probably untrue 
for the parent of a bona fide corporate group, which has considerable 
ability to diversify its portfolio.516 In fact, in some instances, the raison 
d’être of corporate groups or conglomerates is diversification.517 There-
fore, the corporate parent of a subsidiary is likely to have no less ability 
to diversify than any outside creditors. Second—and more impor-
tantly—is that in the context of the single economic unit theory, the 
shareholder at issue controls the firm.518 It has the ability to manage its 
risk exposure to the subsidiary. If a particular corporate claimant can 
control its own risk exposure, it would be economically efficient to shift 
corporate insolvency risks to the corporate claimant.519 This means that 
a corporate parent should be liable for its subsidiary’s debts, which 
supports the use of the single economic unit theory as a basis for invol-
untary piercing within corporate groups. 
 Another consideration raised in
of mited liability in attracting corporate investment. It has been ar-
gued that one of the most persuasive justifications for limited liability is 
that without it, investors would shy away from corporate investments for 
 
e id. 
 note 35, at 
127
514 See Leebron, supra note 234, at 1627–28. 
515 See id. 
516 See id. at 1629–30. 
517 Se
518 See Akzo Nobel, 2009 E.C.R. I-8237, at para. 60. 
519 See Leebron, supra note 234, at 1629–30. 
520 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 234, at 95–96; Halpern et al., supra
–29. 
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investors in publicly traded corporations.521 This concern is unlikely to 
matter in the situations covered by the single economic unit theory. 
First, the firms covered by the theory are wholly owned subsidiaries. 
They are not publicly traded.522 Second, the only investor at issue in 
 corporate parent, which is anything but passive. 
-
signment to creditors of priorities in the distinct pools of assets that re-
these companies is the
If its subsidiary may expose it to shareholder liability, it has the power 
to prevent such liability from materializing given its complete control 
over the subsidiary’s operations.523 
 In sum, transaction cost analysis of limited liability lends strong 
support to the use of the single economic unit theory to hold a corpo-
rate parent liable for its wholly owned subsidiaries’ debts. Other com-
mentators have made similar suggestions in the past.524 What remains 
o bet  seen is whether economic analysis also supports the introduction 
of full enterprise liability under the single economic unit theory. 
2. Enterprise Liability 
 The single economic unit theory need not be confined to the im-
position of subsidiary liability on a corporate parent. One commentator 
famously proposed single enterprise liability for a corporate parent and 
all of its wholly owned subsidiaries. 525  The important question is 
whether the single economic unit theory should be similarly extended 
to reverse piercing and lateral piercing, in addition to the forward pierc-
ing considered above. 
 Other commentators have argued that separate corporate person-
ality526 is important because it allows economically efficient asset parti-
tioning, which they define as “the designation of a separate pool of as-
sets that are associated with the firm, and that are distinct from the 
personal assets of the firm’s owners and managers . . . [and] the as
                                                                                                                      
521 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 234, at 95. 
as. 59–61 (describing the relationship of a 
pare
82–90 (arguing for use of single economic unit theory in tort claims); Lee-
bron  note 234, at 1588–95. 
, supra note 96, at 590. 
nn & Kraakman, supra note 469, at 393. In fact, they use a different 
term y than “separate corporate personality.” For the sake of clarity, however, this 
Arti
522 Cf. Akzo Nobel, 2009 E.C.R. I-8237, at par
nt company to its subsidiary, distribution of shares, and extent of control). 
523 See id. at para. 60; Leebron, supra note 234, at 1627. 
524 See, e.g., Blumberg, supra note 234, at 623–34; see also Hansmann & Kraakman, supra 
note 234, at 18
, supra
525 See Landers
526 See Hansma
inolog
cle will continue to use “separate corporate personality,” the terminology familiar to 
most readers. 
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su from the formation of a legal entity.”lt 
ments made by each 
ar
preserved under practically all circumstances.538 
                                                                                             
527 Asset partitioning is efficient 
because it reduces monitoring costs.528 There are two types of asset par-
titioning: affirmative and defensive.529 Affirmative asset partitioning re-
fers to the assignment “to the firm’s creditors a claim on the assets asso-
ciated with the firm’s operations that is prior to the claims of the 
personal creditors of the firm’s owners,” and defensive asset partitioning 
refers to “granting to the owners’ personal creditors a claim on the 
owners’ separate personal assets that is prior to the claims of the firm’s 
creditors.”530 As a result, forward piercing overrides defensive asset par-
titioning, and reverse piercing trumps affirmative asset partitioning.531 
 According to these commentators, affirmative asset partitioning is 
the most important attribute of corporation law.532 Without affirmative 
asset partitioning, the creditor of any shareholder can proceed against 
the corporate assets and petition for the firm’s liquidation.533 There-
fore, the firm’s creditors will need to monitor each shareholder’s cred-
itworthiness along with the firm’s.534 To make matters worse, the firm’s 
creditors will also need to monitor the invest
sh eholder because the firm’s assets may be called upon as a result of 
a failed investment by any shareholder.535 The firm’s creditors will not 
be the only ones with incentives to conduct such monitoring. The 
shareholders will also monitor each other.536 Reverse piercing, which 
overrides affirmative asset partitioning, will hence result in a substantial 
increase in monitoring costs. In contrast, defensive asset partitioning, 
which implicates limited liability, is less essential and the argument for 
it less conclusive.537 This explains why there are different variations of 
defensive asset partitioning, while affirmative asset partitioning is fully 
                         
t 393. 
an, supra note 297, at 574–76 (explaining that in forward piercing 
case rporation may be held personally liable for corporate obliga-
tion y be held liable for the debts of 
its s
 
 & Kraakman, supra note 469, at 423. 
527 Id. 
528 Id. at 398. 
529 Id. a
530 Id. 
531 See id.; Youabi
s the stockholders of a co
s, whereas in reverse piercing cases the corporation ma
hareholders). 
532 See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 469, at 406. 
533 Id. at 402. 
534 Id. 
535 Id.
536 Id. at 402–03. 
537 See id. at 423, 428–32. 
538 See Hansmann
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 The implication of the foregoing discussion for the single eco-
nomic unit theory and the corporate veil doctrine generally is that for-
ward piercing is economically more defensible than reverse piercing.539 
Nonetheless, the impact of reverse piercing under the single economic 
unit theory on the benefits of affirmative asset partitioning may not be 
as serious as has been suggested. The increase in monitoring costs will 
be much less substantial in the case of a wholly owned subsidiary. The 
commentators referred to above have acknowledged this.540 Given that 
there is only one shareholder, there will be no cross-shareholder moni-
toring.541 Subsidiary creditors’ monitoring of the parent will be more 
an
of their businesses. On one end of the spectrum are corporations that 
ope the same line of business, perhaps as producers of different 
com be called integrated sub-
sid e spectrum are members of a con-
glo ses are unrelated to each other. These corpo-
rati or nonintegrated subsidiaries.546 
m ageable, even though they will still need to monitor the corporate 
parent’s risk exposure, including the finances of affiliated corporations 
within the group.542 A separate justification for allowing reverse pierc-
ing, at least under some limited circumstances, is that otherwise corpo-
rate parents will simply move their assets to their subsidiaries to avoid 
liability.543 The parent will itself contract liabilities with outside credi-
tors while keeping its assets in the subsidiaries.544 A categorical refusal 
to sanction reverse piercing would be tantamount to an open invitation 
for manipulation. 
 From an economic perspective, whether lateral piercing between 
two affiliated corporations should be allowed depends on the degree of 
integration between the two corporations’ businesses. With respect to 
affiliated corporations, one can align them by the degree of integration 
rate in 
ponents of the same product. These may 
iari .  On the othe
sines
es 545 r end of th
merate whose bu
ons may be called conglomerate 
                                                                                                                      
539 See id. at 398–405. Hansmann and Kraakman identified additional benefits for de-
fensive asset partitioning, namely decision-making economies, enhanced creditor monitor-
ing, economies of transfer, and risk-bearing economies. Id. at 424–27. These benefits are 
likely to be negligible, however, for a wholly owned subsidiary and its corporate parent. Id. 
at 402. 
540 See id. (“The advantages of asset partitioning, and particularly of affirmative asset 
partitioning, are far more obvious in the case of a business firm that has numerous indi-
viduals as owners.”). 
541 See id. 
542 See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 469, at 402. 
543 See Leebron, supra note 234, at 1623. 
544 See id. at 1613–14, 1623. 
545 See id. at 1616–17. 
546 See Leebron, supra note 234, at 1616–17. 
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General Electric is the quintessential conglomerate.547 The disaggrega-
tion of a single line of business into distinct legal entities yields few 
economic benefits in terms of diversification. 548  Hence, there is a 
strong argument for lateral piercing between integrated subsidiaries. 
The argument for limited liability is greater for conglomerate subsidiar-
ies, no less because it will be easier for creditors to monitor affiliated 
corporations with distinct businesses than for them to monitor one sub-
sidiary operating two businesses.549  In the former scenario, the two 
creditor groups need not spend time to familiarize themselves with an-
other line of business.550 As an illustration, the argument for lateral 
ier
en the affiliated corporations.553 Separate corpo-
rate personalities should be upheld for affiliated corporations with dis-
                                                                                                                     
p cing between the two subsidiaries in D.H.N. would be strong, given 
that they had no independent business of their own and merely owned 
different parts of the same grocery business.551 
 In summary, the economic justifications for forward piercing un-
der the single economic unit theory are strong. The theory should be 
made readily available for the imposition of subsidiary liabilities on a 
corporate parent. The argument is less conclusive for reverse piercing, 
in light of the impact it has on the benefits of affirmative asset parti-
tioning.552 Still, the need to forestall circumvention means that reverse 
piercing must be permissible at least under some circumstances. 
Whether lateral piercing should be permitted depends on the degree 
of integration betwe
 
bout General Electric’s diverse range of business, which in-
healthcare, security, oil and gas, media, and entertainment, 
e h
for contractual claims between a corporate parent and its wholly owned subsidiary serves 
the purpose of isolation of assets for the purpose of secured borrowing. Therefore, limited 
liab itors. Id. at 1614. Although 
this  may be valid for financial creditors, it has little applicability for trade credi-
tors  contractual creditors into account, it is not so 
clea rent against its wholly owned sub-
sidi ent. 
34, at 1616–17. 
547 See id. For information a
cludes aircraft engines, finance, 
se ttp://www.ge.com/products_services/index.html. 
548 See Leebron, supra note 234, at 1616–17 (“From a financial and commercial per-
spective, such entities are not truly independent. Investments in them do not represent a 
diversification of risk, and thus there is no reason to recognize a regime of limited liability 
for them, at least with respect to tort claimants.”). Professor Leebron’s proposal was con-
fined to tort claims, hence the caveat at the end of his statement. Nevertheless, his reason-
ing is equally valid for contractual claims. He also argued that upholding limited liability 
ility should continue to apply to the claims of financial cred
 argument
 and employees. Taking these latter two
r that limited liability protection for a corporate pa
ary’s contractual claims is economically effici
549 See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 469, at 399–401. 
550 See id. 
551 D.H.N., [1976] 1 W.L.R. at 854–56. 
552 See supra notes 532–538 and accompanying text. 
553 See Leebron, supra note 2
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tinct lines of business.554 Veil piercing should be allowed against inte-
grated subsidiaries. 
D. Reformulation of the Theory 
1. Involuntary Piercing 
 Thus far, the discussion of the single economic unit theory has 
proceeded on the premise that it only applies between a corporate par-
nt ae nd its wholly owned subsidiaries. D.H.N. and Beckett both featured 
such groups.555 One problem with this narrow scope of application is 
that it exposes the theory to easy circumvention. There was no concern 
about circumvention in those two cases because they both involved vol-
untary piercing.556 In an involuntary piercing context, however, a cor-
porate parent bent on avoiding shareholder liability could do so simply 
by adding a nominal shareholder to the subsidiary.557 To preempt such 
circumvention, the theory needs to be modified so that it continues to 
apply to cases where the additional shareholders are merely nominal. 
To escape the reach of the theory, the shareholders other than the cor-
porate parent must evince meaningful independence from the corpo-
rate parent. 
 Complete, or virtually complete, share ownership is only a neces-
sary—but not sufficient—condition for invoking the theory. Only when 
the corporate parent actually controls the subsidiary can it be fairly 
deemed responsible for the subsidiary’s conduct and liabilities. A re-
quirement of control is consistent with economic analysis. Conclusions 
about the corporate parent’s lower information costs and superior risk-
bearing abilities are both premised on its control over the subsidiary, as 
is the argument that shareholder liability will not deter a corporate 
are 558p nt from investing in its subsidiary.  Without actual control, a cor-
porate parent may no longer be the least-cost monitor or optimal risk-
bearer. The economic justifications for applying the single economic 
unit theory will be weaker. Control must entail more than the mere 
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rt of Appeal treated the parent and the two subsidiaries as a single entity, 
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te 234, at 99–101; Leebron, supra note 234, at 
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555 See Beckett, [2007] I.C.R. at 1545–46; D.H.N., [1976] 1 W.L.R. at 857–58. In Beckett, 
the English Cou
out clarifying their ownership structure or specifying that they were wholly owned. See 
[2007] I.C.R. at 1545–46. 
556 See id. at 1544–46; D.H.N., [1976] 1 W.L.R. at 857–59. 
557 See Youabian, supra note 297, at 594. 
558 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra no
–78, 1630. 
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power to elect directors.559 A corporate parent is only deemed to exer-
cise control over a subsidiary if it can command its daily operations.560 
The mere ability to elect directors may not allow the parent to lower its 
information costs and control its risk exposure to the subsidiary effec-
tively. Moreover, every corporate parent with complete or close to com-
plete share ownership of its subsidiaries has the power to elect direc-
tors.561 If mere ability to elect directors qualifies as control, it would 
practically eviscerate the control requirement. 
 Nevertheless, it remains to be determined which party should bear 
the burden of proving or negating control. From an evidentiary per-
conduct include fraud, evasion of existing legal obligations, and cir-
     
spective, the burden of proof should rest on the corporate parent be-
cause it will have greater access to evidence that is needed for disprov-
ing its control of the subsidiary.562 This may be done by showing that 
the board exercises independent judgment in the daily operations of 
the subsidiary or that the subsidiary has acted against the parent’s wish 
in the past.563 To invoke the single economic unit theory in involuntary 
piercing cases according to this theory, then, the plaintiff will first be 
required to demonstrate the absence of independent shareholders in 
the subsidiary, which establishes a presumption of actual control by the 
corporate parent. The burden of proof then shifts to the parent to re-
but the presumption of control. 
 The elements of the theory that have been discussed so far pertain 
to the independence and integrity of the subsidiary, or to use the ter-
minology of the instrumentality doctrine—the economic substance of 
the subsidiary. As a variation of the corporate veil doctrine, the single 
economic unit theory should require an improper conduct or purpose, 
at least in the involuntary piercing context. This parallels the impropri-
ety prong of the instrumentality doctrine.564  Examples of improper 
                                                                                                                 
559 Cf. Gramophone, [1908] 2 K.B.at 95–96 (noting that the power to elect directors 
alone does not confer corporate control). 
presumption of liability for fines imposed on its subsidiar-
ies)
ns without the 
par
companying text. 
560 See United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 55 (1998) (holding that a corporate par-
ent that actively exercised control over the operations of a subsidiary’s facility may be di-
rectly liable as an operator of that facility). 
561 See Douglas & Shanks, supra note 1, at 196. 
562 Cf. Akzo Nobel, 2009 E.C.R. I-8237, at paras. 60–61 (holding that the parent company 
has the burden of rebutting a 
. 
563 One example of such independence is found in Craig v. Lake Asbestos of Quebec Ltd., 
where the parent could not prevent the subsidiary from making acquisitio
ent’s consent. 843 F.2d 145, 152 (3d Cir. 1988). 
564 See supra notes 347–350 and ac
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cumvention of statutes.565 The impropriety requirement distinguishes 
the single economic unit theory from the kind of general enterprise 
liability proposed by some commentators.566 Although the economic 
analysis presented earlier may lend support to general enterprise liabil-
ity, imposition of shareholder liability absent impropriety would be a 
dramatic extension of the English corporate veil doctrine.567 Despite 
some support for this approach in Rainham Chemical Works, in which 
shareholder liability was imposed for a corporate tort in the absence of 
pr
                                                            
im opriety,568 the weight of English case law clearly indicates that im-
propriety must be present before shareholder liability can be im-
posed.569 Therefore, once control on the part of the corporate parent 
is established, the burden of proof shifts back to the plaintiff to demon-
strate the presence of impropriety. Lastly, in keeping with an earlier 
suggestion of incorporating a proximate causation requirement in an 
English instrumentality doctrine,570 the plaintiff should additionally be 
required to show that the improper conduct by the parent contributes 
to its loss. Once all these elements are met, the single economic unit 
theory applies to impose liability on the corporate parent. 
 Both reverse piercing and lateral piercing should only be permit-
ted under limited circumstances. In particular, they should only be al-
lowed if there is evidence of asset stripping to evade liability. Yukong 
Line Ltd. of Korea v. Rendsburg Investments Corp. of Liberia illustrates how 
lateral piercing can be crucial for preventing liability evasion.571 In that 
case, Rendsburg repudiated a charter-party with Yukong after market 
conditions had deteriorated.572 On the same day, Rendsburg’s share-
holder transferred its assets to another company controlled by him.573 
Although the shareholder at issue was an individual,574 one can easily 
imagine the same sequence of events transpiring with a corporate par-
ent. Without lateral piercing, a corporate parent could do exactly what 
                                                          
565 See Lowendahl v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 247 A.D. 144, 145 (N.Y. App. Div. 1936), 
aff’d, 6 N.E.2d 56 (N.Y. 1936). 
566 See, e.g., Blumberg, supra note 234, at 621–26; Landers, supra note 96, at 651–52. 
4]–-[112]. It would also be a dra-
mat , supra note 7, at 1041. 
 Eng.). 
389–392 and accompanying text. 
t accompanying notes 400–406. 
.L.R. 294 (Q.B.) at 306. The shareholder in the case, however, was not a 
com
567 See Stone & Rolls Ltd., 1 A.C. 1391 (H.L.) at [10
ic extension of the U.S. doctrine. See Thompson
568 Rainham Chem. Works, Ltd. v. Belvedere Fish Guano Co., [1921] 2 A.C. 465 (H.L.) 
at 470–79 (appeal taken from
569 See supra notes 
570 See supra tex
571 [1998] 1 W
pany, but an individual. 
572 Id. at 297–98. 
573 Id. at 298. 
574 Id. at 302. 
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was done in Yukong to evade liability. One may question why lateral 
proposed for involuntary piercing is clearly ill-suited for voluntary 
piercing. Issues of control, impropriety, and causation linked with 
pla h whether voluntary piercing should be 
per
piercing should be confined to asset stripping situations and not be ex-
tended to all integrated subsidiaries. Although economic analysis sug-
gests that lateral piercing should be available against integrated sub-
sidiaries, determining the degree of economic integration of affiliated 
corporations is fraught with difficulty. It requires substantial business 
expertise on the part of the courts.575 Moreover, given English courts’ 
formalistic approach to judicial decision-making and aversion to non-
doctrinal considerations,576 it is highly unlikely that they would embark 
on such an inquiry. Therefore, lateral piercing is appropriately con-
fined to asset stripping situations. 
2. Voluntary Piercing 
 One further issue is whether the single economic unit theory should 
be available for voluntary piercing at all. Given the arguments against 
voluntary piercing generally, the theory should arguably not be available 
in voluntary piercing cases. Beckett, however, signaled the English courts’ 
continual willingness to entertain voluntary piercing claims.577 If the the-
ory is to be made available to voluntary piercing, it should only be under 
exceptional circumstances. Few extenuating circumstances should be 
recognized to ensure that voluntary piercing under the single economic 
unit theory is kept to a minimum. After a finding of an extenuating cir-
cumstance, it is then up to the courts to weigh the equity and policy con-
siderations of the situation to decide whether voluntary piercing should 
be allowed. 
 Such an open-ended approach seems best suited for voluntary 
piercing for a number of reasons. First, the burden-shifting framework 
intiff loss have little to do wit
m  piercing cases implicate 
the same underlying issue of limited liability, voluntary piercing cases 
feature such a wide variety of facts that it is probably impossible to 
                                                                                                                     
itted.578 Second, while many involuntary
 
575 See Leebron, supra note 234, at 1615–17 (remarking on the difficulty a court can 
encounter when attempting to determine the degree of economic integration of affiliated 
corp
 Alexander, supra note 217, at 357–58. 
orations). 
576 See Adams, [1990] Ch. at 536–37. 
577 See Beckett, [2007] I.C.R. at 1552. 
578 See Henn &
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come up with a general framework for deciding them.579 Third, every 
voluntary piercing case will require the court to confront the question 
of whether the corporate parent should be allowed to set aside its own 
subsidiary’s separate persona ng the benefits of incorpo-
tio
ited States is particularly illuminating 
lt. Given 
e 
lity after enjoyi
ra n.580  As such, a totality of circumstances approach would likely 
provide the best solution. Although this will mean that there is little 
predictability in voluntary piercing cases, the nature of voluntary pierc-
ing is such that lack of legal certainty seems inevitable. 
Conclusion 
 By undertaking a comparative study of the corporate veil doctrine 
in the United States and United Kingdom, this Article aims to provide a 
better understanding of the English doctrine. A comparison between 
the United Kingdom and the Un
because although the corporation law of the two countries shares a 
common lineage, their approaches to the corporate veil doctrine and 
their modes of judicial reasoning show considerable divergences. It is 
hoped that some useful insights have been gleaned about judicial 
treatment of issues of policy and justice and about judicial decision mak-
ing on both sides of the Atlantic. 
 As a standard-based exception to the general rule of limited liabil-
ity, the corporate veil doctrine involves the fundamental choice facing 
every area of law and every legal system: the choice between legal cer-
tainty and the attainment of justice in particular cases. Limited liability 
promotes legal certainty and encourages investment in business activi-
ties. But as many courts have recognized, unyielding protection of it 
will lead to injustices on particular occasions. It is the responsibility of 
the corporate veil doctrine to ensure that injustices do not resu
th United States’ emphasis on economic freedom and entrepreneur-
                                                                                                                      
579 See, e.g., Macaura, [1925] A.C. at 619–21 (involving an insurance claim for assets 
owned by a corporation but insured under the name of the sole shareholder and creditor 
as an individual); Beckett, [2007] I.C.R. 1541–45 (involving voluntary piercing of veil be-
tween group members to give effect to employment contract that prohibited competition 
with parent company after employment, although the subsidiary provided the group’s 
services); D.H.N., [1976] 1 W.L.R. at 857 (involving voluntary piercing of a corporate par-
ent operating a separate company which was owned by the parent’s subsidiary, a third 
company, where a provision for compensation upon government purchase of company 
property was involved). 
580 Cf. Tate Access Floors Inc. v. Boswell, [1991] Ch. 512 at 531 (Eng.) (discussing how 
those who benefit by utilizing the corporation as a medium to conduct affairs should not 
then be able to set aside corporate personality to their benefit when the corporation is 
under scrutiny). 
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d the United 
States, from jurisprudential approaches to treatment of specific cases. 
The English formalistic approach to judicial decision making and strict 
adherence to separate corporate personality means that there is little 
need to incorporate notions of justice and policy considerations when 
deciding corporate veil claims. This de-emphasis on justice and policy 
in turn obviates the need to fashion new analytical frameworks and al-
lows the English courts to rely on common law concepts, many of which 
are ill-suited for the purpose. Part III argues that despite all the differ-
ences between the United Kingdom and United States highlighted in 
Part II, there are in fact elements in the English corporate veil cases 
that share substantial commonality with U.S. cases. Revealingly, one can 
in fact construct an instrumentality doctrine out of the English cases. 
Having demonstrated the surprising similarities between the two cor-
porate veil doctrines, this Article goes one step further by proposing a 
revival of the single economic unit theory that will put the English cor-
porate veil doctrine ahead of its U.S. counterpart. It will allow the Eng-
lish courts to craft a more uniform and systematic approach to corpo-
rate veil cases arising in the context of corporate groups. 
ship, and the United Kingdom’s relatively more liberal reputation, it is 
perhaps surprising that U.S. courts have taken a more interventionist 
approach to veil piercing. What explains this apparent mismatch, how-
ever, is beyond the scope of this Article and will probably require a 
comprehensive study of the judiciaries in these two countries. 
 This Article highlights a number of crucial differences between 
the corporate veil doctrines in the United Kingdom an
